


1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)



OPERATIONAL REPORT LESSONS LEARNED

FOR OT RD File
670473

~~Downgraded at 2-year intervals~~

~~Issued after 12 years~~

~~FCM 5200.10~~

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AD 385 642

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO *Det. No 284749*
AGAM-P (M) (23 Oct 67) FOR OT RD-670473

27 October 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USAGDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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as

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
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1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)



OPERATIONAL REPORT LESSONS LEARNED

FOR OT RD File
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
 APO San Francisco, California 96490

3

23 May 1967

ACCAVDAGG NO

PO REGISTR

cert no 254749

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

TO: Comanding General
 I FFORCEV
 APO San Francisco 96350
 ATTN: AVFA-GC-O+T

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2. General

a. General situation: For the first time since September, 1965 when the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) arrived in the Republic of Vietnam, the Division was able to concentrate its forces, three brigades (minus) reinforced by the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division to fully pacify a single province. During this reporting period, 1 February to 30 April 1967, the Division dominated the lush, densely populated Binh Dinh Province with two successive operations, Thayer II, which terminated on 11 February and operation Pershing which was continuing as of 30 April 1967. Main force enemy units were encountered primarily on the Bong Son Plain and in the An Lao Valley, an enemy sanctuary never entered before in force. Because of this aggressive pursuit in Binh Dinh Province, NVA/VC main force units withdrew on occasion into Quang Ngai Province, north of the I/II Corps boundary. As a result the Division was committed for the first time outside the II Corps Tactical Zone to conduct Operation Le Jeune from 7 - 22 April. Elsewhere the one battalion task force on operation Byrd continued to operate in the vicinity of Phan Thiet under control of I FFORCE V. Several local search and destroy operations were conducted in the TAOR, and the base defense unit improved Camp Radcliff security. Brigade missions in Binh Dinh Province during the period were mostly search and destroy with the emphasis on searching for and finding the enemy. A vigorous base development program continued simultaneously with tactical operations as stay-behind units in Camp Radcliff improved the road networks, laid concrete pads and constructed the prefabricated twenty feet by eighty feet buildings.

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b. Division organization and key personnel during the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Division Headquarters

Major General John Norton	Commanding General
Major General John J. Tolson III	1 Apr 67
Brigadier General George S. Blanchard	Ass't Div Comdr
Brigadier General William A. Becker	Ass't Div Comdr
Brigadier General Alfred J. F. Moody	12 Mar 67
Brigadier General Edward de Saussure	28 Mar 67
Colonel Herbert E. Wolff	Chief of Staff
Colonel George W. Casey	7 Apr 67
Lieutenant Colonel William W. Palmer	ACofS, G1
Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Seigrist	ACofS, G2
Lieutenant Colonel James T. Root	ACofS, G3
Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Tolar	ACofS, G4
Lieutenant Colonel Harry J. Phelps	ACofS, G5
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Tackaberry	10 Feb 67

(2) 1st Brigade

Colonel James C. Smith	CO, 1st Bde
Colonel Donald V. Rattan	15 Apr 67
Lieutenant Colonel Ardie E. McClure, Jr	CO, 1/8 Cav
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Tackaberry	CO, 2/8 Cav
Lieutenant Colonel John C. Dashiell	7 Feb 67
Lieutenant Colonel George D. Eggers	CO, 1/12 Cav
Lieutenant Colonel Loyd P. Rhiddlehoover	8 Apr 67

(3) 2d Brigade

Colonel George W. Casey	CO, 2d Bde
Lieutenant Colonel Fred E. Karhohs	1 Apr 67
Lieutenant Colonel James H. Mapp	CO, 1/5 Cav
Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Stevenson	CO, 2/5 Cav

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Lieutenant Colonel William J. Buchanan	CO, 2/12 Cav
(4) 3d Brigade	
Colonel Jonathan R. Burton	CO, 3d Bde
Lieutenant Colonel George W. Orton	CO, 1/7 Cav
Lieutenant Colonel Fred E. Karhohs	CO, 2/7 Cav
Lieutenant Colonel Leo D. Turner	25 Mar 67
Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. W. Canham, II	CO, 5/7 Cav
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew J. Gatsis	8 Feb 67
(5) Division Artillery	
Colonel William F. Brand	CO, Div Arty
Colonel George W. Putnam, Jr.	21 Feb 67
Lieutenant Colonel James F. Culp	CO, 2/19 Arty
Lieutenant Colonel Lester C. Farwell	CO, 2/20 Arty
Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Knowles	10 Apr 67
Lieutenant Colonel William C. Carlson	CO, 1/21 Arty
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur L. Kelly	CO, 1/77 Arty
Major Stuart G. McLennan	CO, E/82 Arty
(6) 11th Aviation Group	
Colonel Howard I. Lukens	CO, 11th Avn Grp
Lieutenant Colonel James F. Hamlett	CO, 227th
Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Michaelson	CO, 228th
Lieutenant Colonel Frank W. Nadeau, Jr.	15 Feb 67
Lieutenant Colonel John M. Blair	CO, 229th
(7) Support Command	
Colonel Charles L. Daniel	CO, Spt Comd
Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. Corkill, Jr.	CO, 15th S&S
Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Leighton	CO, 15th Med

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	Lieutenant Colonel Keith J. Bauer	CO, 15th TC
	Lieutenant Colonel Shreve D. Squires	CO, 27th Maint
	Captain William D. Henderson	CO, 15th Admin
(8)	Lieutenant Colonel A. T. Pumphrey Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Nevins, Jr.	CO, 1/9 Cav Sqdn 15 Apr 67
(9)	Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Olentine	CO, 8th Engr
(10)	Lieutenant Colonel James C. Struthers	CO, 13th Sig
(11)	Captain Gary W. Lawhead	CO, 545th MP Co
(12)	Captain William J. Rowe Captain Joseph K. Hultquist	CO, HHC 1st Cav Div 28 Mar 67
(13)	Special Staff	
	Lieutenant Colonel James W. Ransone	Surgeon
	Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur G. Jenkins, Jr. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel S. Rickard	IG 22 Feb 67
	Captain John L. Houle Lieutenant Colonel Duke C. Bradford, Jr.	Chem Off 10 Feb 67
	Lieutenant Colonel Emory M. Sneed	SJA
	Lieutenant Colonel Daniel B. Plyler	AG
	Lieutenant Colonel Lewell V. Autrey	Fin Off
	Lieutenant Colonel James Oliver	Provost Marshal
	Lieutenant Colonel Wesley G. Jones	CIAH
(14)	Attached Units	
	Lieutenant Colonel (P) Fred C. Parker III	CO, 2/17 Arty
	Major James E. Moore	CO, 478th Avn
	Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Smith	CO, 191st MI Det
	Captain Michael M. Schneider	CO, 371 Radio Research Co
	Captain Thomas Cleary	11 Mar 67

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Major Joe H. Machetto	CO, 24th Det 5th Wea Sqdn
Captain Gordon Spillinger	17 Feb 67

(15) Supporting Units

Colonel Robert C. Arbuckle	Sub-area Commander
Major James B. Barron	34th QM Bn
Lieutenant Colonel John R. Redman	CO, 70th Engr
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Ballard	CO, 2d Surg.
Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Carter	CO, 56th Med Det
Captain Robert L. Jackson	CO, 11th Avn Grp, Path Co.
1st Lieutenant Gary E. Harvey	CO, 184th Cml Plt
1st Lieutenant Richard E. Carzoli	CO, Det 1, 54th Sig Bn
1st Lieutenant Thomas J. Hawes	28 Mar 67
Major Billie C. Flourot	CO, 382d TC Det

(16) List of military units stationed at Camp Radcliff, see inclosure 1-1.

(17) VIP visits listed at inclosure 2-1.

3. Personnel:

a. Strength: Authorized and assigned strength at the beginning and close of reporting period were as follows:

(1) Beginning of Reporting Period	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized	1217	677	15024	16918
Assigned	1484	481	16619	18584
(2) Close of Reporting Period	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized	1221	677	15027	15955
Assigned	1318	518	16777	18613

b. Replacements: A total of 3700 enlisted replacements were received during the same period division losses were 29%. Some 257 emergency leaves were processed during the period.

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c. Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) Morale throughout the division and attached elements remained excellent.

(2) Decorations Awarded:

Distinguished Service Cross	9
Silver Star	103
Legion of Merit	5
Distinguished Flying Cross	99
Soldier's Medal	2
Bronze Star w/V	303
Bronze Star	424
Air Medal w/V	150
Air Medal	4952
Army Commendation Medal w/V	174
Army Commendation Medal	526
Purple Heart	512
TOTAL AWARDED	7239

(3) Combat Badges Awarded:

Combat Infantryman Badge	916
Combat Medic Badge	69
Aircraft Crewman Badge	345

d. Promotions: A total of 6060 enlisted personnel were promoted during this reporting period.

e. Reenlistments: A total of 241 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The reenlistment/extension breakdown was: 76 first term RA reenlistments, 95 career reenlistments, 26 AUS enlistments, 42 RA extensions and 2 AUS extensions.

f. Postal activities for the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Money Order sales	\$2,070,846.36
(2) Postal and Parcel Post fees	67,248.85
(3) Incoming mail	1,003,026 lbs
Daily average:	11,225 lbs
(4) Outgoing mail	337,011 lbs
Daily average:	3,767 lbs
(5) Number of incoming mail days	86
(6) Number of outgoing mail days	89

g. Special Services: During the reporting period a total of 85 movies and TV shows were circulated throughout the division. A total of 4178 out of country and 933 in country R&R quotas were used during the period.

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h. Financial Services:

(1) In March 1967 all financial data records folders (FDRF) for enlisted personnel were refiled from an alphabetic for the entire division system to an alphabetic by unit payroll system. The records had been maintained on a division alphabetic basis since March 1966.

(2) The reorganization enabled the finance office to provide better service to the troops. Under the new system each clerk is responsible for specific units and can effect direct liaison with the FSNCO, 1SG, and Unit Clerk on pay matters. Further, each clerk is responsible for his unit's payroll rather than having a centralized payroll section as the division alphabetic system required.

(3) Results of this reorganization are evidenced by improved payrolls, fewer pay complaints being received. Further, all the records for a unit can be taken directly to the unit when they return to base camp. At this time the personnel can sit down with the clerk and review their record without having to make a trip to the finance office. The unit payroll system provides more responsive, personalized pay service.

(4) During February 1967 mass distribution of Cav Form 42, Pay Complaint was made. This form was designed as a means of communication between the trooper and this office on pay matters. It provides written evidence of the problem and the finance office reply. It enables the service member the opportunity to obtain an answer to his questions without having to visit the finance office. If the form is used properly the member will only have to visit the finance office on major problems or to complete a Class Q Allotment.

(5) Use of this form has reduced the loss of time from duty to visit the finance office, has resulted in written explanations of pay problems or corrections, as applicable, and improved the communications between the soldier and the finance office.

(6) In March 1967 a liaison visit was made to hospitals and finance offices involved in the payment of former members of the division who were hospitalized in Japan or Okinawa. The pay accounts for these personnel are maintained on CAMPS until the member is transferred from these hospitals to CCNUS or units other than the 1st Air Cavalry Division. Net pay checks continue to be sent to dependents or banks while they are assigned to these hospitals. Members receive casual payments to meet their needs while at the hospitals based on information on status of the pay accounts furnished by CAMPS Operations, Finance Center. A memorandum of understanding was effected between the hospitals and finance offices to outline and implement the DA procedures.

(7) Full implementation of these procedures results in hospitalized former members of the 1st Air Cavalry Division receiving better pay service under CAMPS than it is possible for other Army personnel to obtain.

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i. Chaplain Activities:

(1) Chapel Attendance: A steady increase in chapel attendance during the reporting period. This increase is attributed to the following:

(a) Chaplains and commanders are made aware of Chapel Statistics weekly via command letter.

(b) The Division Chaplain has encouraged the chaplains to conduct more services.

(c) Operation, "Prayer Mobile": This utilizes the Psy War aircraft to broadcast Scriptures, Prayer, or just a reminder that the day is Sunday.

(2) Tape Recorders: All chaplains are utilizing AIWA Tape Recorders, purchased out of Chaplain Funds (\$42.50 ea) and after 5 months of use no breakdowns as yet.

(3) Religious Radio Programs instituted this quarter:

(a) The Baptist Hour

(b) Monitor

(c) Revival Time

These programs are aired Friday, Saturday and Sunday on An Khe radio. Agencies have permitted 1st Cavalry Division Chaplains to edit all tapes.

(4) Chaplain Hospital visits to Japan: These are highly successful. Problems concerning morale are easily solved by this contact with a 1st Cavalry Chaplain. Chaplains have regular R&R to Japan plus 5 days TDY to visit hospitals.

(5) LZ Easter Sunrise Services: A total of 6 Sunrise Services were conducted.

j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order:

(1) Military Justice:

(a) General Courts Martial 9

(b) Special Courts Martial 64

(c) Summary Courts Martial 22

(d) Article 15's 930

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(2) Discipline: A total of 336 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's office during the reporting period.

k. Inspector General Activities: No significant trends in complaints and/or requests were revealed.

1. Medical

(1) Disease and injury statistical data:

(a) Injured as a result of hostile action (IRHA)	985
(b) Non-battle injuries	544
(c) Disease	2505
<u>1</u> Malaria Total	297
Vivax	107
Falciparum	190
<u>2</u> Scrub Typhus	2
<u>3</u> Hook worm	40
<u>4</u> Psychiatric cases	62
(d) Killed in Action	257
(e) Remaining in Hospital (In Country)	394

(2) Discussion of diseases

(a) Malaria cases: A total of 297 cases of malaria occurred in personnel of this division from 1 February to 30 April 1967 inclusive. Of these 107 cases were to plasmodian vivax and were caused in most U.S. Forces by failure to take weekly chloroquine-primaquine pill.

The malaria incidence is as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC 1st Bde	0	2	0	2
1/8	11	12	25	48
2/8	14	7	25	46
1/12	7	9	8	24

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC 2nd Bde	1	0	0	1
1/5	8	4	8	20
2/5	4	7	4	15
2/12	13	12	5	30
HHC 3rd Bde	0	1	1	2
1/7	6	3	15	24
2/7	4	7	7	18
5/7	2	14	14	30
Div Arty	9	3	7	19
1/9	3	0	0	3
Avn Gp	0	1	1	2
Spt Cmd	1	1	1	3
Sig Bn	0	0	0	0
Engr Bn	0	1	1	2
HHC Div	0	0	1	1
15th Admin	0	0	1	1
Others	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTAL	84	85	128	297

1 Experience gained from the previous quarters indicate that the malaria season in the Central Highlands ranges from March through November with a peak expected during the period of April through July.

2 The total malaria incidence is 297 cases as opposed to 347 cases for the previous quarter.

a Other selected diseases of importance are as follows:

Scrub Typhus	2
Immersion Foot	2
Heat Exhaustion	12
Poisoning	3
Animal Bites	53
Hepatitis	9
Dengue Fever	0
Infectious Meningitis	1

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3 Discussion of IRHA, WIA and NBI

a KIA/IRHA ration 228/779 or 13/5.47 was considerably different from the ration of 1/4.07 in Korea.

b Types of IRHA's: During the reporting period 78 punji stake wounds occurred compared to 97 for last reporting period.

c NBI: The total number of Non-Battle injuries this quarter is 544.

m. Office of Information and History

(1) (U) Information activities will be discussed in paragraph 2 followed by historical activities in paragraph 3.

(2) (U) The Information Office continued to increase its services to the world's press and division troops during the reported period. The following is an analytical breakdown by functions:

(a) The Information Section operated forward press centers during the following operations:

Thayer II: 25 Oct 66 - 11 Feb 67
Pershing: 11 Feb 67 -
Le Jeune: 7 April 67 - 22 April 67

(b) The Information Section continued to place emphasis on hometowners both in radio and newspaper.

	HOMETOWNERS	TAPED HOMETOWNERS
FEB	1624	90
MAR	820	100
APR	<u>1092</u>	<u>117</u>
	3536	307

(c) In addition the Information Section exchanged 26 taped messages with the citizens of Columbia, South Carolina for the Rally Support for Vietnam Personnel. Messages received are broadcast over the local radio station.

(d) A weekly hospital newsletter to 4 hospitals providing unit level news such as promotions and awards is prepared and distributed to hospitalized Cavalrymen.

(e) Troop Topics emphasizing 1st Cavalry accomplishments were published each week and command information brochures were distributed on the following listed subjects:

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- 1 Unit Decorations
- 2 Postal Privileges
- 3 Highlights of 1966
- 4 The Battle of Binh Dinh
- 5 MPC, Piaster spending
- 6 Pay procedures for personnel wounded or evacuated
- 7 State Income Tax

(f) There were 145 newsmen who visited the Division during the quarter 64, 53, 28 respectively. They represented the following agencies:

UPI
Pana News
AP
WEED Radio - Chicago, Ill
NKU-TV - Japan
Southeast Photo's
ABC News
Nouvel Du Dimanche
Columbus, Inquirer, Ga
Asahi
Minneapolis Tribune
Overseas Weekly
Ladds Publishing Co
NBC
Newsweek
WIRY, Radio News Plattsburg NY
Australia
Combat Artist
Paris Match-Paris
Nouvel Observer
CBS
Life Magazine
Army Times
Weekend Telegraph
Harpers Magazine
Fortune Magazine
Reuthers
DASPO
MACOI
London Evening Standard
Abilene Reporter

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Collegiate Press Service
Realities Magazine
600 Photo
Pickerell Associates
Pix Inc

(g) The radio section produced the following news stories, interviews and additional support, during this quarter:

1 Number of news stories (i.e. news copy) aired over AFRS-AN Khe totaled 2,259. Section SOP calls for two newscasts each day at 1230 and 1905. The evening addition (1905) is again replayed at 2305.

2 Number of taped interviews aired over AFRS-AN Khe during the quarter totaled 323. The interviews are usually featured during our local newscasts.

3 Number of regular taped radio hometown interviews sent to Kansas City totaled 129.

4 Number of taped radio hometown messages for Mother's Day totaled 166.

5 Continued to produce two taped news programs each week for hospitalized Cavalrymen in Qui Nhon.

6 Continued to provide AFTV-Qui Nhon with war reports, news stories, taped interviews, Camp Radcliff recreational activities and slides.

7 Continued to produce two newsletters (0600 and 1800) each day totaling 178 newsletters during the quarter. (Newsletters are produced for base camp and forward division command post).

8 Continued to furnish Columbia R.S.V.P. officials with tapes concerning news of the 1st Cav Division, its background and the effect the R.S.V.P. program is having on skytrooper morale and the 1st Team's Civic Action projects. (25 tapes)

9 Completed 49-page, 1 hour and 45 minute taped history of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam with sound effects and 150 slides for such purposes as briefings, information for the 1st Cavalry Division Assn., and other interested parties. To date 21 copies of the tape have been produced. AC of S: G-3 provided text and slides.

10 Completed "Battle of Binh Dinh", a 23-minute program dealing with the accomplishments of the 1st Cav in Binh Dinh Province. Eight copies of this tape have been produced.

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11 Continued to provide AFRS-An Khe with three radio announcers each day giving the Division 12 hours of local broadcast time. Saigon AFRS provided the other 12 hours to complete the 24 hour broadcast day. During the local time periods the announcers provided musical entertainment, local weather, information and news programs while placing emphasis on division policies, etc.

12 Continued to provide one radio announcer for live D.J. show from American Red Cross Recreation Center each Friday night. We also taped two Red Cross girls on one-hour shows each week for delayed broadcast purposes.

13 Produced one 30-minute Country-Western program featuring the Lisa Jane Country-Western show which was sponsored by the Division's Reenlistment Office.

(h) OIAH continues to have operational control of 13th Signal Battalion Photo Section and were responsible for taking, developing an estimated 3750 photos. Several having gained international attention for substance and quality.

(i) The following world wide TV and news features were developed concerning the 1st Cav during the last quarter:

1 Pierre Shoemoerffer's documentary on Lt. Anderson's platoon from 1/12th released and praised internationally.

2 ABC's Don North TV news film of 1st Cavalry Division contact with 22nd NVA Div on Bong Song Plain given 4 1/2 minutes on ABC-TV, longest total time for any newscast on RVN.

3 NBC filmed 1/9th and Phu My pacification program, 30 minutes.

4 Japanese TV spent four weeks filming color documentary on the 1st Cav.

5 NBC, ABC, filmed start of Pershing.

6 Two columns on Battle of Binh Dinh by Joe Alsop.

(j) OIAH accepted responsibility for Secretary-Treasurer and Custodian of 1st Cavalry Division Association.

(k) Received the 41st and 42d PI Detachments, composed of 2 officers, and 3 enlisted men each. Trained and sent to 1st Brigade and 11th Aviation Group.

(l) Permanent 20 x 80 building to house enlisted personnel completed. A 20 x 40 building was completed for club room facilities. In addition partitioning of office building started and sound proofing of radio studio completed. Outside two culvert bridges for entrance ways in addition to 150' of side walks completed.

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(m) MTOE approved by USARV and forwarded to CINPAC.

(n) The Military Press section in addition to supporting with stories and editing was responsible for the release of 106, 83, 83 stories and features during this reporting period respectively. Many gaining recognition in many national papers, i.e. New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Army Times.

(o) Provided daily report to USARV to publicize role of Army Aviation in Vietnam.

(p) During this period two combat photographers were awarded the Purple Heart.

(q) Contact work was started to begin the publishing of the Cavalair in Tokyo at Stars & Stripes.

(r) Provided a 1st Cav Representative to Stars & Stripes Saigon Staff.

(3) (C) The Office of the Staff Historian continued with considerable historical documentation of the Division's activities. Each field historical team completed a historical research document, one of the Attack on LZ Bird (Incl 3-1) the other on the Battle of Phu Huu (2) (Incl 4-1). Other projects included two tape transcriptions by LTC Tackaberry, CO 2/8th Cav, on Lessons Learned and Combat Operations, an historical report on Operation Irving, and, in conjunction with the 14th Military History Detachment, the completion of the seven-month historical and briefing data for April - October 1966. Research projects continued on the following combat actions:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>OPERATION</u>
C/1/5 Cav	21 Nov 66	Cambodian Border	Paul Revere IV
2nd Bde	27-31 Jan 67	Bong Son Plain	Thayer II
1/12	2-3 Oct 66	Hoa Hoi	Irving
3rd Bde, 25th Inf	6 Mar 67	Northern Crescent	Pershing
2/5th Cav	11-12 Mar 67	Southern Crescent	Pershing
2nd Bde	7-22 Apr 67	Quang Ngai Province	Le Jeune

4. (C) Intelligence

a. (U) G2 organization no change.

b. (C) Operations.

(1) Thayer II

(a) Terminated at 111315 Feb 1967.

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(b) The only major activity on operation Thayer II during the reporting period was an 82mm mortar attack on LZ English (vic BS 877013) during the night of 6-7 Feb with light damage resulting.

(2) Pershing

(a) Operation Pershing commenced at 111100 Feb. Reliable intelligence indicated that elements of the 22d Regt were massing on the Bong Son Plain (vic BS 890035) under the cover of the TET truce period for an attack on LZ English (vic BS 877013). In an attempt to spoil this attack the 1st ACD conducted a reconnaissance in force into the Bong Son Plain where contact was made with the 22d NVA Regt. The enemy was forced to withdraw from the plain to the mountains to the west and north.

(b) In addition to the contact mentioned above which initiated Operation Pershing, there have been 4 other significant contacts during the reporting period.

1 The next major contact was on the 18th of Feb in the western Bong Son Plain. Elements of the 1st Brigade engaged an enemy battalion (vic BS 870121) which resulted in 62 enemy killed.

2 The next major contacts were on the north (vic BR 966883) and south (vic ER 975790) of the Dam Tra-O Lake. On 6 March elements of the 2d Brigade engaged elements of the 18th NVA Regt just north of the lake. After the fight the enemy left 84 bodies on the battlefield. Five days later on 11 March, elements of the 2d Bde engaged elements of the 18th NVA Regt just to the south of the lake which resulted in 42 enemy killed by body count.

3 The next major contact occurred on the 19th of March in the northern portion of the Bong Son Plain. One rifle company from the 1st Brigade came under heavy fire as it approached a hamlet (vic BS 8716). In the three day battle which ensued a total of 13 infantry companies were committed against two battalions and the HQ of the 22d NVA Regt., 121 enemy were killed in this battle.

4 On 4 April elements of the 3d Brigade were engaged (vic BS 745110) by an unknown size enemy force in the An Lao Valley. A total of 5 US companies and a tank platoon were committed in the three day fight. A total of 78 enemy were killed.

(c) During Operation Pershing the 3d NVA Division Headquarters and the 22d NVA Regt were forced from their positions in the An Lao Valley and the Bong Son Plain north across the Binh Dinh - Quang Ngai Border out of the division's AO. Every attempt by the enemy to reenter Binh Dinh Province in force has met with attack by elements of the division driving the enemy back into his base areas north of the provincial border.

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(3) Operation Le Jeune

(a) On 7 April the 2d Brigade with 2 battalions were deployed to Duc Pho (vic BS 8138) to initiate Operation Le Jeune. The purpose of the operation was to relieve the 3d Bn, 7th Marines for return to their parent unit. The operation concluded on 22 April with the 3d Brigade, 25th Div relieving the 2d Brigade.

(b) Though no single significant contact resulted, the constant pressure placed on enemy forces in the Duc Pho area resulted in 176 enemy killed in the 16 day operation.

(4) Operation Dazzlem

(a) Though there was little major activity in the FAOR during the reporting period long range reconnaissance patrols and agent reports confirmed wide spread, low level enemy activity. The majority of this activity was reported to the NE, N and NW of An Khe.

(b) The major event was the mortaring of Camp Radcliff and the attack on LZ Charles (vic BR 427298) on the night of 8-9 April. During the attack on LZ Charles, the enemy was driven off leaving 9 enemy bodies on the field of battle. During the attack 80, 82mm mortar rounds were fired at the Golf Course area of Camp Radcliff and resulted in light damage to aircraft parked in the impact area.

c. (C) Enemy casualties and losses.

	<u>KIA</u> NVA/VC	<u>Captured</u> NVA/VC	<u>Weapons</u> IND/CS
Feb	90/394	33/280	220/32
Mar	160/452	13/645	146/5
Apr	15/491	3/417	62/1

d. (C) Order of Battle

(1) The Order of Battle Section has continued operations both at the division CP in LZ's Hammond and Two Bits and at the Camp Radcliff. Present organization and personnel strength has been adequate to fulfill the requirements of 1st Air Cav Division operations in both areas.

(2) There were no changes made in the organization of the Order of Battle Section, but Document Exploitation, previously supervised by the OIC, OB Section was changed to the supervision of the OIC,

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IPW Section. Two ARVN Aspirant Officers were lost to the Section in this change of supervision. The change had no derogatory effects on the operations of the section. There was a physical improvement in the section as congestion was substantially relieved in the working area.

(3) The Section has increased the amount of basic data files being kept in the field location. Previously, the majority of bulk files had remained at Camp Radcliff, but stabilized operations in the same general area made it advisable to bring them forward, reducing the time required for completion of intelligence studies beyond normal tactical requirements. The section now, however, would not be able to move itself by organizational vehicles at one time due to the increased load.

e. (c) G2 air surveillance statistics for the quarter.

(1) Missions

<u>MISSION TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER FLOWN</u>
IR	250
SLAR	87
PHOTO	203
VISUALS	160
REPRINTS	<u>39</u>
TOTAL	739

(2) General Comments

(a) IR. Adverse weather conditions resulted in only 44% of scheduled missions being flown. Very few missions were aborted because of aircraft or sensor unavailability. Areas covered included the Quang Ngai - Binh Dinh boundary, An Lao Valley west, Cay Giép and Nui Mieu Mountains, areas north and west of the Kim Son River, the Oregon Trail and the Crow's Foot area.

(b) Efforts continued to obtain follow-up information on reported hot spots. Generally hot spots are engaged with artillery and followed up by a visual reconnaissance conducted by the 1/9th Cavalry.

(c) SLAR. Surveillance of the coast continued with pilots making in-flight reports to Navy "swift" boats conducting Market Time operations. In one case the "swift" boat reported it had 8 detainees and one sampan captured and three more sampans had evaded toward shore.

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(d) PHOTO. Good mid-day weather allowed all scheduled photo missions to be flown. Missions were flown in support of future operations, current operations, trail studies, S&D operations, LZ studies and post arc-light studies

(e) VISUAL. Daily visual reconnaissance missions were flown throughout the Pershing AO and the TAOR. On several occasions observation of personnel attempting to evade the aircraft was reported. No significant results were obtained from these reports.

(3) Miscellaneous Comments.

(a) The ASTA Platoon and the II Section will leave An Khe and join the Div Fwd CP early in May. This move should result in better service because of the quicker reaction possible with all elements in close proximity and the elimination of communication and distance problems.

(b) The ground data link (TAZ-1) is currently in operation near the G2 Air tent.

f. (C) 191st Military Intelligence Detachment.

(1) The IPW Section interrogated 5,000 detainees and 1400 NVA/VCC. 1380 linear inches of captured enemy documents were translated. Items not translated at this headquarters were forwarded to IFFORCE V for further exploitation/translation. Considerable intelligence was obtained from all sources to include unit identifications, designations, locations, strengths and enemy activities. Also, the populace is showing more inclination to pass on to US units warning information as to VC mining incidents, as well as that concerning VC activities or movements. Liaison with GVN/ARVN/US intelligence agencies has produced considerable collateral intelligence for the division.

(2) Interrogation techniques for both CI and IPW. Before a new interrogator/spécial agent goes to the field, he is briefed on the details of successful interrogation techniques which have been tried and found useful.

(a) Know enemy military and governmental structures well enough to be able to exploit every source to the fullest, whether NVA or SVN, military or civilian.

(b) The IPW/SA controls the interrogation at all times, not the interpreter. However, the interpreter is valuable to the interrogator in that he can provide information as to dialect, attitude, etc of the PW.

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(c) Detainees of whatever category should not be allowed to relax during interrogation, nor to converse among themselves, and should be treated firmly in order to enhance the interrogation atmosphere.

(d) When interrogation is in progress, require the detainee to look into the interrogator's eyes as this tends to reduce the inclination of the detainee to give evasive answers or to lie to the interrogator.

(e) The interpreter must use the same pronouns used by the interrogator in translating from the interrogator to the detainee, and from the detainee to the interrogator. That is, never allow the interpreter to say, "He says, etc..."

(f) Because of the large numbers of persons to be processed at the forward screening points, military age males apprehended under suspicious circumstances are more important than an 83 year old woman or a young mother with a new-born child. Examples of special categories to receive special attention are:

- BY AGE: 8-15 years Children's Group Members
- 16-21 years Youth Group Members
- 17-35 years Military age personnel to include hamlet and village guerrillas or main force and NVA cadres.
- 27-37 years Organization leaders, hamlet defenders, and cadre and labor members.

FEMALES: In the younger years, females usually fall into the same above groups to include hamlet guerrillas. Some, also, may belong to Women's Associations or Women's Liberation Groups.

(g) The trick question, direct approach and the "know it all" approach are excellent methods for obtaining information from detainees. An excellent approach is, "How long were you forced to work for the VC?" Or, "We know the hamlet is controlled by the VC, and those who do not work for the VC are jailed. So what were you forced to do?" The exploitation of any admission made in response to these and similar questions depends on the versatility of the interrogator. The direct approach is most successful with adult males.

(h) The type of information obtainable varies with each category of detainee: cadre, group members, children's group leaders, school teachers, political cadres, propaganda leaders, agricultural (Farmers') associations, Women's Group Leaders, or VC guerrillas, Main Force VC, and NVA units.

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(i) It has been noted that men do not believe all is black or white; i.e., Americans are not guilty of all the wrong-doings attributed to them by the VC. Consequently, they generally provide some information. The NVA is easier to approach than the SVN VC in-as-much as he is far from home and family and is not identified with the country where he is fighting. The SVN VC on the otherhand is at home and is fighting for a cause. Women are the most difficult to interrogate; however, they are susceptible to kindness, although this is time-consuming on the part of the interrogator.

(3) CI Teams continued to support brigade forward screening points. These points reduce the number of persons to be evacuated to rear areas for further screening.

(4) The facilities of a GVN Central Collection/Screening Point to be manned by National Police have resulted in a more efficient determination of the various categories of personnel apprehended in and evacuated from the battle zones. These categories are innocent civilians, refugees, VC infrastructure (Civilian Defendants), returnees and prisoners of war. Civilian defendants are kept in a facility administered by the District. These facilities relieve the 1st Air Cavalry of this onerous task which detracts from its primary mission of seeking and destroying enemy military forces.

(5) Security throughout the Division is improving. The aggressive program of enforcing security regulations has begun to show improvement. Personnel are becoming more and more aware of their individual responsibilities.

(6) The assignment of Vietnamese linguists to the detachment has not been sufficient to provide that very necessary element to enhance intelligence activities in the Division. Shortages continue, also, in ARVN Interpreter assignments to the Division.

(7) One shortcoming noted during the past operation, Pershing, is that the CI is not given enough advance information about future plans. Hence, a time-lag occurs before information about an area can be obtained, compiled and disseminated.

G. (C) Det 31, 5th Weather Squadron

(1) Dominant weather factors for the period 1 Feb 1967 to 30 Apr 1967. The dominant weather factor affecting the Div AO and An Khe during the period was the gradual weakening of the NE monsoon for the first two months and the beginning transition to the SW monsoon during April. Rainfall for all areas was light, showery and infrequent during Feb and Mar with dense early morning ground fog most prevalent in the

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sheltered interior valleys being the greatest problem. During April, showers and occasional thunderstorms were common, especially on the ridges west of the coastal plain. Early morning ground fog, although occurring less frequently in April, was still a problem.

(2) Lessons Learned - Weather.

(a) Ground fog will often interfere with operations in the early morning, especially in the sheltered interior valleys. Higher ridges tend to remain clear but hazy with some obscuration of the ridge tops occurring as the fog lifts and burns off.

(b) A clear night with light or calm winds is almost a sure sign of ground fog development the following morning. Light SW winds in the early morning encourages fog obscuration of LZ Two Bits and LZ English. Light SE winds in the early morning encourages fog obscuration of LZ Uplift.

(c) In April, ridges are often obscured during the afternoon and evening due to towering cumulus (with their showers) and occasional thunderstorms. A thunderstorm or two will occur over these ridges and in the Pleiku area almost every day during April. Operations are occasionally hampered by these thunderstorms and adjacent showers but the ceilings usually remain above 2000 ft. Visibility is 3 miles or better in all but the heavier showers, and turbulence is a minor hazard except in thunderstorms and their accompanying gusty winds.

(3) Lessons Learned - Weather Support Concept.

(a) The OL was required to support Div Fwd, 3rd Bde HQ's, and English Airfield as well as An Khe Airfield and the Golf Course. Several changes in the concept were required:

1 One observer was pulled from each Bde Weather Support Unit to provide personnel for a 24 hour a day observing capability at Div Fwd. This left one Army driver and one trained weather observer in support of each Bde HQ's. Only two Bde HQ's were supported in this fashion. Sufficient personnel, radios and tents are not available under present manning and TO&E Documents to support 3 Bde HQ's, a fwd airfield, Div Fwd, An Khe and the Golf Course. It would seem desirable to combine weather facilities at An Khe, thus providing more personnel and equipment to support the forward areas.

2 A radio relay was set up for the weather commo net, first on LZ Uplift, then on Hong Kong Mtn. This insured adequate radio commo between An Khe Weather and all forward operation weather teams.

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5. (C) Operations and Training

a. Organization. The MTOE submitted in December 1966 was converted in February to the New Army Authorization Document System (NAADS).

b. Operations. Commitment of battalions during the reporting period is shown below.

	<u>Battalion Days</u>	<u>Days on Operations</u>	<u>Percent of Available Time on Operations</u>
Infantry	801	696	87%
Artillery	534	434	81%
Cavalry Squadron	89	89	100%

Defense of the base camp was conducted by one infantry battalion, plus one infantry company OPCON, an artillery battalion, and up to 350 reinforcing personnel from support and tenant units. The defense mission includes perimeter defense of Camp Radcliff and limited offensive operations within the division tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) under the continuing code designation of Operation DAZZLEM. Operations under DAZZLEM included patrolling and ambushing, real and mock air assaults within the TAOR, the artillery H&I program, support of local CIDG operations, and extensive civic action projects. There was one attack against the base camp (para c below).

c. Discussion and analysis of major operations. During the reporting period the division conducted operations in ARVN II CTZ in eastern Binh Dinh Province (THAYER II, PERSHING) and Binh Thuan Province (BYRD). For a brief period, the division AO was extended north into ARVN I CTZ, where Operation LEJEUNE took place near the coast of Quang Ngai Province. In addition, the division conducted battalion operations in the TAOR; provided escort forces for convoys (Roadrunner Operations); flew aerial rocket artillery (ARA) and armed Chinook ACH-47A (Guns a Go-Go) on smoke, CS, and interdiction missions provided reserve/reaction forces for CG I FFORCEV. Figures used in the following discussions of operations have been taken from division daily sitreps. Discrepancies between these figures and data presented in after action reports should be resolved in favor of the after action reports, which contain G-1 and G-2 figures developed after the operation was terminated.

(1) Operation BYRD (25 August 1966, continuing in Binh Thuan Province). TF 2/7 Cavalry continued operations in support of GVN Revolutionary Development activities. The TF, with attached artillery, engineers, signal and helicopters, has had unusual success in their operations with ARVN and PF forces in their AO. As of 30 April 1967, the following results had been reported:

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	<u>Enemy</u>		<u>1st Cavalry</u>
KIA VC/NVA	509/17	KIA	14
POW VCC/NVAC	72/7	WIA	150
Civil Defendants	70	MIA	0
Returns	8		
Foodstuffs			
Rice (tons)	293.3		
Salt (tons)	3.8		
Grain (tons)	7.4		
Indiv Wpns	176		

(2) Operation Thayer II (1-11 February 1967, continued from 25 October 1966, Binh Dinh Province).

(a) The division with attached and supporting units continued their search in assigned AOs to locate and destroy the 18th NVA Regiment. Operations through 4 February resulted in sporadic contact and 2d Brigade supported 22d ARVN Division forces in their successful search for a VC hospital near BR 790110.

(b) Operations during the remainder of THAYER II were complicated by the Vietnamese TET Holiday period, and associated cease fire, which lasted from 080700H (local time) through 120700H February.

1 Two weapons caches were discovered on 5 and 6 February by 1st Brigade, while 2d Brigade conducted MINITMAID, a 7-company raid into the An Lao Valley near BS 7405, from 5-8 February. This successful operation cost the enemy the following:

VC KIA	8 BC
VCC	13
Rice	42 Tons
Gray Uniforms	3200
Weapons	
SA	15
CS	3
Sewing Machines, HD	7

2 An unidentified enemy force attacked the division installation at position ENGLISH from 070740 Feb to 070310 Feb, using mortars and small arms. Personnel and equipment casualties were light, and there was no assessment of casualties inflicted on the enemy.

3 As the TET period began, numerous truce violations were reported throughout the AO. Contact near CR 042727 on 8 February led to major relocation of forces by 2d Brigade, as two battalions were air assaulted into and around the mountains

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on 9 Feb for a defensive reconnaissance in force. Contact was established, and the brigade continued the operation through 10 Feb, attempting to deter the enemy in his efforts to resupply and reposition his forces during the TET truce.

4 Concurrently there were numerous reports of a large enemy build-up on the Bong Son Plain, north of the THAYER II AO. As a result of the reports, 2d Brigade conducted extensive reconnaissance in the Bong Son (BR 8594)-De Duc (BR 8798) area. Heavy AW fire was reported as soon as aircraft entered the area, and elements of two brigades were air assaulted into the Bong Son Plain to begin Operation PERSHING. Thus, the third phase of the Binh Dinh Pacification Campaign closed and the fourth began, as Operation THAYER II terminated 111315 Feb 67. This operation, at 111 days, was the longest yet conducted by the division. The final enemy body count of 1757 is the highest tally for a division operation since arrival in RVN.

(3) Operation PERSHING (11 February 1967, continuing in Binh Dinh Province).

(a) Attached and supporting units began PERSHING on conclusion of THAYER II, as the division AO was expanded north to the I/II CTZ border. Division retained responsibility for the old THAYER I/IRVING AO. The initial operations on the Bong Son Plain were characterized by search of villages and hamlets on the southern portion of the plain, operations in the mountains to the north and west of the plain, and introduction of the 3d Brigade of the division to the AO, bringing to four the number of brigades committed. During the first week of the operation, the enemy was flushed in large numbers from tunnels, wells, and hidden bunkers in and around villages.

(b) Heavy fighting took place on 18 and 19 February, as an enemy battalion was defeated near BS 857133 and left 68 VC KIA in the area. Extensive search operations failed to locate the fleeing enemy unit once contact was lost. During this period, final sweeps of the KIM SON Valley removed remaining civilians and permitted the Vietnamese Air Force to begin crop destruction operations to deprive the VC of the rice in the Valley.

(c) Heavy contact was reported 27-28 February, again on the Bong Son Plain, and operations throughout the area were hampered by the large number of booby traps emplaced by the enemy. Contact on 6 March in the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div AO (near BR 973879) resulted in 55 NVA KIA, and led to extensive search of the CRESCENT area near BR 8878 and in the Cay Giep Mountains by 2d Brigade of the division. This, in turn led to contact on 11 March near the Dam Tra-O Lake by 2d Brigade elements.

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(d) Extensive search operations continued until 19 March, when 1st Brigade made contact with an estimated enemy battalion near TAM QUAN (BS 9013). As the contact developed, 2d Brigade terminated operations in the Cay Giép Mountains and moved north to support the 1st Brigade. An attempt to encircle the enemy force, which was fighting from well-prepared bunkers in and around the village fell short, and by 22 March contact had been broken off by the enemy. This was followed by extensive use of bulldozers in the Bong Son Plain to destroy bunkered positions, and eventually led to attachment of a tank company to the division on 30 March.

(e) In the An Lao Valley, a Vietnamese Marine TF operated in conjunction with division elements from 18 March through 1 April. During the period the Vietnamese searched the valley floor, while division forces screened the mountains to the east and west of the valley. Resistance was light and sporadic.

(f) Units operated in assigned AOs until 6 April, when 2d Brigade elements moved north into Quang Ngai Province for operation LEJEUNE. (See para. 4c(4), below); Boundaries of units which remained in the PERSHING AO were adjusted and operations continued as units attempted to gain contact with major enemy forces. On 8 April, two companies of 1/7 Cav became heavily engaged with an enemy unit in the An Lao Valley, near BS 745115. The US force quickly expanded to five companies as units were air assaulted into the area, and by the time resistance ceased on 10 April, 78 enemy bodies had been found in the position. Tanks from A Co, 1/69 Armor assisted in the reduction of the enemy strongpoint.

(g) The remainder of the reporting period saw the 2d Brigade return to PERSHING on 19 April and the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division assume responsibility for LEJEUNE on the same day. The TF 3/25 Inf Div was detached from OPCON to the division on 22 April. Other operations included extensive S&D in the Bong Son Plain, in the Kim Son, Suoi Ca and An Lao Valleys, and increasing operations in support of or in conjunction with the 22d ARVN Division.

(h) The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div served with THE FIRST TEAM from 3 Jan - 22 Apr 67. During that time, the competence and professional attitude of the officers and men assigned to the TF never failed to impress those with whom they worked. The TF made significant contributions to our success in the Binh Dinh Pacification Campaign. This contribution can only be partially reflected in the results below:

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KIA VC/NVA	247/166
POW VC/NVA	313/9
Small Arms	100
Rice (tons)	34

(i) Operation PERSHING was continuing on 30 April.

(4) Operation LEJEUNE (7-22 April 1967, Quang Ngai Province). The division began operations in the I CTZ (Quang Ngai Province) with the commitment of TF 2/5 Cav into the Duc Pho area (BS 8255) in response to reports of a significant enemy build up. The TF relieved 3/7 Marines, who were subsequently redeployed. On 8 Apr the remainder of the 2d Bde TF (less 2/12 Cav OPCON to 1st Bde) deployed to the Duc Pho area. Operations by the TF included securing Vietnamese civilians harvesting rice, securing a beach landing site, providing security for engineers constructing an airstrip, and extensive S&D operations in the AO. There were numerous light contacts and one heavy contact (16 April). On 19 April control of LEJEUNE was passed from 2d Bde TF to TF 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, with the 2d Bde returning to the PERSHING AO. On 22 April TF 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div was released from OPCON to the division and the division terminated participation in operation LE JEUNE at 221200 April 1967. Results of the operation follow:

	<u>1st Cavalry Division</u>	<u>TF 3/25 Div</u>	
KIA	17	-	
WIA	65	16	
MIA		-	
<u>ENEMY</u>			
	<u>1st Cavalry Division</u>	<u>TF 3/25 Div</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA (BC)	176	29	205
VCC	127	-	127
Weapons (SA)	16	2	18
(CS)	1	1	2
Mines & HG	23	7	30

(5) Operation DAZZLEM (1 October 1966, continuing in Binh Dinh Province. DAZZLEM is the plan for defense of Camp Radcliff). On 9 April 1967 an unidentified enemy force attacked the Camp Radcliff defense complex with mortars and ground elements. The mortar attack began at 090050 and ended by 090058, during which time at least 83 82mm mortars landed on the southeast corner of the helicopter

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parking area (Golf Course). There were no personnel casualties from the mortars and only light damage was inflicted on parked aircraft. The ground attack was launched against forces defending LZ CHARLES (BR 432498), part of the defense complex, by an estimated 40 - 60 enemy at about 0100. The perimeter of the LZ was penetrated in three places before small arms fire from the defenders and intense fire from tube artillery and aerial rocket artillery (ARA) drove the enemy from the position at approximately 0140. Contact was broken at about 0155. Results of the attack follow:

<u>ENEMY</u>		<u>1st Cavalry Division</u>	
KIA BC	15	KIA	9
VCC	0	WIA	15
Individual Wpns	7	Aircraft damaged	15
Grenades	40		
Gas Masks	3		

(6) For Task Force Organization for major operations see inclosure 5-1. For organic aviation support for the reported period see inclosure 6-1 and for TAC Air supporting forces see inclosure 7-1.

d. Training

(1) Training activities continued under the provisions of Division Circular 350-50. Plans were completed for a summer training program, designed to insure adequate preparation of replacements prior to releasing them to join their units. The training program will include the following courses for incoming personnel.

(a) Senior Officer Orientation Program. A five-day course for incoming Colonels and Lt Colonels, which will include briefings by major subordinate units, an overflight of division areas of operations, and visits to adjacent US and allied units.

(b) A four-day program will be conducted for warrant officers and officers through the grade of major. Two days of this course will overlap with the enlisted replacement course (para d (2) below), while two days will be devoted to officer-oriented subjects. The latter two days of training will be conducted, seminar-fashion, by experienced field grade officers and will be branch-oriented.

(c) The replacement training program for all enlisted personnel will be continued.

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(d) A unit readiness program will be developed where-
by squads, platoons and companies will be required to exercise a series
of tactical drills under the supervision of the next higher commander.
Drills will be programmed to follow receipt of the majority of the
replacements, based on known and projected losses, and will take place
in areas of low-intensity operations.

(2) The Division Training Center continued to provide
valuable training support to all elements of the division. A total
of 3711 replacements received the four-day orientation during the re-
porting period. In addition the following courses were continued:

(a) The Combat Leader Course continued to provide
training to enlisted personnel serving as fire team/squad leaders, and
to other combat arms personnel selected by commanders for leadership
training. Initially the 12-day course was conducted each month for 36
students. This figure was subsequently raised to 42 students twice a
month. A total of 273 students graduated from the course during the
reporting period.

(b) The two-day map reading refresher course for
division personnel nominated for the MACV Recondo School continued during
the quarter, with a total of 62 personnel attending the course.

(3) Training support from non-divisional sources:

(a) A total of 342 division personnel attended air-
craft maintenance training courses under the Army Aviation Mobile
Training Assistance Program (AAM TAP). The courses varied in length
from one week to four weeks.

1 One hundred fifty-six personnel attended
maintenance training courses on the UH-1, CH-47, and OH-6A at Vung
Tau, RVN.

2 One hundred ten personnel were trained on
various maintenance aspects of the OH-6A helicopter by a New Equipment
Training Team (NETT) which was at Camp Radcliff from 27 February to
24 April 1967.

3 Forty-five mechanics received airframe main-
tenance training in three two-week courses on the CH-47 helicopter.
Training was conducted by a NETT which visited Camp Radcliff from 17
February to 1 April.

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4 A NETT visited Camp Radcliff from 7 - 30 April and trained 31 division personnel on the XM-21 Armament System in four courses of five days each.

(b) Five officers attended the one-week civil affairs course conducted in Saigon for MACV/USOM personnel.

(c) Division continued to fill quotas to the MACV Recondo School at NHA TRANG, RVN. Eighteen members of the division graduated from the school during the period.

(d) Nine officers attended a 5-day course of instruction at PACAF Jungle Survival School, Clark AFB, Republic of the Philippines. Purpose of the course is to provide advance training in jungle escape and evasion techniques for aviators.

(4) Unit training programs which continued to receive emphasis included unit orientations, small arms familiarization, aerial suppressive fire training for crew chiefs and door gunners, and replacement training for aviators.

e. Combat Developments: During this reporting period the following significant activities took place:

(1) Items received for evaluations:

(a) SS-11 APERS Warhead - 50 warheads are undergoing tactical evaluation by the 2/20th Aerial Rocket Artillery Battalion. Monthly reports are furnished to ACTIV and CG, and USARV for transmittal to DA, OACSFOR.

(b) CAR-15 Submachine Gun - 300 CAR-15s were distributed throughout the division. The weapon has functioned reliably and effectively. The reduction in size from the M16A1 makes it highly popular with long range patrols, point men, air crewmen, officers at battalion, company and platoon level. All elements of the division expressed their interest by responding expeditiously to approximately 300 questionnaires representing at least 15000 items of data for reduction and analysis. The questionnaires were forwarded to ACTIV for processing.

(c) XM 148 Grenade Launcher - Approximately 60 questionnaires were forwarded to ACTIV for processing. In general, the XM 148 does not appear to be a suitable substitute for the M79 grenade launcher. Material improvements could make it more acceptable. Meanwhile, there appears to be a limited requirement for such a rifle/grenade launcher configuration in the long range patrols and the Air Cavalry Squadron.

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(d) Aircraft Bullet Detectors.

1 Fifteen non-directional acoustic bullet detectors were mounted in 1/9 Air Cavalry Squadron UH-1 helicopters. Initial dissatisfaction resulted from high sensitivity settings which were adjusted by the maintenance company. The detectors were requested in April 1966 and were furnished for full tactical use.

2 One directional acoustic bullet detector was installed on a 1/9 Air Cavalry Squadron UH-1 helicopter and the pilot was trained to interpret the readout device. The detector malfunctioned on the second day and was later removed. ACTIV indicates that technical support and additional detectors will be available in June 1967. The detectors were furnished by LWL for tactical evaluation.

(e) Integral Smoke Generator. Three integral smoke generators from LWL were accepted for tactical evaluation. Current operations indicate that the delivery aircraft must be an armed helicopter. Therefore the ordnance load dictates that only the small fog oil tank will be acceptable in this division. Units are in the process of submitting their requirements.

(f) Fire Resistant Flight Coveralls - 56 developmental flight coveralls of two different weights are being worn by pilots in this division. Initial reaction is that the heavyweight suit is too warm for comfort. Questionnaires are being processed and will be forwarded to ACTIV.

(g) Grenade vests. Forty lightweight vests configured for cool wearing and the convenient carrying of eighteen 40mm grenades were distributed throughout the division. Initial reaction is favorable.

(h) Battlefield Illumination. Four lightweight battlefield illumination systems were evaluated by the 2/5th Cav. The system consists of twelve rocket flares which gives a total of six minutes of continuous illumination. The backblast of the rockets toppled the launcher even though it was staked down.

(i) Lightweight Jungle Rucksacks. Thirty-nine new rucksacks were received from ACTIV for evaluation. Initial reaction has been highly favorable.

(j) Foxhole Diggers. Fifty foxhole diggers were received for evaluation. Each item consists of a cratering charge and a clearing charge. The charges have not functioned reliably. Evaluation will continue during the month of May. A report will be forwarded to ACTIV.

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(k) Fragnacord. Four thousand feet of fragnacord was distributed for evaluation. Although widely employed by the division, there have not been any reported enemy targets encountered.

(l) Electroluminescent Paddles. One set of electroluminescent paddles and apron was issued to the division Aviation Office for evaluation. The item could be useful to the pathfinders for aircraft control at remote LZs.

(m) Sniper Telescopes. Fifty Colt Realist telescopes for the M16 rifle were received. They will be used in the sniper evaluation scheduled for 1 May 67 to 1 Aug 67.

(n) Rome Plows. Six Rome Plows (4 organic) are on hand within the division. Two organic plow systems are incomplete (2 cutting blades and 2 grinders are missing). A follow up search is underway by the ACofS, G-4. The systems are not in use because the organic DGB's are heavily committed in the forward tactical area (approval of the MTOE will alleviate the problem). The attached 70th Engr Bn turned in its HD16M tractors and has not received the Rome Plow adapters for its D7E tractors. The priority need for the Rome Plow is in the TAOR.

(o) Man Pack Personnel Detector. The acceptance of the personnel detector was hampered primarily by the desires of point men to be unencumbered. Also the equipment presented a distraction to point men who are attuned to exercising fully their natural detection faculties. However, the employment of the personnel detector from low flying helicopters resulted in the detection and attack of numerous targets beneath the cover of jungle canopy. A division evaluation to determine the best concept of employment is underway.

(p) Airborne Personnel Detector. One personnel detector for the UH-1 helicopter will be delivered to and supported at the division during June 1967. Experience from the use of the man pack personnel detector should provide a data base for comparison of effectiveness. The airborne detector is more sophisticated in configuration and capability.

(q) Off Leash Scout Dogs. Four scout dog teams especially trained for off-leash work employed a radio system and worked about 50 - 100 yards in front of the handler. There were several incidents of their effectiveness including one enemy contact. The contact would not have been made without the dog which alerted to several NVA soldiers bivouaced and camouflaged about 30 meters off a trail. The NVA soldiers were surprised and engaged by friendly forces alerted by the dog. The division desires to convert all of its scout dogs to off-leash handling technique.

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(r) Mortar Aerial Delivery System (MADS). The 2/20th Aerial Rocket Artillery Battalion has redesigned the mortar chute for dropping 81mm mortars. The system is still under evaluation

(s) Ballistic Flight Helmet. New ballistic flight helmets are undergoing a rapid evaluation for USARV. There have been frequent comments of discomfort and the breaking of nylon screws.

(2) In response to a USARV request, the division identified new requirements which could enhance combat effectiveness. In addition the status of all ENSURE and QRP correspondence on file was reviewed. The subject of the division letter is "Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and Combat Developments (CD) Requirements in Vietnam", and is dated 26 Apr 67.

(3) ENSURE correspondence was initiated for:

- (a) 4.5 inch rockets for ACH-47 (Go - Go).
- (b) New transistorized lightweight Decca System.
- (c) New versatile, lightweight, AM FM, SSB, CW, Burst Code Portable radio.
- (d) Gyrojet Rocket Pistol for tunnel exploration teams.
- (e) Quick erectable antennas with variable impedance matching.
- (f) Psyops loudspeaker systems for UH-1 helicopters.

(4) Miscellaneous actions included:

- (a) Preparation for the three month USARV sniper evaluation.
- (b) Preparation for accepting combat tracker teams.
- (c) DA Survey on the M16A1 rifle.
- (d) HQs CDC VEEA survey.

f. Chemical Operations:

(1) During the reporting period numerous Riot Control Agent missions were conducted in support of combat operations. During Operations PERSHING and DAZZLEM, the XM3 (modified) grenade dispenser was used on numerous occasions primarily in a reconnaissance by CS to

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induce enemy movement. For a short period the dispensers were loaded with a mixture of CS and HC grenades with the aim of increasing the agent cloud longevity. Agent cloud longevity was not significantly increased. A total of 26 missions have been conducted during the 3 month period dropping a total of just under 10,000 grenades. Two missions were conducted in village locations followed immediately by assaulting troops in masks. More attention will be given to this type employment in the future. Contamination of terrain (suspect CP locations, trail networks, way stations, caches, etc) using CS-1 powder has been accomplished during the reporting period. In operation PERSHING a total of 29,600 lbs of CS-1 has been dispersed using drum drop missions. The CS drums are rigged with M10 destructors and 8 second delay initiators. They are ejected from the CH-47 aircraft through use of a metal rack with rollers. The drum fusing system is activated by a static line attached to the initiator pull pin; this permits arming after the drums are free of the aircraft. Approximately 5,500 lbs of CS-1 was dispensed using two M5 helicopter mounted dispersers during Operation BYRD. The targets were primarily dry stream beds which serve as the main avenues of enemy travel. Another 860 lbs of CS-1 were dispersed through blowing bags of agent with detonating cord, hand dispensing from the bag, or mixing with diesel fuel to provide slow release into the air. The latter method has been used successfully around LZs in the forward areas where Vietnamese civilians attempt to circumvent the concertina wire.

(2) Defoliation of the Camp Radcliff barrier has continued through the period. With a few minor exceptions, defoliation has been accomplished through use of a CH-47 spray rig developed by the 1st Cav. A total of 6,600 gallons of agent ORANGE was sprayed using the CH-47 rig. Another 150 gallons was sprayed using hand dissemination means. The Vietnamese Air Force supported 1st Cavalry Division operations with a total of 44 sorties or 44,000 gallons of agent in crop destruction missions. Currently the biggest problem in defoliation is the availability of agent to perform necessary missions with our organic capabilities.

(3) Use of flame and flame field expedients has developed into a much used capability over the past quarter. A total of 81 flame fougasses (55-gal) have been emplaced and rigged for firing. Most of the fougasses have been emplaced thus far in the forward landing zone areas to increase the defensive posture. Also used during the period were 45 drums of napalm by 2d Brigade in a mission designed to burn a major enemy installation. A new item recently added to the 1st Cav capabilities is a system for dropping napalm drums in support of the troops. The system and method of drop are similar to the CS-1 drops. A single CH-47 sortie provides a 2½ ton napalm capability. The system was developed and has now been put into use. A total of 7 tons (35 drums) of napalm has been dropped and is now in high demand.

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6. (C) Logistics

a. General

(1) During the period 1 February 1 February 1967 through 30 April 1967, combat service support was provided for 4 major operations: THAYER II, BYRD, PERSHING, and LEJEUNE.

(a) Operation Thayer II, in progress at the beginning of the period was concluded on 11 February 1967. This operation was supported by the 1st FSE located at LZ Hammond, collocated with a FSA from the Qui Nhon Support Command. The primary means of resupply was a land LOC, on a daily basis whenever possible, from Qui Nhon to LZ Hammond, backed up by a air LOC from Qui Nhon and An Khe. The forces supported included 1st and 2nd Brigades of the 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, which remained OPCON to 1st Air Cav Div. The 3/25th Infantry Division continued to receive logistics support direct from the Qui Nhon Support Command.

(b) Operation BYRD continued throughout the period as the 3rd FSE remained in support of TF 2/7 in Phan Thiet. Cam Ranh Bay Support Command continued to provide supplies via sea LOC to the FSA collocated with the 3rd FSE. This operation continues.

(c) Operation PERSHING was initiated on 11 February 1967. All three Brigades from the 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 3/25th Infantry Division participated in this operation in Binh Dinh Province. The 1st and 2nd Brigade bases were located at English and the 3rd Brigade base was located at LZ Pony. The 2nd FSE, augmented by supply and maintenance elements of the 1st FSE, supported this operation from English. 1st Logistical Command Support was provided by the Qui Nhon Support Command's FSA, "Task Force Buono", also located at English. The principal means of resupply was an extension of the already established land LOC, from Qui Nhon. Approximately 90 vehicles are utilized in a daily turn around between Qui Nhon and English. The land LOC to LZ Pony in an effort to reduce the flying hours of the CH-47's and CH-54's. This objective has been achieved.

On 22 April the 2nd Brigade, after being deployed from the Pershing AO into the LEJEUNE AO, was re-established at LZ Uplift. DISCOM's 1st FSE, which also participated in operation LEJEUNE was relocated to LZ Uplift and provided logistical support to this two battalion Brigade. Daily resupply was established by a ground LOC from Qui Nhon. Elements of a FSA were collocated at the brigade base provided by the Qui Nhon Support Command. Operation Pershing continues.

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(d) Operation LEJEUNE began on 7 April. The 2nd Brigade with two battalions deployed into the vicinity of DUC PHO in the Quang Ngai area, relieving elements of the III MAF. The 8th Engineer Battalion constructed a C7A strip within the brigade base area which was the only method of effecting resupply, other than by organic division helicopters, for the first 6 days. The primary means of resupply, sea LOC did not become fully operational until 13 April. Resupply was affected by discharging cargo on the beach site and externally slinging the loads into the DUC PHO area, some 4 kilometers distance, as a land LOC was not available. This proved to be an effective method of delivering supplies, although expensive in terms of aircraft hours flown. Lessons learned from this operation include:

1 Personnel and materials handling equipment (MHE) should be available on the beach site prior to arrival of the landing craft and supplies.

2 Access roads should be planned and constructed in advance when the tactical situation permits.

3 It is not desirable to rely on an air LOC as a sole source of resupply.

4 Supply accountability is extremely difficult when supplies are airlifted into various locations, directly from the source and the FSE is by-passed.

Operation LEJUENE was terminated on 22 April after the 3/25th Infantry Division and the 2nd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division exchanged brigade bases.

(e) During the period, M-48 tanks and other full tracked vehicles (M-42, M-55) were attached to the division. Although supply and maintenance support has been adequate, several potential problem areas bear consideration:

(1) The maintenance detachment in the Forward Support Element does not provide for the personnel skills and tools necessary to adequately perform maintenance on full track vehicles.

(2) Fragmentation of a tank company into separate, independently operating platoons imposes a maintenance burden on the organic maintenance element of the company.

(3) Repair parts channels for full track vehicles are ill-defined and slow.

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(f) Throughout the period continuous responsive support provided by the Qui Nhon Support Command, 1st Logistical Command.

b. Supply and Services:

(1) Class I: The serving of "A" rations as compared to the serving of "B" and "C" rations continued to increase during the reporting period. This can be attributed to the timely arrival of reefer ships at Qui Nhon from CONUS, and command emphasis being placed on the serving of "A" rations whenever and wherever practicable. Larger quantities of Long Range Patrol Rations began arriving in the division during the month of April to relieve the previous shortage. The construction of the ration breakdown office building and open shed storage building was completed at the Division Class I facility and should provide for more efficient operation. There have been no significant problems in this area as all operations have been conducted smoothly and efficiently.

(2) Class II and IV: Organizational clothing and equipment showed a marked improvement during this period. Sufficient quantities of insect bars, ponchos, poncho liners, camouflage helmet covers, air mattresses and sleeping bags were received to fill all outstanding requisitions with a significant number remaining on hand to fill future requirements. The first shipment of the regular subdued 1st Air Cav patches arrived in the division in April with the forecast that subdued US Army nametapes and rank insignia will be arriving in May or June. Major items of equipment were received to fill most of our critical shortages. Still in short supply are 3/4 ton trucks, forklifts, M60 cranes, a small number of 2½ ton trucks, and maintenance float vehicles. On 30 March 1967 USARV Form 47, a procedure used to obtain approval for equipment in excess of authorized allowances, was rescinded; however, emergency requests for excess equipment may still be submitted and since to date has shown that they will be approved if sufficient justification is submitted. There are presently no shortages of equipment which adversely affects the capability of units to accomplish their mission.

(3) Class III: Quality surveillance checks were conducted on fuels throughout the division. All dispensing equipment and 500 gallon fuel bags were remarked in accordance with instructions received from USARV. No problems were encountered nor are anticipated in this area.

(4) Class V: Fifteen day bulk ASR allocations continued to be provided to this division by higher headquarters. In the few instances where the ASR was in danger of being exceeded, additional allocations were received upon request. Starting on the 24th of May, CR ammunition will be allocated to the division on a monthly basis.

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Four members of the Division Class V section received training on the XM-47 mine system at Pleiku. Ammunition suspension messages showed a marked increase during this period with the majority of the problems being found in the fuzes rather than in the projectile itself. Consolidation of the division and 1st Logistical Command ASP's at An Khe was completed and is operating efficiently. No significant problems were encountered during the period.

(5) The following amounts of supplies were used during this period:

(a) Class I (short tons)

- 1 A Rations: 4,839.39
- 2 B Rations: 3,550.54
- 3 C Rations: 1,209.07

(b) Class II & IV (short tons)

- 1 Clothing and equipment: 1,261.26
- 2 Fortification Material: 2,172.11

(c) Class III

- 1 AVGAS: 783,900
- 2 JP-4: 7,816,206
- 3 MOGAS: 1,789,300
- 4 Diesel: 1,586,490

(d) Class V (short tons): 20,633.96

c. Transportation:

(1) Significant movements during the period 1 February to 30 April are as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>CARGO LBS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
21 Feb	2/8	Ank	Eng	C-130	32,600	306	22
26 Feb	8th Engr	Eng	PT	C-130	65,000	75	5
4 Mar	1/5th	Eng	Ank	C-7A	29,600	501	27

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>CARGO LBS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
9 Mar	1/5th	Ank	Eng	C-7A	31,145	465	27
10 Mar	1/12th	Eng	Ank	C-7A	15,580	479	23
15 Mar	C-1/77th	Ank	Eng	C-7A	34,380	83	11
16 Mar	2/12th	Ank	Eng	C-7A	30,600	428	23
2 Apr	2/5th	Eng	Ank	C-7A	30,000	481	29
13 Apr	1/12th	Ank	Eng	C-7A	25,500	450	26
13 Apr	1/8th	Eng	Ank	C-7A	25,500	443	25
15 Apr	1/35th	QN	Chulai	C-130	392,467	576	22
15-20 Apr	3/25 Bde	Litts	D Pho	C-7A			97
15-20 Apr	2nd Bde	D Pho	Litts	C-130	18,600	577	6

(2) Eight C-130 passenger flights and three C-130 cargo flights were scheduled to An Khe on a daily basis during the period. Additionally, a C-130 medical evacuation service was provided between An Khe, Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang and Tan Son Nhut on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday. A daily courier service was maintained throughout the period with C7A aircraft. At the close of the period C7A courier service was in operation between An Khe and Hammond, Crystal, Bong Son, English, Phan Thiet and Qui Nhon.

(3) The division was supported throughout the period by the 541st Transportation Company (Lt Trk). Vehicle support averaged 45-2½ ton cargo trucks daily.

(4) 1st Cavalry Division Regulation 55-1, Transportation for Tactical and Administrative Movements was published during the reporting period.

d. Ground Maintenance:

(1) Vehicle roadside spot check inspections have been conducted weekly in the base camp area throughout the reporting period. Spot checks of vehicles in the forward areas were started on 18 February 1967. A total of 35 vehicles were inspected each week in both the forward area and base camp. Inspections results were forwarded through command channels and the units replied by indorsements on action taken to correct deficiencies.

(2) Eleven maintenance activities in the forward area were inspected. The inspections are informal in nature and are geared to point out weaknesses in maintenance operations. Information copies of each inspection are reviewed by this headquarters to determine if additional assistance should be provided to the inspected unit.

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(3) Command Maintenance Management Inspections

(a) Headquarters and Service Company and Supply Company, 15th Supply and Service Battalion were inspected on 2 February 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(b) Headquarters and Headquarters Company and A, 13th Signal Battalion were inspected on 8 February 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(c) Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry were inspected on 15 February 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(d) 15th Administration Company was inspected on 22 February 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(e) Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Company B, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry were inspected on 1 March 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(f) 371st Radio Research Company was inspected on 15 March 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(g) Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry were inspected on 22 March 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(h) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Air Cavalry Division was inspected on 5 April 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(i) 545th Military Police Company was inspected on 5 April 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(j) Headquarters and Headquarters, 15th Medical Battalion was inspected on 19 April 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(k) Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry were inspected on 26 April 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(l) Results of these inspections indicated that additional emphasis was needed in the areas of generators and chemical equipment, maintenance and repair parts management. Classes were conducted during the period 23-28 January 1967 on repair parts management. The results

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of this training has been evident in recent PLL checks. Continued generator operator training has brought the division generators up to satisfactory maintenance standards.

(m) The Department of the Army "Operation Counter Team" comprised of twelve enlisted men and one warrant officer arrived on 24 March to assist units in purifying prescribed load lists. Spending on an average of four days with each unit, the team has completed a total of thirty-four division units.

(4) Extensive purification has reduced the ASL from 12,790 to the present 9366 line items. At the present time ASL stands at 55% fill. Requisitioning procedures are being reviewed to determine what action must be taken to increase the percentage of ASL fill and decrease due-outs to the units.

(5) The division has received 300 CAR 15 and 723 XM148 weapons. Repair parts packets were furnished with both weapons. No significant maintenance problems have been experienced with these weapons.

(6) End of report period statistics (percent operational).

Vehicles	94.4
Radios	96.7
Generators	93.8
Artillery	99.3
Weapons, light	99.8

(7) 1st Cavalry Regulation 750-8 was revised and published on 10 February 1967.

(8) The 3rd quarter, FY 67 Material Readiness Report (DA Form 2406) was submitted to USARV on 3 March 1967.

e. Aircraft Maintenance:

(1) The following number of aircraft by type have been dropped from accountability during the reporting period.

<u>ACFT</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
OH-13's	15
UH-1B	13
UH-1C	2
UH-1D	13
CH-47	2
OV-1	1
CH-54	0
O-1	

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(2) The following number of aircraft by type have been issued (from depot stock or other commands) during the reporting period.

OH-13's	5
UH-1B	3
UH-1C	15
UH-1D	19
CH-47	4
OV-1	1
CH-54	3
O-1	0

(3) Safety of Flight Inspections:

(a) Inspection of UH-1 engine for defective fifth stage disc. T/53-1-3/7, -9, -9A, and -11 engine within certain serial number groups possibly had defective fifth stage compressor rotor discs (Reference: Unclas message 34th General Support Group AVGF-MM GS-02-93, DTG 201115Z Feb 67, and TB 55-1500-207-20 dated 11 Feb 67). Inspection revealed that one (1) suspect T/53-3/7 engine was located on OV-1 serial number 62-5880 presently being processed for CONUS evacuation and one suspect T53-L-11 engine had been shipped to CONUS. US Army Aviation Material Command and 34th General Support Group were advised of results. Project closed out 23 March 1967.

(b) Inspection of UH-1 Aircraft Engine for alignment fixture dowel. T/53-L-11, -11A, -11B and -13 engines with certain serial number groups were inspected for alignment dowel pins on the inlet housing plate. (Ref: Unclas message 34th General Support Group AVGF-MM GS-02-56, DTG 131035Z Feb 67). Inspection criteria was further clarified and defined by unclassified message AVGF-MM GS-02-102, DTG 230100Z Feb 67. Information was disseminated to the field and inspection continued. Inspection criteria was finalized upon receipt of TB 55-1500-206-20, dated 11 Feb. Inspection was completed and project was closed out 16 March 1967.

(c) Inspection of aft battery installation UH-1D Aircraft. All UH-1D aircraft were inspected for damaged longerons in the aft battery rack attachment area (Reference: Unclas message 34th General Support Group AVGF-MM GS-02-42, DTG 101115Z Feb 67 and unclassified message USAAVCOM AMSAV-EAA-SDO-02-2, DTG 091900Z Feb 67). As a result of this inspection there was a total of twelve (12) aircraft grounded awaiting disposition instructions. Upon receipt of MWO 55-1520-210-20/17, dated 11 Feb 67 these aircraft were routed through direct support facility for rework and modification. Results of this inspection were forwarded by this office to US Army Aviation Material Command and 34th General Support Group. Project was closed 23 March 1967.

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(d) Inspection of damper adapter mounts UH-1 aircraft. All UH-1 aircraft were inspected for correct installation and torque of damper adapter mounts P/N 204-010-922-5 and P/N 204-010-922-7 (Reference: Unclassified message 34th General Support Group AVGF-MM GS-02-112, DTG 260330Z Feb 67 and TB 55-1500-206-20/2 DTG 20 Feb 67). There were no defective installations noted. Project was closed out 16 March 1967.

(e) Inspection of tail rotor hub and blade assembly UH-1 aircraft. All UH-1 aircraft were inspected for installation of incorrect tail rotor grip nut P/N 204-010-708-3-21509 (Reference: Unclassified message 34th General Support Group AVGF-MM GS-02-173, DTG 030400Z Jan 67). There was a total of ten (10) suspected installations noted. Assemblies were routed through direct support facility and corrective action taken. Inspection results were forwarded by this office to US Army Aviation Materiel Command and 34th General Support Group. Project closed out 9 March 1967.

(f) Inspection of UH-1C main rotor blades. All UH-1C (UH-1B/540) aircraft were inspected for cracked main rotor blades. This project was originally closed out 12 January 1967 but upon receipt of additional inspection criteria (TB 55-1520-211-20/8 dtd 27 Dec 66) the project was reopened. To date there have been no failures reported. This is a continuing inspection and all failure data will be forwarded by this office to 34th General Support Group and US Army Aviation Materiel Command.

(g) Inspection of O-1 aircraft engines for defective crankshafts. O-470-15 engines within certain serial number groups were subject to crankshaft failure (Reference: Unclassified message 34th General Support Group AVGF-MM BS-02-83 DTG 180730Z Feb 67 and TB 55-1510-202-20/7 DTG 11 Feb 67). Inspection revealed that one (1) suspect engine was located on O1-D Serial Number 57-2875. Engine was removed and 34th General Support Group was advised of results.

(4) Configuration Control

(a) Compliance with MWO 55-1520-210-20/15 cargo door support bracket installation (UH-1D aircraft) dtd 12 Nov 66. All UH-1D aircraft in First Cavalry Division were screened for compliance with subject modification work order. Results of survey indicated compliance accomplished on one hundred sixty-five (165) aircraft out of one hundred seventy-five (175) total strength. This information was furnished to 15th Transportation Bn Configuration Control and Division Safety Officer.

(b) Decca project. All aircraft in First Cavalry Division were screened for compliance with modification work orders that incorporated Decca navigation system provisions. Survey indicated compliance accomplished on one hundred fifteen (115) aircraft. Information was furnished to 15th Transportation Bn Configuration Control and 15th Trans Bn Avionics repair for coordination.

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(5) Publications

(a) In order to update criteria relative to aircraft recovery procedures 1st Cavalry Division Circular 750-4 was revised. Draft copy of the new circular was distributed to interested organizations and staff sections for review, comment, and recommendations. The circular was published 11 April 1967 and distribution to the field was effected.

(b) Upon expiration of 1st Cavalry Division Circular 725-6, Supply Procedures for Aircraft and Associate Equipment, a copy of same was routed through interested organizations and staff sections for review, up dating, and recommendations. A draft circular was then compiled, circulated, and approved by reviewing sections. Circular was submitted from publication and will be distributed to the field in the near future.

(6) End of reporting statistics

(a) Aircraft ASL by DSU (% Fill)

	Co A	Co B	Co C	Co D
Aircraft	68	66	81	85
Armament	77	74	78	88
Avionics	63	66	82	84

(b) Average EDP (%) (1 Feb 67 thru 30 Apr 67)

OH-13	14
UH-1B	15
UH-1C	17
UH-1D	15
CH-47	21
All aircraft	17

(c) Average EDM (%) (1 Feb 67 thru 30 Apr 67)

OH-13	15
UH-1B	17
UH-1C	14
UH-1D	17
CH-47	27
All aircraft	14

(d) Average Mission Ready (%) (1 Feb thru 30 Apr 67)

OH-13	70
UH-1B	68

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UH-1C	65
UH-1D	70
CH-47	51
All aircraft	68

f. Construction and Facilities:

(1) Construction Materials. 2" X 4" lumber was in critical supply during February, resulting in a tremendous slowdown in building prefabrication for self-help erection. The situation improved with March showing twice the issue of February and April showing approximately six times the February issue. Cement supplies were adequate for both MCA and O&MA funded projects. In addition supplies are continuing to stockpile for the An Khe Army Airfield project. Penepime for dust palliation dropped to critical supply levels during the period. As a relief, heavy oil and diesel, mixed, was provided in bulk (5000 gal tankers) and proved to be completely satisfactory. Medium and rapid cure asphalt cut-backs were also provided. The situation is improving steadily and dust palliation efforts continue unabated in aircraft operating areas and have resumed on the primary road nets after about a two week stoppage. There has been no significant improvement in the status of electrical supplies. Some O&MA funded wiring materials are available; none have been received for MCA funded projects.

(2) Base Development. Earthwork for the An Khe Army Airfield is about complete after removal of clay lenses from the sub-grade and replacement of selected fill. Double surface treatment of the existing runway has proven to be unsatisfactory and AKAAF has been closed to C-123 and C-130 aircraft. Tentative plans are to concrete this area, as well as the main runway. Work has resumed on Golf Course helipad construction and on construction of helicopter revetments. Five ARMCO revetment kits were obtained from the USAF and the 70th Engineer Battalion is currently erecting the kits into nine 12 foot high walls for protection of CH-54 helicopters. Republic Steel Ground Mat has proven to be entirely satisfactory for CH-47, UH-1, and OH-13/LOH revetment construction by self-help. 491 structures have been issued as troop billets and the total number of semi-permanent approved buildings has risen to about 1300. Method of issue of billets has again changed to permit larger base oriented units to house their personnel sooner. Combat and combat support units that are area oriented and spend only limited time in base camp will receive only 65% of the billet authorization. All units are being permitted to select their own priorities and erect other type structures upon completing 65% of the billet program. This has proven to be more equitable and recognizes mission requirements. RMK-BMJ is progressing with the Central Power System with the Generator Plant and Transformer Station under construction. The IWCS antenna site is nearing completion. The BWQ,

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Division Chapel, G2/G3 Building, and Command Quonsets have been completed. The G-Staff BOQ is under construction. The Song Ba recreation area has been improved with addition of a double quonset and completion of the skeet range. The Lazy Acres Recreation Area is in operation with boating and picnic facilities available. Twenty-five of the 84 quonset huts have been erected and are being used as maintenance buildings on the Golf Course and unit dispensaries.

(3) Pacific Architects and Engineers. PA&E continues to expand its services, having assumed almost complete responsibility for road maintenance. The shower/latrine construction has been stopped by 1st Logistical Command with about 70% of the required 250 structures completed. 1163 of 1250 rifle racks have been completed. The Dog Kennel and DTC Rappelling Tower has been finished and work is under way on the new Radar Tower for Hong Cong. The kitchen for the Generals Mess is finished and work is in progress on the dining room. PA&E is still critically short of personnel in critical skill areas such as refrigeration and air conditioning.

(C) Civil Affairs

a. General: Civil Affairs efforts during the period were directed toward support of combat operations - THAYER II and PERSHING - and to civic action in the TAOR and Psychological Operations.

b. Support of Combat Operations

(1) Operation THAYER II

The final days of the operation (1 - 11 February 1967) were characterized by the evacuation of the population of the Soui Ca Valley. On 5 February the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division whose AO included the Soui Ca initiated operations to remove all the population from the valley. This was done to deny the VC further use of this area as a support base and a haven by devoiding the area of its population. During the operation 2640 civilians were evacuated from the valley and resettled in Phu Cat District. The operation terminated on 11 February 1967.

(2) Operation PERSHING

(a) Population and Resources Control

1 Refugees. Some of the hardest fighting engaged in during the operation occurred on the well populated Bong Son Plain and the An Lao Valley. The concept of the operation included US Forces keeping the population in place and not becoming involved in large

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refugee operations. This was successful to the extent that refugees neither significantly interfered with combat operations nor were they encouraged to move. Nevertheless, because of the intense fighting in these areas, 12,000 civilians sought refuge voluntarily in the GVN controlled area of Bong Son, Gia Huu and Tam Quan by mid-March. Refugee support was provided by USAID which included bulgar, refugee shelters and materials for the building of 560 family units in the Tam Quan and Bong Son areas.

On 15 March authority was received to evacuate the population from the An Lao Valley. Hoai Nhon District, supported by trucks and supervision of the 22d ARVN Division and Psyops support from the 1st Cav, conducted the phased evacuation operation. The plan was to give the population of the An Lao five days to move from the valley starting on 19 March. Two VNNC battalions searched and destroyed north into the valley for one week generating evacuation of civilians. Then the Marines swept south out of the valley driving civilians out. The Marine operation produced about 3800 of the estimated 6000 people expected to be occupying the valley. Knowing that additional people remained in the valley, the 3rd Brigade inserted two companies that swept out an additional 1408, officially clearing the valley by 14 April. Since the GVN did not keep close track of the population that left the An Lao, it is estimated that from 800 - 1000 additional people had left the valley prior to the middle of March.

Reception, processing and resettling of the refugees was the task of the GVN and 22d ARVN Division. The plan was to resettle all An Lao refugees in An Tuc. A camp was established at "The Soccer Field" (BR 864961) in Bong Son for reception and screening of the refugees. 22d ARVN Division was to provide transportation for the move to An Tuc. A resettlement camp was to set up at An Tuc and staffed by a province refugee team and two US Civil Affairs Teams from the 41st CA Company. Screening was performed on a small percentage of the refugees accounting for less than 100 detainees. The decision by the Province Chief to give refugees an option as to whether to move to An Tuc or not accounted for the resettling of only 855 refugees. The expansion of the Phu Duc Refugee Camp in Bong Son provided room for the resettlement of 1886 persons there. The remaining 3300 have been absorbed into the Bong Son population.

2 Central Collection Point. The operations of the Central Collection Point was the responsibility of the Provost Marshal who was assisted by IPW and Civil Affairs elements. The innocent civilians produced from the screening process were returned to their place of capture principally through the coordinated efforts of division and brigade civil affairs elements. Of the 2934 innocent civilians produced over 85% were transported by trucks and helicopters back to secured areas nearest their place of capture, while the remainder chose to be resettled in Bong Son.

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3 Denial Area Concept. During the reporting period a plan was conceived that would deny the use of one time enemy sanctuaries and support areas to his use by methodically removing the population centers and RD areas of northeastern Binh Dinh Province. They were selected to arrange the three War Zones - Kim Son, Soui Ca, and An Lao Valleys which are in effect denial areas. The eventual phased establishment of these denial areas at a rate supportable by the Province and OCO would create a buffer zone around Phu My Valley, the Crescent Area, the Bong Son Plain, the Greater Bong Son Area and Hoai An District GVN controlled area, thus significantly contributing to the security of these areas.

(b) Civic Action

1 Civic Action conducted during PERSHING was primarily short duration, high impact type. Daily sick calls and emergency medical treatment were provided at the Division Central Collection Point, the refugee camps and at various other locations throughout the Division AO. Since the beginning of PERSHING, the Division has conducted a total of 396 sick calls in which 19, 551 patients were treated.

2 1st Air Cavalry Division presented band concerts in Hoai Nhon and Hoai An Districts to improve community relations and promote good will between US Forces and the Vietnamese people through the medium of good music. Over 10,000 people came to hear these concerts which were extremely well received by both the Vietnamese people and GVN officials.

3 A civic action survey conducted in the PERSHING AO indicated a need for general improvement in educational and recreational facilities. As a result of the survey a plan was developed to rehabilitate these schools. Each major command was assigned to help improve one or more schools. Tasks included:

- a Repair of desks and benches.
- b Painting both exterior and interior.
- c Patching existing floors.
- d Repair of doors and windows.
- e Erection of flagpoles.
- f Construction of recreational equipment.

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These self-help projects are being accomplished in close cooperation with local Vietnamese officials.

c. Camp Radcliff Civic Action Activities

(1) Nature of Operations: Civic Action projects in An Tuc District which have been completed or begun during this period are listed in (2) and (3) below. Civic Action areas of responsibility in the maneuver and artillery battalions. This action was taken to allow these units to concentrate their efforts in the forward tactical area of operations. Sufficient support for the local area is provided by divisional and non-divisional support units stationed at Camp Radcliff.

(2) Long Range Projects

(a) The Tu Long Bridge project was completed on 31 March 1967. The bridge is a single lane span, 75 feet long, with a rated capacity of 15 tons. Villagers and PF provided labor, Division Artillery, PA&E and Page Communications made the project possible.

(b) The An Khe Dispensary has been extensively renovated. Projects included rewiring of entire dispensary, repainting of examination building, installation of new running water system pump and well house.

(c) 71 homes were built with the assistance of divisional units.

(d) 18 wells were completed or begun for local hamlets.

(e) Work continues on the PF housing project next to district headquarters.

(f) A second Montagnard resettlement village has been established in An Tuc District. Wells are under construction in both villages.

(g) Divisional units provided 25,000 gallons of edible garbage to local pig cooperatives and orphanage pig sty.

(3) Short Range high impact projects.

(a) 37,040 patients have been treated at sick calls conducted by division medics.

(b) The 15th Medical Battalion continues to support the An Khe Dispensary, and to conduct on the job training for 3 PF and 4 civilian health workers.

(c) 21,378 pounds of food, 1962 pounds of clothing, and 2124 pounds of soap were distributed to needy families.

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d. Psychological Operations

(1) Activities of Reporting Period

(a) Psychological operations during reporting period were highlighted by increased activities indicated by larger numbers of leaflets and loudspeaker hours and increased number of missions flown per day. A total of 48,208,000 leaflets and 669 hours 10 minutes of loudspeaker broadcasts were placed on targets by aircraft, US Navy Swiftboat, and ground loudspeaker teams during the conduct of over 1260 missions.

(b) Three significant campaigns were initiated during the period which were directed at the 22d NVA Regiment, Viet Cong Guerrillas in the An Lao Valley, and Viet Cong inhabiting the coastal areas.

1 A campaign, directed at the 22d NVA Regiment, was conducted from 22 Feb - 1 Mar 67. This campaign was designed to encourage defection from enemy ranks based on information obtained following a similar campaign in January 1967.

2 A campaign lasting for two days was directed at VC inhabited coastal areas from a US Navy Swiftboat. A total of 11 hours speaker broadcasts and 5000 hand bills were directed at selected targets.

3 A face to face propaganda campaign was directed at refugees from the VC infested An Lao Valley who had relatives in the Viet Cong forces. A total of 15 Viet Cong returned to the GVN in a six-day period as a direct result of this campaign.

(c) Support Limitations

1 Printing support from the 245th Psyops Company was adversely affected when the Division moved from LZ Hammond to LZ Two Bits in mid-Feb, and was further restricted by requirement that all support would emanate from Nha Trang as opposed to the nearer Pleiku facility.

2 Aircraft Support from the USAF Commando Squadron based at Nha Trang continues to be questionable. Although weather is at times a controlling factor, other conditions create a much less responsive support capability than is desired. The fact that aircraft flying from Nha Trang to LZ Two Bits and back each day causes the following significant problems:

a A shortened flying day for mission flights.

b A waste of three hours per day flight time to and from the laager location (Nha Trang).

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c The times of day when target audiences are most vulnerable to propaganda (early morning and late evening) are wasted by the requirement that directs the aircraft to fly back and forth on a daily basis.

d Aircraft responsiveness is restricted to the extent that there is no such thing as on-call or ready-reaction psyops support.

3 Mass media support in the form of radio is lacking in the Division AO. Radio has been reported as the major link between North Vietnamese soldiers in South Vietnam and their homes in the North. In fact prisoners of war have stated that they listened to three one-half hour broadcasts per day from North Vietnam. At present no radio broadcasts are beamed at enemy forces by friendly transmitter in the Division AO. Because of the lack of friendly radio, it is not possible to compete favorably against enemy propaganda.

(d) Problem Areas:

1 The lack of replacement parts and repair facilities continues to render some helicopter-mountable loudspeaker equipment useless. In late March it was determined that repairs responsibility was given to the 98th Light Equipment Repair Company at Qui Nhon; however, no repairs have been completed on the three sets turned in for repair.

2 Maximum use of Psyops aircraft is not possible when three hours of every day is lost traveling to and from the laager base at Nha Trang.

3 A major factor restricting Psyops exploitation of returnees and prisoners of war is the lack of a Psyops Oriented interrogator assigned to the IPW Teams. Presently only the obvious vulnerabilities are exploited at this level.

4 Loudspeaker missions flown by USAF U-10 aircraft are marginally effective due primarily to the altitude at which the aircraft is required to fly.

5 Requested materials when completed are not expeditiously shipped to the using unit primarily because aircraft are not made available for the transportation of leaflets. Maximum emphasis is placed on the development of propaganda yet minimum consideration is given to the delivery of propaganda materials.

(2) Psyops leaflets see inclosure 8-1.

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SECTION II (C): Commander's Observations and Recommendations
Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

PERSONNEL

ITEM: General Engineer Support.

DISCUSSION: The 8th Engineer Battalion has found it necessary to continue the practice of supporting committed brigades with a company minus. The remaining resources are retained under battalion control in order to provide a general support capability.

OBSERVATION: Operations during this quarter reinforce the argument made in previous ORLL's concerning the need for a fourth engineer combat company within the airmobile engineer battalion. Such a unit is sorely needed to provide direct support to the division's cavalry squadron, attached or supporting non-divisional combat forces, as well as a reasonably constant general support capability for the division.

OPERATIONS

ITEM: Movement of Signal Equipment by UH-1D.

DISCUSSION: In support of Operation LeJeune, it was necessary, because of the size of the LZ at Sa Huynh, to displace one AN/MRC-112 and a FM voice ground relay by means of UH-1D helicopter. This displacement was successful in that it did allow the Signal Battalion to locate its equipment and personnel at the site necessary for the accomplishment of the mission. However, this procedure required the ground relay 3 sorties.

OBSERVATION: By disassembling the equipment and sling loading the trailer, it was proven that the UH-1D helicopter can transport a MRC-112. This technique permits the MRC-112 to be positioned in areas that were previously considered to be inaccessible. A disadvantage of this type operation is the increased possibility of maintenance problems caused by the disassembly and reassembly of the equipment. During this particular move, no maintenance problems were experienced.

ITEM: Operations Against Fortified Villages.

DISCUSSION: In discussing past operations against fortified villages, several observations should be presented.

1. 1. In almost all villages in the Pershing AO heavy bunkers have been built that can withstand almost all forms of artillery fire with the exception of a direct hit. In many of these bunkers are hiding places under the floor boards, false walls or ceilings where personnel and equipment can be hidden.

2. In a 24-28 hour period the enemy can prepare an elaborate perimeter and positions affording him excellent cover and concealment while allowing him to defend the entire village by fire. Within the village the enemy will prepare sniper positions in palm trees or on the ground that conceal him while he covers main approaches into and trails through the village.

3. Once contact is made and our forces encounter strong resistance, the procedure of pulling back or out of the village and calling for supporting fires causes our forces to lose the initiative and spirit of battle and permits the enemy to regroup and/or attempt an escape from the village.

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4. In forming an encirclement to trap the enemy, the delay in getting elements to the area and setting up positions causes an even greater loss on the initiative of our forces. Even under artillery fire the enemy can reorganize and attempt an escape with his main force through many avenues such as hedgerows, tunnels, stream beds, paddies, or sugar cane before the encirclement can be completed. In attempting an escape, the enemy will generally leave a small covering force in the village with the mission of directing enough fire at our elements so that we will not assume a break out maneuver.

5. In completing an encirclement with the main enemy force trapped we have found that he will make numerous attempts at breaking out during the hours of darkness. Each sector of the encirclement will be probed with a small force. If a break or gap in the encirclement exists, the main enemy force will use this as an escape route and can break our trap before our lines can be adjusted. This escape route may not be a likely avenue, because the enemy can use clandestine methods to reach our lines and disappear, concealed by darkness.

6. Two weapons have proven highly effective at destroying enemy bunkers:

a. The 90mm gun of the M-48 tank will destroy bunkers when point detonation type fuze is used. Element leaders must insure proper coordination with other units in the specific area where the gun will be fired to prevent accidental friendly casualties.

b. The M-67 90mm recoilless rifle, found at company level, will destroy bunkers with HEAT rounds. Coordination with other elements must also be established when firing this weapon.

OBSERVATION: Methods of operation against fortified villages to afford our elements better success are explained below.

1. When conducting village searches and heavy bunkers are found, they must be thoroughly searched and then destroyed if at all possible. Engineer teams or demolitions can be requested for this purpose.

2. Village perimeters and all approaches must be thoroughly searched for dug-in positions, tunnels, trenches, or fortifications. All element leaders must be briefed to report finding any sign of enemy activity.

3. When contact has been established with enemy elements, every effort must be attempted to maintain it, while other elements are maneuvered to destroy and/or cut off his routes of escape.

4. Supporting fires can also be used to cut off enemy escape by firing on likely avenues of exfiltration.

5. When utilizing an encirclement:

a. Close coordination must be effected between company size units to ensure no breaks or gaps exist in the encirclement.

b. All platoon sized elements in the encirclement must set up rear security.

c. Unit commanders are responsible to insure that element leaders check each position to be sure there are no gaps or breaks in the encirclement and that all escape routes are covered by fires.

d. Commanders of elements comprising the encirclement must ensure all personnel are dug in for protection from artillery fire into the village and covering escape routes.

e. If they are available, back-up forces of platoon sized elements should be placed in positions behind the encirclement to combat break-throughs or provide rear covering forces.

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ITEM: Use of Medium Tanks.

DISCUSSION: The use of the medium tanks in conjunction with search and clear operations has the capability of being an extremely effective weapon to use against fortified positions. However, there are considerations that the commander must take into account when utilizing the tank unit. One of the most important factors is that of utilizing the tank unit. One of the most important factors is that of trafficability. During the dry seasons and the latter stages of the rice growing cycle, the M-48 can move across the rice paddies with a certain amount of ease. In spite of this ease of movement, the tanks are restricted to crossing sites along the numerous streams that flow through the area. During periods when the rice paddies are flooded, trafficability is greatly restricted. Much care must go into reconnaissance of the routes to be taken.

OBSERVATION:

1. Infantry must be used to clear all built up areas to preclude use of any type of anti-tank weapons or command detonated mines.
2. If tanks are to be used effectively, numerous crossing sites must be prepared to allow the tanks the freedom of movement throughout an area of operation. This decreases the chance for the enemy to booby-trap all the crossing sites.
3. Continuing engineer requirements exist to increase route options and provide a mine sweeping capability.
4. The bulldozer is an essential contributor to tank maneuverability.
5. A great deal of coordination must be exercised when the tanks firing into a village. Allowance must be given to the area immediately to the rear of the area under fire to insure that those rounds do not burst amongst friendly troops.

ITEM: Effective Logistical Ship Usage.

DISCUSSION: The requirement for using two (2) UH-1D log ships to support battalion daily requirements has proven to be inefficient in aircraft utilization hours and payload capability. In many cases the second ship became only a chase ship.

OBSERVATION: One (1) log ship can adequately support battalion needs. Such usage significantly reduces aircraft utilization hours.

ITEM: Booby Traps.

DISCUSSION: Recent operations have disclosed the enemy's capability to booby trap everything from empty C ration boxes to fox holes.

OBSERVATION: Personnel must be continually alert to avoid picking up or tampering with the more obvious debris of the battlefield. Any available cover such as a foxhole or lean-to should be immediately suspect to contain booby trap devices. Care must be exercised in searching enemy dead.

ITEM: LZ Preps.

DISCUSSION: In some cases, LZ preparations have been omitted so as to gain surprise.

OBSERVATION: All LZ's should be prepped, if only by ARA a few seconds prior to insertion. Experience has shown that detailed visual reconnaissance is insufficient to insure the absence of enemy presence or activity. The capability of conducting screen operations along the periphery of the LZ compensates for the loss of surprise.

ITEM: Reconnaissance by Fire.

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DISCUSSION: Recent operations have demonstrated the enemy's capability to utilize good concealment and withhold fire until friendly forces have closed to the extent that the initial enemy fire causes heavy casualties and denies use of close-in fire support.

OBSERVATION: The rules of engagement must be re-aligned to allow friendly forces the prerogative of conducting reconnaissance by fire on suspect enemy areas, to be determined at the ground unit commander's discretion.

ITEM: Employment of aero-rifle platoon.

DISCUSSION: Instances continue to occur where the supported command envisions use of the aero-rifle platoon in a role similar to that of a rifle company, e.g., ground search over a vast piece of terrain for an extended period of time.

OBSERVATION: The aero-rifle platoon is an extension of the reconnaissance means available to the Air Cav Troop Commander. The insertion of this platoon should occur upon discretion of the Air Cav Troop Commander into a limited area of search for a restricted period of time. As an integral part of a reconnaissance oriented unit, the platoon should be utilized to develop a situation, not terminate one.

ITEM: Tunnel Systems on the Bong Son Plain.

DISCUSSION: The tunnel systems encountered by the Engineer Battalion on the Bong Son Plain may be categorized as three types which are typical in the three different physiographic areas present; the lowland rice-paddy, the terraced highlands, and the foothills and mountains. The lowland tunnels usually have a single entrance located under a house or animal pen. The tunnel itself usually is 10 feet long and runs under rice paddy dikes or hedgerows to a small single room. The overburden is seldom over 3 feet thick. These tunnels can usually be destroyed by cratering from the surface. The tunnel systems of the terraced highlands usually have several entrances in a radial pattern with narrow tunnels 20 to 50 meters long converging on a common room normally 6 ft long by 6 ft wide by 4 feet high. It is not uncommon for several systems to interconnect. Overburden ranges from 4 to 10 feet thick preventing destruction from the surface. Charges placed in the sides of the rooms, passageways, and at the entrances will effect complete destruction. The tunnel can be denied by filling with CS crystals and sealing the entrances. The latter method is effective, can be rapidly accomplished, and is therefore more compatible with the air cavalry tactics. The foothill and mountain tunnel systems are considerably deeper than the types previously mentioned. Entrance is gained through vertical shafts, sometimes in excess of 60 feet deep. The shafts go down to horizontal passageways. These passageways in turn lead to a common room. These rooms are interconnected with horizontal tunnels to other rooms which in turn have the vertical shaft entrance system. A complete hillside may be pockmarked with such shafts, although the entrances are usually obscured by vegetation to the degree that they look like shell craters. Destruction is accomplished by placing charges in the walls of the rooms and shafts, thereby collapsing the entire system.

OBSERVATION: The underground fortification system of the Bong Son plain is extensive and well prepared. Adequate security for the period of time necessary for engineers to destroy or deny these fortifications must be allocated. Units encountering these systems must, if engineers are not readily available, report the location and type of fortification for future destruction. A special task force of engineers and security can then be dispatched to remain on site until total destruction or denial is accomplished.

ITEM: Infantry utilization of organic mine detectors and chain saws.

DISCUSSION: Although each infantry battalion is authorized two mine detectors and each infantry company a chain saw, engineers supporting maneuver elements are usually tasked for all minesweep and chain saw support, prevents infantry personnel from becoming familiar with the operation and

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maintenance of this equipment. The situation could conceivably arise where the immediate use of these items is necessary to accomplish the mission and engineers are not immediately available. Examples are the need to cut an LZ for medevac and suspicious areas for mines. Also, units with organic chain saws can capitalize on their use for bunker construction without having to request the same support from supporting engineers.

OBSERVATION: The Division Replacement Training Program should include an introduction to mine detectors and chain saws. This training can be continued during field operations. Supporting engineers are more than willing to conduct training on mine detectors and chain saws whenever circumstances permit.

ITEM: Fortification for Forward Landing Zones.

DISCUSSION: The recent trend by 1st Air Cavalry Division units to construct extensive fortifications on forward LZ's which are utilized but for a short period of time is undesirable from the standpoint that the rapid evacuation of these positions precludes the removal of the materials. At LZ ANCHOR (DR 941850) approximately 1000 meters of triple standard concertina fence was left in place. This wire if removed by the enemy, could be mixed with explosives to make anti-personnel mines, made into tire damaging devices, hung between trees or across an LZ to damage aircraft, etc. In the same respect, bunker material left on LZ's may be reused for the same purpose by the enemy. All materials installed on forward area LZ's must be evacuated or destroyed to preclude enemy utilization. For LZ's destined to be utilized for short periods of time, the XM-37 linear mine could be utilized in lieu of extensive tactical wire and foxholes dug instead of bunkers.

OBSERVATION: The enemy can use anything we leave behind against us. Fortifications in excess of that which we can rapidly evacuate or destroy should not be installed on forward LZ's unless that it is planned to occupy the LZ for an extensive period of time.

ITEM: CS-1 Dispensing from CH-47's.

DISCUSSION: Drums of CS-1 have been dispensed from the CH-47 with success. Initial drops were made by laying the drums on their side and rolling them out the exit ramp. An improved method of delivery has been perfected using a steel rack with conveyor rollers allowing the drums to set upright and be pushed out the back of the ship.

OBSERVATION: The new procedure is much easier and safer in that a static line is used to arm the explosive after the drum has left the aircraft.

ITEM: Colocating QRF Aircraft with QRF Platoon.

DISCUSSION: A plan was developed and executed to colocate both the infantry troops and the lift aircraft involved in the QRF. Previously both had been at different locations. The infantry is brought back nightly to the laager base and briefed by the responsible brigade and the lift unit. Specific aircraft to be used are designated, and if intelligence dictates, the flight leader and the infantry platoon leader conduct a joint reconnaissance. If no requirement for employing the force arises during the night, they are air assaulted the following morning into their battalion's AO. The time requirement that the QRF is required to meet is that it should be heliborne within 10 minutes of initial alert.

OBSERVATION: The collocating of infantry and lift ships reduces reaction time and makes the team concept a reality.

ITEM: Artillery Advisory to Aircraft.

DISCUSSION: Incidents were reported of artillery rounds bursting near the flight path of aircraft when the source of fire could not be determined.

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OBSERVATION: The advisory service must be functioning at all times.

ITEM: Mining and booby trapping of LZ's has increased. This is particularly true in LZ's that have been previously used.

DISCUSSION: On 22 April an air assault was conducted into LZ Honeycomb. Ground artillery did prep the LZ, but the ARV fire missed the landing zone. Troops departing two aircraft detonated mines which resulted in serious casualties and aircraft damage.

OBSERVATION: Accurate artillery support is reemphasized. The aviation commander must exercise his responsibility to execute a go-around and continued the fires whenever a prep is questionable.

ITEM: Clearance of fires near ARVN or subsector controlled areas.

DISCUSSION: In order to rapidly react to fire requests that fall in or near areas controlled by ARVN, PF or CIDG Forces and their maneuver plans. Permission to fire is requested for large areas, commensurate with the rules of engagement. Periodic checks are made with ARVN officials throughout the day insuring that the precleared status has not changed. This system allows immediate target engagement in most areas without any time loss trying to get specific grids cleared.

OBSERVATION: This procedure aids in the rapidity of delivering fire.

ITEM: Incorporation of all useful resources in different fire support plans.

DISCUSSION: In addition to the artillery and mortar defensive fire program established at battalion fire bases, other elements, when available, were incorporated. A surveyed searchlight and BC Scope permits immediate pinpointing of a location by coordinates or preplanned concentrations. This BC Scope/searchlight combination provides a valuable information gathering agency 24 hours a day. The addition of a collocated direct fire weapon, also surveyed and laid on common direction, presents a potent defensive position for base defense. Any line of sight target can be engaged by illumination, observation, direct, and if necessary, indirect fire as everyone is on a common grid. The M-42 "Duster" 40mm SP automatic weapons offers the commander another mobile defense weapon. The M-42's are located near the center of the area and have preplanned and surveyed perimeter positions, if attacked or threatened by attacks, they may be directed to proceed to any station and react accordingly.

OBSERVATION: Defense of a base area can be materially enhanced by incorporating all available fire power and fire support agencies in a single coordinated plan.

TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

ITEM: Inexperienced personnel and OJT training.

DISCUSSION: Each Chinook trained repairman fresh from school has little experience. He is reluctant to dig into a job when armed with only academics. The student is provided with some practical training; however, the real experience comes only after working in an operating unit.

OBSERVATION: Duplication of the experience gained in an operational unit is difficult if not impossible. Practical experience can only be gained on-the-job. All operating units must plan for this inevitable lack of maintenance experience and provide the necessary on-the-job training for all incoming personnel.

ITEM: Track Vehicles.

DISCUSSION: Missions assigned the cavalry troop involve security of principal lines of communication, convoy escort, and reconnaissance.

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OBSERVATION: The inclusion of track vehicles to the organization of the cavalry troop would provide a far greater capability for cross-country maneuver, security and reconnaissance operations. Air mobile operations would be enhanced rather than hindered through the use of a lightweight, air-transportable, track vehicle.

INTELLIGENCE

ITEM: Language Barrier.

DISCUSSION: The barrier of an unfamiliar language continues to hamper operation with respect to intelligence.

OBSERVATION: The use of cards with key words opposing each other (e.g. Machine-gun _____ VN word for machine gun) has assisted materially in understanding the essentials that a VN national may be attempting to convey.

ITEM: Distribution of Detailed Intelligence.

DISCUSSION: There exists a mass of intelligence information which when assembled presents an accurate picture of the organization, training, tactics, weapons, and political structure and control of the enemy. There is a tendency to fail to present this information in a logical form to the fighting units.

ITEM: Use of District officials to assist in search operations.

DISCUSSION: Each district has a number of village/hamlet chiefs who know the people of the area and the lay of the land. For the most part these local GVN leaders are anxious to assist in their village/hamlet areas.

OBSERVATION: Coordination with MACV advisors for assistance has resulted in the capture of numerous confirmed VC who might have gone unnoticed without the assistance of village/hamlet officials who pointed them out. Every effort should be made to utilize these local officials.

ITEM: Counter Measures by NVA to Friendly Propaganda.

DISCUSSION: The special rally day for the 18th NVA Regiment caused the NVA cadre to place their units in position and keep them there for two days, thus rendering them ineffective for that period. Rally week for the 22d NVA Regiment was not successful in either bottling up the enemy or causing defections; however, interrogation reports show that political officers intensified training during the week 22 Feb - 1 Mar 67.

OBSERVATION: The enemy will restrict operations for limited periods of time (one or two days) to offset effective allied propaganda; however, for longer periods, countermeasures in the form of stepped up political indoctrination are used.

ITEM: Propaganda Technique (Person to Person).

DISCUSSION: On 25 April 1967, two members of a guerrilla band were found living among refugees from the An Lao Valley; both agreed to contact personal acquaintances in their old unit. On 26 and 28 April an additional 13 Viet Cong turned themselves in to 1st Cavalry units and each have agreed to make personal contact with their former comrades in an effort to cause mass defections.

OBSERVATION: The direct person to person approach for Psyops is most productive if absolute secrecy and security are provided the target audiences.

ITEM Meaningful Propaganda.

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DISCUSSION: Most of the better educated people in the AO have moved to Government controlled areas, leaving behind the less literate of the population who do not understand many of the leaflets messages.

OBSERVATION: It was found that a simple message with a supporting picture or sketch is more effective than the sophisticated leaflets in standard use.

ITEM: Reaching the target audience.

DISCUSSION: Although many hundreds of thousands of leaflets have been disseminated, many of the Viet Cong say they do not understand how to rally, nor do they apprehend the Chieu Hoi program as it applies to them. This is especially true of local VC who have not actively supported the Viet Cong recently.

OBSERVATION: Specific rules of eligibility for the Chieu Hoi program should be published on posters and leaflets in an attempt to eliminate active Viet Cong supporters and break down the infrastructure.

ITEM: Establishment of Denial Areas.

DISCUSSION: The enemy relies on critical terrain in the form of partially inaccessible populated and rich valleys in the central coastal and highland regions where he can stage for attacks into adjacent GVN controlled and contested areas. To deny the enemy use of these staging areas by removing his source of support - population and resources, such as rice, cattle, shelter will help to significantly reduce his effectiveness.

OBSERVATION: Establish Denial Areas where the enemy habitually seeks support and haven by evacuating the population, livestock and crops and destroying dwellings. Exploit the Denial Areas by conducting combat operations periodically in the area to monitor changes in the situation. H and I programs can be planned throughout the area to restrict enemy movement. Rules of engagement still apply for observed fire. GVN must conduct Psyops and other controls to prevent civilians from reentering the areas. A bonus effect of establishing Denial Areas is that the population and resources evacuated came under GVN control.

ITEM: Rice harvest operations in VC controlled, contested and denial areas.

DISCUSSION: When refugees are generated by voluntary or involuntary migration from VC controlled, contested and denial areas they leave growing rice crops behind, that will be ripe and usable at a later date.

OBSERVATION: Operations to harvest rice in these areas can be conducted to deny the rice to the enemy and use it to help feed the refugees. District paramilitary forces can provide control and local security for refugees returning to harvest rice, while US or ARVN forces provide outer security and transportation.

ITEM: Popular Forces Participation in Civic Action.

DISCUSSION: The participation of Popular Forces in combined civic action projects is highly desirable from an overall program standpoint, but is often difficult to obtain on a project level. The Tu Luong Bridge project in An Tuc District was significant as being the first project in the area where a majority of the labor was provided by the local Popular Forces unit. The pride of accomplishment and resulting publicity for the Popular Forces will foster future cooperation.

OBSERVATIONS:

1. Popular Forces participation was obtained by pointing out the advantages of their participation to the District Chief and the ARVN security forces chief in the district. Points emphasized were faster project completion and the favorable publicity for the Popular Forces within the district. Participation directed by the security forces chief ensured platoon leader cooperation.

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2. The Assistant Subsector Advisor acted as overall project coordinator and Division Artillery provided full time on-site supervision. The commendation of the Popular Force effort combined with tactful comments on weak areas resulted in a continual improvement in the PF labor.

3. Photographs taken during the construction highlighted PF and joint villager and PF participation. The plaque placed on the bridge at the dedication emphasized that the bridge was constructed by the villagers and Popular Forces with the assistance of USAID, 1st Cavalry Division, and US civilian contractors. Copies of the photographs were given to WDS. The Assistant Division Commander praised the Popular Force participation at the dedication ceremony in the presence of the Province Chief.

4. Popular Force Elements are proud of their participation in the bridge construction. District Officials are receptive to new joint US-PF village projects.

ITEM: Reaction plan for serious incidents, accidents, atrocities or natural disasters.

DISCUSSION: Serious incidents and accidents caused by US Forces conducting combat operations can have an adverse effect upon VN-US relations. Efforts must be made to reduce these effects by immediate response of US Forces. Atrocities committed by the enemy upon the Vietnamese should be exploited to place the blame on the VC and undermine his credibility. Exploitation must be timely to be efficient. Civic action objectives can be further realized by immediate assistance by US Forces to civilians stricken by natural disasters.

OBSERVATION: Operation REBOUND is a plan presently in effect that is designed to accomplish the objectives stated above. Each major command that is responsible for a piece of real estate has a provisional organization for a REBOUND team which can be rapidly dispatched to the scene of one of these events to take appropriate action. Each team is tailored to meet the situation but should include elements of the following: Civil Affairs, Medical, PIO, Engineers, Psyops, Military Police, security and work parties if needed. Representation by local district National Police and other Vietnamese officials should be arranged upon implementation of this plan. Examples of the function that can be done by the team are: relief to stricken victims (solatium payments, medical assistance and evacuation, repair of damaged property), exploitation of intelligence and propaganda, publicity for civic action.

ITEM: Employment of District Authorities to Conduct Major Population Control Operations.

DISCUSSION: Every effort should be made to encourage the GVN to conduct operations that concern control of the population such as population evacuation etc. This helps the local GVN authorities to foster respect among the people and establish prestige for themselves. In order to insure achieving these objectives there must be absolute assurance of success of the operation, otherwise prestige and respect is lost.

OBSERVATION: No population control operation should be undertaken by GVN authorities unless success is certain. If there is doubt, advisors and US elements must prevent failure by offering the assistance that is needed to make the operation successful. Often district GVN officials are unable to thoroughly anticipate the problems that might arise. Their plan must be trouble shot and advice and material assistance offered where necessary to prevent failure and loss of face.

ITEM: Rehabilitation of Civil Defendants.

DISCUSSION: After the Central Collection Point was established, it became necessary to hold Civil Defendants there for an extended period. The accumulation of hundreds of these personnel created problems in that there was a considerable amount of inactivity and uneasiness. Concurrently the need for school furnishings in Hoai Nhon District was discovered. A project was initiated to build over 200 school benches and desks using available labor. Other detainees were used to improve existing detention facilities.

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OBSERVATION: When large numbers of personnel are detained for an appreciable period of time, look for evidence of unrest among them, investigate detainee capabilities and skills, and utilize these skills to accomplish needed and meaningful projects.

LOGISTICS

ITEM: Rear-area supply and service.

DISCUSSION: Requests for supplies and services normally handled through rear-area channels continue to receive less than desired attention. It is understood that forward area units must receive priority, however valid due-outs, as this unit holds for ice-chests, water trailers, and fire extinguishers must be filled if the total supply system is to operate.

OBSERVATION: A continuous interrogation of unit records insures validity of requisition. Instances of this nature give rise to "scrounging", the prime detriment to a working supply system.

ITEM: Construction Equipment:

DISCUSSION: Operations THAYER II, PERSHING, and LEJEUNE again emphasized the need for additional items of construction equipment. Asphalt distributors are essential items for the application of dust palliatives. A water distributor is needed to obtain optimum moisture content for the compaction of soils. To accomplish missions which require such equipment, it was necessary to borrow items or to use field expedients. More often than not this course of action was unreliable or resulted in unsatisfactory equipment.

OBSERVATIONS: The 8th Engineer Battalion cannot rely on non-divisional engineer units to support the battalion with mission essential items of equipment at all times, nor can the division depend upon non-divisional engineer support to accomplish the tasks requiring certain equipment. Asphalt and water distributors have long been approved for issue as additions to the battalion's equipment.

ITEM: Long straps for Sling Loads.

DISCUSSION: Long rigging straps on engineer equipment (the D6-B Dozer in particular) cause take-off and landing to be more difficult. At a time when maximum power and lift is required, the long straps prevent the crane from taking full advantage of ground effect, thereby reducing lift capability.

OBSERVATION: Time and again it has been stated that we must have shorter rigging straps if we are to continue hauling the heavy equipment in hot weather. Yet, short straps have appeared only now and then in recent operations.

ITEM: Attachment of Combat Units.

DISCUSSION: Attachment of non-division units to elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division creates many support problems.

OBSERVATION: When attachment occurs support arrangements must be formed up beforehand. As a minimum, a system for normal resupply of parts to the should be effected. In addition, maintenance agencies must be identified to provide daily support and these agencies must be given the resources to complete their requirements. Where more than one headquarters is involved a written document should be drawn up identifying the agency and services it will supply.

ITEM: Loose Ammunition in Sling Load Operations.

DISCUSSION: Ammo, carelessly rigged, can be a hazard to property and personnel on the ground. If lost it can also be used by the enemy for making booby traps.

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OBSERVATION: Rigging personnel must be made aware of severe wind forces exerted on external cargo loads in flight. Those loads that have been haphazardly rigged or have weak or otherwise faulty webbing may be lost during flight.

ITEM: Ground Guides in Sling Load Operations.

DISCUSSION: A ground guide is of no value whatsoever if he cannot be seen. In most cases a smoke grenade is adequate for marking drop sites and it provides the pilot with vital information. There are times, however, when a ground guide is desired.

OBSERVATION: In order to be effective, the guide must position himself far enough upwind to be seen by the pilot hovering high over the desired drop site. A good rule for the guide is to keep pilots head in site. A less desirable alternative is to get close to the load being lowered and signal up to crewman in the rear seat.

OTHER

ITEM: Excessive outages caused by broken wire lines in the vicinity of engineer construction areas continues to be a serious problem.

DISCUSSION: The rehabilitation of roads in the forward CP areas is a continuous engineer task. The constant traffic of heavy equipment in these areas causes outages on wire lines that are laid on the surface or buried beneath roads.

OBSERVATION: Whenever possible, wire should be routed overhead and marked with engineer tape. (Except in the vicinity of Helipad). Compliance with this policy has resulted in a marked reduction of wire line outages at LZ English.

ITEM: Rainy Season Repairs to CH-47A Blades.

DISCUSSION: During the rainy season fiberglass repairs cannot be accomplished unless the blade is removed and placed under cover. This process involves a 75% increase in maintenance time.

OBSERVATION: That some sort of tool could be devised to inclose a portion of the blade while it is on the aircraft. A plywood box, designed to fit the curvature of the blade and house two heat producing light bulbs could be used to allow fiberglass blade repairs during inclement weather.

ITEM: Elimination of Lateral Vibrations on UH-1 Rotor Systems.

DISCUSSION: The elimination of lateral vibrations has always been a problem. Aside from the problem of readily identifying a lateral vibration as felt on the ground, a great deal of confusion exists as to which blade was discrepant in weight (light) and to what extent. In many cases, the correct was selected (at random), but an insufficient amount of tape was added to create a noticeable dynamic change and consequently the other blade became a suspect. This was time consuming, hit or miss process and delayed return of the aircraft to an airworthy status. An almost foolproof method exists to eliminate the problem of trouble shooting laterals. When a severe lateral is present, the use of a tracking flag will detect the discrepant (light) blade and make it evident by the following:

1. Of the two strikes on the tracking flag, the longer of the two will be the light blade and the one requiring weight. Generally, two to ten wraps of two inch tape will be sufficient to bring the blade into balance under the above indication. Weight to tape ratio is listed below.

2. If only one hit on the tracking flag is evident, the blade that strikes the flag is the light blade and the one requiring weight. In this case, even greater amounts of tape will be required, sometimes as many as twenty-two wraps. The severity of the lateral will be quite evident to pilots in this case and it is fairly safe to start with eight to ten wraps initially.

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OBSERVATION: A number of rotor blades have been released for use that were manufactured shorter than blueprint tolerance. Therefore, it is possible to get an indication similar to (1) or (2) above during the tracking process, but without the associated lateral vibration in the airframe. It should not be assumed that one of the vibrations under these conditions, make a tab on the tracking flag with masking tape. This will allow the long blade to cut the tab and the short blade to leave a mark. Normal tracking procedures can then be followed.

WEIGHT TO TAPE RATIO

'B' model 44' rotor	One wrap 2" tape equal to 3.1 ounces in belt.
'D' model 48' rotor	One wrap 2" tape equal to 3.4 ounces in belt.
'G' model 44' rotor	One wrap 2" tape equal to 2.42 ounces in belt.

ITEM: Leaking Main Rotor Blade grip seals on UH-1B and D aircraft.

DISCUSSION: Leaking seals have been a major cause for premature removal of main rotor hubs for demand maintenance. This condition is further aggravated when operating the aircraft in a dusty or sandy environment. Since centrifugal force seems to seal the seals during flight, the leakage normally occurs in the static position. The following method has proven highly successful in eliminating these leaks.

1. Disassemble the hub grips and thoroughly clean all affected parts.
2. Install new seals and reassemble the rotor hub.
3. Service the blade grip with grade 1100 oil.

OBSERVATION: In most cases the leak will be eliminated for remaining hours on the hub assembly.

ITEM: Bridgespans.

DISCUSSION: Prefabricated bridgespans weighing up to almost 8 tons and varying in length to about 70 feet can be successfully lifted for short distances and set in place by the CH-54A.

OBSERVATION: With adequate planning, preparation, and coordination between flight personnel and engineer personnel, considerable time can be cut from the total construction time. This type operation is most successful when aviation personnel to be involved participate also in early planning.

ITEM: Drogue Chute on CH-47 and CH-54.

DISCUSSION: When sling loading the CH-47, a drogue chute is a definite asset and necessity if any distance is involved. The chute will provide the needed stability at the cost of only a few knots airspeed. If the chute detaches in flight, the resulting oscillation may require the helicopter to jettison its load.

OBSERVATION: The chute is attached to the aft end of the Chinook utilizing a swivel connector to preclude twisted suspension lines which would result in the chute collapsing. Additional work needs to be done in this area to determine what drogue chute attachment and number and size of drogue chutes are most effective.

ITEM: Section Equipment on 155mm Howitzers.

DISCUSSION: The practice of attaching section gear to gun trails for movement by CH-54A is not acceptable during the hot months. The main reason is simply too much weight. Also by past experience the typical artillery position generally is a very poor landing area which further reduces the safety margin.

OBSERVATION: Section equipment attached to trails must be limited to absolute minimum during hot months.

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ITEM: Smoke Grenades vs Tear Gas for Marking LZ's

DISCUSSION: The advantage of using smoke to mark landing areas are numerous. Smoke identifies the area effectively and provides pilot with valuable wind information. Do not use gas grenades for this purpose! Obviously, incapacitation of the pilots could have disastrous consequences.

OBSERVATION: Require reemphasis on correct use and proper selection of pyrotechnics for marking LZ's.

PART II: Recommendations.

NONE

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GEORGE W. CASEY
Colonel GS
Chief of Staff

8 Incl

1. 1st Cav Div (AM) organization structure and list of units at Camp Radcliff
- ~~2. Visitors~~
3. Attack on LZ Bird
- ~~4. Battle of Phu Hnu (2)~~ **goc**
5. Task Organization
6. Aviation Data
7. TAC Air Supporting Forces
8. Psy Ops Leaflets

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AVFA-GC-OT (23 May 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1967 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 11 JUL 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington D.C.; 20310

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed the 1st Cavalry Division Operational Report of Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1967, and pertinent comments are as follows:

2. (U) Reference paragraph 4f (6), Section I (page 24) - Intelligence: Concur. Headquarters, MACV letter, subject: ARVN Interpreter Program, dated 14 June 1967, states that a review of requirements for ARVN interpreters will be made in the near future.

3. (C) Reference paragraph 5e (1)(e), Section I (page 34) - Operations and Training: Non Concur. Integral smoke generators have been employed by other aviation units OPCON to IFFORCEV with unarmed aircraft (slicks) with apparent success. The practice of limiting the employment of the smoke generator to an aircraft incapable of using its maximum capability, i.e., large tank (armed aircraft), severely curtails the utility of this item of equipment.

4. (C) Reference paragraph 7a, Section I (page 49) - Civil Affairs: Concur. The organization has an outstanding Civil Affairs, and Populous and Resources Control Program which has obtained outstanding results. It has also provided strong support to the tactical mission as well as the overall pacification effort:

5. (C) Reference paragraph 7d, Section I (pages 53 and 54) - Psychological Operations:

a. Paragraph 7d (1)(c) 1: Concur. The requirement to furnish printing support for the 1st Cavalry Division was placed on the Nha Trang Detachment of 245th PsyOp Company by the 245th PsyOp Company.

b. Paragraph 7d (1)(c) 2: Concur. An O-2 aircraft was stationed at Qui Nhon on 5 July 1967 for on call support of the division, which will eliminate the three hours per day flying time from Nha Trang to Qui Nhon and return.

c. Paragraph 7d (1)(c) 3: Mass media support became effective in the PERSHING area of operation on 26 June 1967, when the radio station at Qui Nhon began broadcasting with its new 250 foot antenna. The radio coverage is approximately 70 miles which will aid the PsyOp effort in Binh Dinh Province.

d. Paragraph 7d (1)(d) 4: Concur. The O-2 aircraft with its more powerful speaker system should greatly increase the effectiveness of the aerial loudspeaker appeals.

Downgraded at 3 year interval
Declassified after 12 years
DDI DTD 5200.10

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AVFA-GC-OT (23 May 67)

11 JUL 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1967 (U)

e. Paragraph 7d (1)(d) 5: Concur. Maximum emphasis is placed on the delivery of propaganda materials to all OPCON units. The primary problem arises when the amount of leaflets is in excess of a U-10 or O-2 aircraft load and not large enough to constitute a pallet for a C7A aircraft. However, maximum utilization of available cargo space is being used to improve this situation.

6. (C) Reference page 57, Section II, Part I, Reconnaissance by Fire; Commanders Observations: Non concur. The rules of engagement currently in force allow the conduct of reconnaissance by fire in areas cleared by the appropriate RVN officials in accordance with MACV Directive 525-18. If the fires are observed and the target area is identified as enemy, the firing may be conducted without clearance. Fire may be delivered on suspected enemy areas in villages and hamlets provided they are observed and properly cleared, and prior warning has been given. The responsiveness of the artillery for reconnaissance by fire type missions and the prerogative of the maneuver commander for its use can be enhanced sufficiently by obtaining prior clearance for suspected enemy areas in which units will operate. Further relaxation of the existing rules of engagement is not considered advisable.

7. (C) Reference page 64, Section II, Part I - Commander's Observations: Concur. Coordination has been effected with G4, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to ascertain specific shortages mentioned or implied in items one through four, page 64 of the operational report. Additional research will be required before the division can determine its exact requirements. Upon receipt of this information this headquarters will take necessary follow-up action on existing shortages and equipment improvement recommendations.

8. (C) Reference page 65, Section II, Part I - Commander's Observations: Non concur.

a. Elimination of Lateral Vibrations on UH-1 Rotor Systems: Standard procedures for blade tracking are as indicated in TM's 55-1520-211-20 and TM 55-1520-211-35. No other published procedure is authorized. The 1st Cavalry Division has been informed to submit an equipment improvement report.

b. Leaking Main Rotor Blade Grip Seals on UH1B and UH1D aircraft: Standard procedures for repair and/or prevention of such leaks are as established in TM's 55-1520-211-20 and TM 55-1520-211-35. An equipment improvement recommendation has been submitted by the 1st Aviation Brigade. Pending approval of the recommendation by the US Army Aviation Command, no other published procedure is authorized.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

8 Incls
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MICHAEL D. SUNSHINE

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1ST AGC
ASST AG

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2d Indorsement was not received at Headquarters Department of Army

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GPOP-DT (23 May 67) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
from HQ, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 18 OCT 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

1. (C) The following is a listing of all military units stationed at Camp Radcliff.

a. 1st Air Cavalry Division assigned units:

- 1st Brigade (Airborne)
- 2d Brigade
- 3d Brigade
- 5th Cavalry, 1st Battalion
- 5th Cavalry, 2d Battalion
- 7th Cavalry, 1st Battalion
- 7th Cavalry, 2d Battalion
- 7th Cavalry, 5th Battalion
- 8th Engineer Battalion
- 8th Cavalry, 1st Battalion
- 8th Cavalry, 2d Battalion
- 9th Cavalry, 1st Squadron
- 11th Aviation Group
- 11th General Support Aviation Company
- 12th Cavalry, 1st Battalion
- 12th Cavalry, 2d Battalion
- 13th Signal Battalion
- 15th Medical Battalion
- 15th Administrative Company
- 15th Supply and Service Battalion
- 15th Transportation Corps Battalion (AM&S)
- 19th Artillery, 2d Battalion (105 Towed) (Airborne)
- 20th Artillery, 2d Battalion (Aerial Rocket Arty)
- 21st Artillery, 1st Battalion (105 Towed)
- 27th Maintenance Battalion
- 41st Public Information Detachment (Team FB)
- 42d Public Information Detachment (Team FB)
- 77th Artillery, 1st Battalion (105 Towed)
- 82d Artillery, E Battery (Avn)
- 227th Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter)
- 228th Aviation Battalion (Assault Support Helicopter)
- 229th Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter)
- 545th Military Police Company
- HHC, 1st Air Cavalry Division
- HHC, Division Artillery
- HHC & Band, Support Command

b. 1st Air Cavalry Division attached units:

- 14th Military History Detachment
- 17th Artillery, 2d Battalion (105 Towed)
- 25th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

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26th Chemical Detachment
34th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)
41st Civil Affairs Company (Teams 4, 6, 11, 12, 13)
54th Infantry Detachment (Ground Radar)
54th Signal Battalion, Detachment 1
184th Chemical Platoon
191st Military Intelligence Detachment
241st Signal Detachment (CH-54 Avionics Support)
371st Radio Research Company
382d Transportation Detachment (CH-54 DS Maintenance)
478th Aviation Company (CH-54)

c. 1st Air Cavalry Division provisional units:

1st Aviation Detachment (Provisional)
17th Artillery, 2d Battalion, D Battery (Provisional)
An Khe Army Airfield Command (Provisional)

d. The following units comprise the An Khe Sub Area Command:

13th Finance Detachment
34th Supply and Service Battalion (DS)
4th Medical Detachment (VFI)
25th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)
27th Transportation Detachment (TTP)
43d Engineer Detachment (Maintenance)
52d Engineer Detachment (Fire Truck)
86th Engineer Detachment (Utilities)
178th Maintenance Company (DS) (Division)
235th Quartermaster Detachment (POL)
252d Quartermaster Detachment (POL)
359th Transportation Detachment
504th Military Police Platoon
514th Quartermaster Detachment
527th Engineer Detachment (Fire Truck)
527th Personnel Service Company, Detachment of
541st Transportation Company (Light Truck)
537th Engineer Detachment (Fire Truck)
554th Signal Detachment (Maintenance)
602d Engineer Detachment (Water Point)
625th Supply and Service Company (DS)
630th Ordnance Platoon (Ammo)
727th Engineer Detachment (Water Point)
An Khe Area Transportation Office
Pacific Architects and Engineers, An Khe
Office Philco MHE

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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

- e. The following units comprise the 70th Engineer Battalion:
HHC and lettered Companies, 70th Engineer Battalion
84th Engineer Battalion, B Company (Const)
444th Engineer Detachment (CM&P)
511th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge)
585th Engineer Company (Dump Truck), Platoon from company
630th Engineer Company (Light Equipment), Detachment from company
- f. The following units comprise the 509th Signal Battalion

HHC, 509th Signal Battalion
36th Signal Battalion (Combat Area), D Company
69th Signal Battalion (Photo Department)
586th Signal Company (Support)
- g. 18th Artillery, 3d Battalion (composite) with lettered batteries
- h. The following Medical units are located in An Khe:

2d Surgical Hospital (MA)
20th Preventive Medicine Detachment (Attached to 2d Surg)
56th Medical Detachment (DS)
- i. The following Air Force units are located at Camp Radcliff

15th Aerial Port, Detachment 6
5th Weather Squadron, Detachment 24
537th Troop Carrier Squadron, An Khe Detachment
834th Air Division, An Khe Detachment (ALCE)
USAF (TACP)
- j. 610th Transportation Company (AM) (GS)

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HEADQUARTERS, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
Office of Information and History
APO San Francisco 96490

AVDACS-H

18 March 1967

SUBJECT: Unit Historical Reports

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

- 1.. The attached is one of several unit historical reports prepared by the 1st Air Cavalry's Office of Information and History.
2. The text of the action is as factual and accurate as humanly possible. Participants at all levels were personally interviewed for an insight to the greatest possible depth into what actually happened.
3. Although each report is intended solely as a historical document, an analysis of this military history may pinpoint key decisions and crucial turning points of the battle. Combat lessons learned may stand out for future awareness.
4. We hope by this and subsequent unit historical reports a far greater number of present leaders in Vietnam and in the military training and school systems in the U. S. will personally benefit from reading these recent actions of their contemporaries whether on squad or battalion level.



WESLEY G. JONES
Major, Inf
Chief

Distribution:

As specified on last page of 1.


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1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND HISTORY

The ATTACK on LZ BIRD

27 DECEMBER 1966

PREPARED BY
WILLIAM B. FISHER
FIRST LIEUTENANT, INFANTRY
FIELD HISTORICAL TEAM
ALPHA




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Shortly after 1 A.M. on December 27th 1966, the 22nd North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment (approximately 500-700 men) launched a well-planned, well-coordinated attack on the 1st Air Cavalry's Landing Zone (LZ) Bird. Waves of NVA soldiers, well-camouflaged and in overcast weather conditions, crept to within five meters of the perimeter without discovery. Upon the initiation of extremely effective mortar, machine gun, and recoilless rifle fire, enemy infantry crying "GI, you die!" charged over unalerted friendly positions. Fully exploiting the element of surprise, NVA Regulars completely overran infantry positions on the northern and eastern flanks, and charged through the five tubes of the 155mm howitzer battery and portions of the 105mm battery located, respectively, in the northern and southern portions of the landing zone.

The objective of this attack, LZ Bird, was strategically located in the fertile Kim Son Valley. This valley, nineteen kilometers southwest of Bong Son and two hundred and eighty miles north of Saigon, physically resembles a crow's foot with six talons. These talons (subordinate valleys) slope into the heel of the crow's foot and naturally create a position which can dominate the surrounding valleys. This intensively farmed valley is a natural rice bowl producing four crops annually. The Viet Cong (VC), long ago recognizing the economic value of the Kim Son, had constructed a strong infrastructure to collect both rice and recruits from the local hamlets. When the 1st Air Cavalry Division was given the mission of conducting search and destroy operations in this area in Operation Thayer I, it decided to locate a landing zone in the dominating heel of the valley to support, with direct and indirect fire, division maneuvers. The Kim Son River curves and twists into the rough outline of a bird precisely in the area selected for the LZ giving the position its name. (Map I)

To provide this support, two batteries, a 155mm howitzer battery and 105mm howitzer battery, were located at Bird. Each battery was originally composed of six howitzers; however, one of the 155mm howitzers had blown up the previous week, leaving this battery with five tubes. At the time of the attack, C Battery, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery (C/6/16) (155mm) had two officers and sixty-one enlisted men, present for duty, while B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery (B/2/19) (105mm) had three officers and forty-six enlisted men. Both batteries were laid out in a lazy "W" formation with the howitzers roughly twenty to twenty-five meters apart. C Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, (C/1/12), the securing infantry unit, had present at Bird on the 27th of December, three officers and eighty-one enlisted men; of these, sixty-five were assigned bunkered positions along its five hundred to six hundred meter perimeter. Charlie Company was given the securing mission in part because it had been through some rugged fighting in the weeks prior to the Christmas truce, during which the

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
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unit had suffered significant losses including the commanding officer. Besides shortages in personnel, the company had had to assimilate twenty-seven new replacements during the period 25-26 December resulting in a situation where for a sizeable minority, this would be their first fire fight. However, to increase the fire potential along the perimeter, the machine guns from the artillery units were put on line with the infantry, and at the time of the attack, there were machine guns in almost every bunker. (Map II)

Previously each of these units had been warned of the possibility of an attack. These warnings resulted from reliable intelligence estimates which had been building during the Christmas truce period from 7 A.M. on the 24th of December to 7 A.M. on the 26th of December 1966. These reports noted a significant increase in enemy activities around and in the Kim Son Valley and numerous sightings of enemy troops were made in the vicinity of the LZs Bird and Pony. Colonel William F. Brand, the Commanding Officer of Division Artillery, aware of the situation, advised Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) James C. Culp (CO) of 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery, to alert his men to this possibility, and to insure that they were aware of the advantages of the Bee Hive round in the event that their position was overrun. The 105mm howitzer Bee Hive round, composed of 8,500 flechettes, has a thirty degree cone of fire up to three hundred meters. The round, fired at massed infantry, is designed mainly to wound or maim rather than to kill the enemy. LTC Culp, concerned over the prospect of an imminent attack, personally visited his batteries on the 25th of December with particular emphasis on LZ Bird. He later related, "If there was to be an attack I felt it would be either LZ Bird or Pony." Position Pony, which was to figure significantly in the action, was another landing zone located about 7,000 meters to the northeast of Bird. Its mission was to provide artillery support for operations in the Kim Son Valley and areas farther north. On Position Pony were one 105mm howitzer battery and a combined 8"/175mm battery.

During the truce period, brigade intelligence had determined that a significant communist force was in a staging area 4,500 meters southeast of Bird. As a result, four artillery concentrations were planned in the area for 7 A.M. on December 26th, the end of the truce period. At H-hour three 105mm, one 155mm, and one 8"/175mm composite battery massed their fires on the suspected enemy location in an effort to kill or disorganize any force there. Further artillery preparations against a possible attack included prefired concentrations from Position Pony on probable enemy assembly areas around the perimeter of Bird. These concentrations were planned five hundred meters to the southeast, one thousand meters to the northeast of the perimeter on the reverse slope of a hill, six hundred meters northwest along a line of palm trees and six hundred meters to the south.

The infantry unit, meanwhile, had buttressed its positions with trip flares, claymore mines, and some barbed wire; however, the exact location or number of the flares and mines was not know to some of those in the bunkered positions. Heavy fighting in the area had necessitated the



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assignment of several of the infantry platoons to other companies in the battalion leaving a serious coordination problem for the new commanding officer of Charlie Company. Shortly before the Christmas Truce, the first and third platoons had been placed under the operational control of Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry (A/1/12). The weapons and second platoon had assumed their defensive sectors, but this situation combined with the new replacements, made confusion inevitable, when the returning platoons reoccupied their positions. One strand of concertina wire had been placed as an obstacle along the southeast corner of the LZ and although more wire had been requested, delivery was still forthcoming. To supplement these measures, on the night of the 26th of December, the infantry company had taken the precaution of manning two observation posts, one 2,000-3,000 meters to the northeast, the other at the same distance to the southeast. In addition, one platoon from C/1/12 was in an ambush site to the east, southeast of Bird about 9,000 meters. None of these outposts provided any warning of the attack.


On December 17th 1966, the 22nd NVA Regiment received an overlay (Map III) and an operations order from the Sao Vang (3rd NVA) Division Headquarters for the attack on LZ Bird. The Regiment had one week to prepare as the original attack was scheduled for the 23rd of December. Organic elements to participate were the 8th and 9th Battalions and the 2nd Company of the 7th Battalion. Due to the fact that the 8th Battalion was not able to make the rendezvous with the other units at the appointed time, the attack was rescheduled for 26 December. At 6 P.M. on 26 December, the 8th and 9th Battalions of the Regiment surrounded the Landing Zone. The 8th Battalion was responsible for the northeastern flank, while the 9th was to cover the southeastern portion. The 2nd Company of the 7th Battalion was to serve as a regimental reserve and reaction force, and in the event of a complete success it was to collect war trophies.

Each of these battalions was to be supported by two 57mm recoilless rifles, (ten rounds per rifle), two 60mm mortars (twenty rounds per mortar), one heavy machine gun and one light machine gun. For general support on the northeast flank, the Regiment had two 81mm mortars (five rounds per mortar) about four hundred meters from the objective, and two 75mm recoilless rifles (five rounds per rifle) three hundred meters from the perimeter. These general supporting fires were under the control of the regimental commander. Communications were to be effected by wire laid the night of the attack.

The operations order of the 22nd NVA Regiment called for a thorough overrunning of LZ Bird and the complete destruction of all of its artillery pieces. The attack was originally scheduled for 11 P.M. on the 26th, but the assault was delayed until 1 A.M. on the 27th when all units had finally moved into position.

The signal for the attack would be the initiation of mortar fire and simultaneous infantry thrusts aimed at the northeast and eastern flanks of Bird. The infantry would be supported with automatic weapons and recoilless rifle fire located on a finger of a ridge slightly northeast of the LZ about eight hundred and fifty meters from the perimeter. In

B-



Map III

ATTACK ON LE BIRD (BR 795840
 BY 7TH & 9TH BNS 22ND NVA REGT.
 AT 0105 HRS 27 DEC 66
 MAP CAPTURED IN POSSESSION
 OF SENIOR CAPTAIN PHUOC-TRAINING OFFICER 22ND NVA REGT

NVA BUGLE CALLS
 TO TY TE TE TI
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
accordance with this plan, NVA infantry, expertly utilizing camouflage and the intermittent rain, crawled through the four foot high grass around Bird to within five meters of friendly positions. It appeared later that they cut the detonating wires leading to claymore mines and successfully neutralized the trip flares, as their advance went undetected.

The attack, as conceived, was initially followed to the letter. Extremely accurate mortar fire seemed to be in all areas of the perimeter at once, but concentrated in the artillery batteries. Simultaneously the enemy infantry were overrunning positions of the weapons platoon to the northeast and elements of the 1st platoon to the east near the infantry command post. The mortar fire was extremely effective and was responsible for knocking out the number 2, 3, and 5 tubes in the 105mm howitzer battery almost immediately, as well as forcing defenders to keep low in other areas. (Map IV)

"The hill looked alive with enemy, and they were all over the bunker to my right," related Sergeant (SGT) Delbert O. Jennings, squad leader, weapons platoon C/1/12 (position #7, Map II). "Some came in with bayonets fixed." To his right front, enemy supporting automatic weapons fire, on line on the far finger of the rice paddy, looked like a "neon sign." The enemy's two pronged attack from the northeast and from the east swept quickly over the infantry positions. SGT Jennings started to return fire but his weapons, an M-60 machine gun and an M-16 rifle, jammed so he fell back to where he remembered a case of fragmentation and white phosphorus grenades had been left that afternoon. He was unable to open the case of white phosphorus grenades for they were still banded. Instead, he tore open the unbanded box of fragmentation grenades and started pitching them at the advancing enemy.

The speed of the enemy advance was such that they were often behind and ahead of retreating friendly infantry who were now moving from the northern portion to the southwest to where the 105mm howitzer battery was located. Both C/1/12 and C/6/16 had established plans to retreat to the 105mm howitzer battery and allow B/2/19 to fire the Bee Hive round if the LZ was being overrun. The men in the bunkers to the northwest and western flank had not realized the extent or direction of the attack. They continued to return the diversionary fire they received from their front.

In the center of the enemy's thrust from the northeast was the 155mm howitzer battery. Staff Sergeant (SSG) Douglas MacArthur Graham, chief of section number one, was on the night shift with Private First Class (PFC) Zitiello and PFC Wiedman. Suddenly two hand grenades exploded about ten meters away and intense small arms fire shattered the quiet overcast night. Accurate supporting fire was being placed on the position from a line of M79 grenade launchers, M60 machine guns, and recoilless rifles on a ridge to the front. (Map IV) Less than a minute later Sergeant Graham received a warning from Platoon Sergeant James W. Latham of the first platoon C/1/12 who was located in a bunker to the front of the number one tube.




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"Look out Graham," he shouted, "they are coming through." Four NVA seemed to materialize in front of the position, and Graham's section, now in individual foxholes around the tube, easily dispensed with this initial threat. Not realizing the extent of the attack, they left their foxholes and started forward. It was then that they saw the second wave of the enemy, thirty-five to forty men, who had successfully stormed the infantry positions and were only ten meters away. The first section pulled back to a slight depression between the number one howitzer and the C Battery's fire direction center (FDC) to return fire. With so little time to react, a coordinated defense of their position not possible, the men of C/6/16 made individual stands within their respective bunkers around the howitzers. Here some of the most violent hand-to-hand fighting took place. One enemy soldier was found strangled the next morning. Other men reported seeing some of the enemy physically thrown out of the bunkered positions.

After overrunning the positions in the 155mm howitzer battery, the enemy started to systematically destroy the howitzers. SSG Graham, looking back at his number one tube noted, "a whole gang were in my gun pit." After setting up a machine gun to keep effective fire on the rest of the battery, the enemy attempted to open the breech block of the number one howitzer. Decidedly confused with the enigma of the breech block, the NVA Regulars wasted valuable minutes trying to figure out how the howitzer functioned. Finally, appearing as if more accidental than planned to the watching members of C/6/16, the breech block opened. The enemy then tried to blow up the howitzer by throwing "something like a grenade" into the chamber and closing the breech block. After three tries, the "grenade" evidently exploded. This tactic damaged the tube enough to have it airlifted to Hammond the next day for extensive repairs. The number two (155mm) howitzer was also damaged by the same tactic. About this time, Specialist Fourth Class (SP4) William H. Caldwell, with three other men located in the number three tube ammunition bunker, witnessed one of the major NVA accomplishments of the attack--the complete destruction of the number three (155mm) howitzer. At first they made an attempt to defend the tube with rifle fire. They killed one man and wounded two others, but as they were running low on ammunition, they had to watch helplessly as the enemy placed a satchel charge between the bottom and lower carriage in the well, below the elevation arch. Expertly placed, it blew the back off the carriage, completely dismantling the weapon. (Map V)

The attack from the east, simultaneously initiated with the attack from the northeast, was also a complete surprise. On the eastern edge of the LZ at the infantry command post, First Lieutenant (1LT) Charles R. Campanella, the artillery forward observer attached to C/1/12, and 1LT John L. Rieke, acting Commanding Officer of C/1/12, were alerted of the extent of the penetration into their part of the perimeter by SSG Edward J. Denhart of the first platoon. (position III, Map V) The enemy were only ten to fifteen meters behind Sergeant Denhart, as he personally ran to the infantry command post to report his position had been overrun. Immediately those in the infantry command post started moving toward the number six tube of the 105mm battery, carrying out the prearranged plan if Bird were being overrun. At a trench near the number six (105mm)



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artillery piece, retreating elements of the infantry command post and members of the fire direction center of B/2/19 which was also overrun, combined to lay down a base of fire to allow the tube at that position to place direct fire on the enemy. Two high explosive fused time rounds exploded from the weapon and went fifty to seventy-five meters before detonating. Charging NVA regulars, seemingly unfazed by this counterattack drove them off of the tube. These retreating artillery and infantry personnel next moved to tube number four, where 1LT John D. Piper executive officer of B/2/19 was informed that number five and six 105mm howitzers were overrun. In the movement from number six to number four artillery pieces, LT Rieke was hit in the chest by a round from an AK47, a Chinese communist rifle.

The fire direction center of B/2/19 was located in the eastern portion of the LZ about fifteen meters to the northwest of the infantry command post. Captain (CPT) Lenard L. Shlenker, B Battery's commander, asleep but fully clothed, was in his command post tent five meters from the FDC where he awoke to mortar and small arms fire. As he stuck his head out of the command post tent, a "line of red tracers went between me and the FDC." As soon as it stopped, he rushed to the FDC tent, grabbed the radio handset from Private First Class Lewis, and called the Battalion FDC to execute "Bird Quick Fire" which was the preplanned set of concentrations around Bird. 1LT Michael G. Livengood, fire direction officer B/2/19, in the FDC at the time of the attack, looked and saw the enemy "about ten feet away." Those in the tent moved toward the number six position, except for PFC Lewis who insisted on remaining with the radios which, although no one knew it, had been damaged beyond repair by mortar fire. CPT Shlenker, realizing the necessity of getting his battery firing, left Lieutenant Livengood near the number six tube and went to check on the status of his other howitzers. At the number four tube, he found LT Piper with Sergeant First Class (SFC) Carroll V. Crain, and SSG James N. Johnson setting the gun for direct fire. Continuing on to number two, he found the entire section wounded and saw that they could no longer operate the howitzer. He then started toward the number three tube but could see that the ammunition bunker was burning and that there was "no troop movement" so he went to number one. CPT Shlenker found the first section was not operating either but immediately grasping the situation he roused the stunned section and started them placing direct fire at targets of opportunity to the southeast.

Meanwhile at the number three 105mm howitzer one of the first rounds had hit directly on the ammunition bunker. SP4 Charles S. Tournage, who had joined B Battery as a medic on the 26th of December, came out of the bunker after the first few rounds. Some white phosphorus from the burning ammunition bunker landed on his back and leg. When his clothes started to smoke, he jumped into a nearby mudpuddle. As his clothes were still burning when he got out, he took them off. Later dressed in his dark underwear, being olive complected and muddy, one of the NVA leaders mistook him for one of his own men and started waving and giving him directions. The enemy soldier approached to within seven feet before SP4 Tournage shot him in the face with an M79 shotgun shell. It was also at this position that PFC Joseph A. Johnson, due to leave the LZ on the morning of the 27th to begin processing to leave Vietnam, was heard yelling above the din, "I'm

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too short for this stuff! I'm too short for this stuff!"

LT Piper was at the executive officer's command post of the battery on the western side of the LZ when the first round hit. "I was five feet from it," reported Piper. I yelled "Get out of the tent." Sergeant Crain, SP4 Robinson, and Piper crawled out of the tent and into a foxhole next to the command post. During the move from the tent, Sergeant Crain was shot in the hand. Realizing the necessity for returning fire, they left for the number four 105mm howitzer. Crain and SGT Johnson, chief of the number four section put that tube into action. The first target selected was a machine gun on the hill to the northeast, which was placing deadly fire on the LZ. The first round of white phosphorus was a direct hit, and the next morning eight bodies were found where the machine gun had been employed.

The retreating elements of the infantry command post, B Battery's FDC and those who had been at the number six tube, now converged on the number four howitzer. LT Rieke, suffering from a sucking chest wound, received medical attention from SP/4 Tournage who had left the number three position in order to treat the wounded. LT Rieke was then left here near number four tube. "VC are in number five and six and we have to pull back," LT Campanella reported to LT Piper at number four tube. Piper refused to believe this at first because all the enemy fire he had noted had been from the area of the 155 battery to the north. He was finally convinced after he made an attempt to go to number five howitzer and saw it was overrun. Piper then told Crain and Johnson to fall back to the number two artillery piece. When the word was given to move to number two, Private First Class Leaderhouse froze in number four position. His "Buddy", PFC Bud Knaus realizing the situation stayed behind to protect his friend. The next morning both were found dead, but with Knaus' body shielding Leaderhouse.

In the south and southwest, on the opposite side of the LZ from the main enemy thrust, were the positions of the infantry's third platoon. When the attack started, the platoon was mainly receiving mortar fire. The machine gun at position #C, (Map II) according to Platoon Sergeant (PSG) Comer A. Johnson, was not even firing because "there was nothing out front." The men located in position C, Sergeants Johnson and Jenkins, SP/4s Whitaker, Smith and Rözelle scanning to the east and north observed some soldiers on the hill behind them, near number five 105mm howitzer. Not knowing whether they were assaulting NVA or retreating infantrymen, Johnson told his men to remain silent. Straining to pick up some indication of their identity, the men were finally able to distinguish "Vietnamese chatter." "We started throwing grenades", said Sergeant Johnson later, "We threw all we had." The grenades combined with Specialist Whitaker's accurate M79 fire drove the enemy back off of number five tube temporarily.

Not knowing the extent or direction of the attack, Johnson now decided to fall back and regroup his platoon near the number one 105mm howitzer. Before gathering his men together he sent radio telephone operator (RTO) SP/4 Brattis ahead with the platoon radio to the number one tube. Johnson then moved to each of his positions organizing the rest of his platoon for a final stand around number one howitzer.


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It was now at the number one, two and three 105mmms that several of the artillery and infantry elements consolidated to form a new perimeter. SGT Jennings who had been located on the north end of the LZ at the commencement of the attack, had moved to the southwest, policing up the members of the weapons platoon as he went. When he arrived around the number two position, he had fifteen men with him, six were wounded, three seriously. The FDC of B Battery and what was left of the infantry command post had retreated with those at number four to number two howitzer. The last element to join was the third platoon under Sergeant Johnson which numbered about twenty-six. Johnson and Jennings decided to set up the new perimeter around the number one and three artillery pieces with the number two tube about twenty meters outside. Jennings took the western half, Johnson the eastern. (Map VI)

The North Vietnamese Army troops, meanwhile, were placing satchel charges on the 155 artillery pieces. Several of the recoilless rifles were brought into the perimeter and were firing into the retreating elements of the infantry moving to the southwest. One enemy machine gun had been emplaced about the number six 155mm tube and was raking the 105 battery from the north.

LT Piper, remembering the emphasis placed on the Bee Hive round, was now at the number two 105 howitzer. Seeing the area of C/6/16 was completely overrun, he decided to load the Bee Hive round and pointed the tube toward the number one 155 howitzer position in which were massed one hundred to one hundred and fifty NVA. CPT Shlenker returning from the number one 105 tube gave permission to fire. Unable to find the flare which was to alert friendly forces to the firing of the Bee Hive, Piper yelled "Bee Hive! Bee Hive!" In the area of the landing zone into which the Bee Hive round was to be fired, Sergeant Graham of C Battery and ten other men were making a gallant stand near a drainage ditch by the executive officer's bunker to which they had retreated from the area below the number one (155mm), (Map VI). When he heard the warning for the Bee Hive, Sergeant Graham felt the enemy were in the process of massing for a final attack. The cries of the Vietnamese "Yankee, you die tonight! Yankee go home! What are you going to do now, GI?" were rising to a crescendo. I yelled "Shoot it" (the Bee Hive) recounted Sergeant Graham, "and then I ducked my head." The Bee Hive passed directly over his position and sounded like "a million whips being whirled over my head." Graham felt that the round broke the enemy assault in the north. "The gooks were still in my gun pit (number one) and it just tore them up; they started moaning and groaning." Illumination of the battlefield at this time allowed LT Piper to clearly see the round had confused and disorganized the enemy. Yelling "tube left", Piper chambered another Bee Hive round, and pulled the lanyard. The second round reinforced the effect of the first and in the words of Graham, "Charlie didn't come forward anymore."

Communications with LZ Bird were lost shortly after 1:05 A.M. when CPT Shlenker made the original report and requested "Bird Quick Fire." During this period, flares and artillery had been effectively adjusted around the position by Captain James T. Weber, the S-2, 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery who circled overhead in an OH-13 helicopter. Approximately a half an hour



later, at tube position number one, Shlenker found SP/4 Brattis who had been sent there by Sergeant Johnson. B Battery's commanding officer took the radio from him. Although the PRC 25 with the short antenna did not give Shlenker direct communications with LZ Pony, it did reach PFC Charles Abbott on a hill top with a patrol from C Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 2000-3000 meters from Bird. Writing all transmissions on his rubber air mattress, he relayed all fire missions and subsequent changes to Pony. Shlenker was able to make two adjustments of the Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) and he shifted three azimuths 0600, 1000, and 5900 in his head to bring in the ground artillery fire to within fifty meters of the perimeter in the north, south and west. The extent of the artillery support provided for LZ Bird was eight hundred and six 105mm high explosive rounds, one hundred and twenty 8" high explosive rounds, fifty 175mm high explosive rounds and one hundred and sixty-six 105mm illumination rounds. Additionally, during the night, B/2/19 Artillery leveled its howitzers for the direct firing of 243 high explosive 105mm rounds.

ARA participation at Bird was also decisive and showed extremely quick reaction. An ARA patrol ship, in the air at Hammond at the time of the attack, was immediately shifted to Bird. From fifteen to thirty minutes after notification of the attack, this ARA ship was providing supporting fires. Initially the NVA adjusted the ARA on themselves as the only targets that the ship engaged were those enemy automatic weapons which engaged it. The ship made firing runs from the southeast to the northwest, firing "one to three pairs of rockets at about three ripples per run," said Major Ray Pollard of the 2nd Battalion, 20th Artillery, who was in one of the first ARA ships on station. The rockets expended by the six ARA ships and the two GO-GO ships including those on routes of egress were four hundred and twenty-four.

After the firing of the Bee Hive round and because of the accurate adjustment of the ARA and artillery fires, the enemy attack faltered. The enemy then suddenly withdrew from the LZ. By one estimate, once the decision had been made to retreat, they seemed to vanish within two or three minutes.

At about 2:10 A.M., shortly after the enemy left the landing zone, reinforcements from D Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry arrived. Prior to this arrival, several attempts had been made to retake friendly positions and assess damage. 1LT Campanella with twenty-five men had returned to the number six tube of the 155 battery and upon his return, LT Livengood had moved to the number five and number six 105mm tubes. LT Livengood found some of our troops still engaging enemy snipers, and in a ditch near number four tube he discovered LT Rieke where he had been left for the majority of the fight. SGT Jennings, upon the arrival of D Troop, started an immediate sweep of the perimeter to determine the extent of the damage and to take care of the wounded. Within thirty minutes he had encircled the landing zone twice. Everywhere friendly and enemy dead and wounded were intermixed.

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Once contact had been established with the 22nd NVA Regiment, the 1st Air Cavalry reacted immediately to maintain pressure on the withdrawing force. Infantry units were airlifted to blocking positions and ambush sites along the main routes of egress. ARA, artillery, and tactical air strikes were called in on probable enemy assembly areas; and along routes of withdrawal, targets of opportunity were engaged. These efforts met with success. The 22nd NVA Regiment was forced to fragment into platoon and squad size elements to escape the retaliatory pursuit of the Division.

As can be inferred from the narrative, the attack of the 22nd NVA Regiment of LZ Bird was a well-planned and well-supported maneuver. Witnesses were unanimous in the opinion that the NVA troops were individually well rehearsed. "They went right to things," recalls LT Piper and "they seemed to have good intelligence of where things were." The demolition of the number three 155 howitzer was later described by Major Vernon W. Gillespie Jr, Executive Officer 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery, a demolitions expert, as "definitely professional." The attack was skillfully controlled and definite objectives had been assigned which subordinate units systematically tried to accomplish. The support for the attack was extensive. Individual soldiers were well equipped with most having helmets, knapsacks, boots, entrenching tools, knives, and rice rations. They carried ample ammunition. The list of captured equipment demonstrates the extent of preparedness. Included were eight satchel charges, seven bangalore torpedoes, two hundred hand grenades, three cases of rifle grenades, twenty-five 81mm mortar rounds, thirty 60mm mortar rounds, and fifteen to twenty B-40 rockets. In addition an American non-electric demolitions kit with ten sticks of C-4 was found in the immediate vicinity of the perimeter.

What did the attack on LZ Bird accomplish? An effective analysis must examine NVA achievements in light of the mission. The operations order of the 22nd NVA Regiment called for a complete overrunning of the LZ and the destruction of all of the howitzers. The attack failed to accomplish either of these objectives. The NVA Regulars did succeed in assaulting into the perimeter and overrunning more than half of the landing zone before they were stopped and decisively defeated. The enemy did demolish the number three 155 howitzer and sufficiently damage the number one and number two artillery pieces to require their removal to Hammond for repairs. In the 105 howitzer battery, mortar rounds made several of the pieces temporarily inoperative but the battery was fully operational the next day. Raw statistics show from 27-31 December that the enemy lost two hundred and sixty-six killed by body count, and an unestimated number of dead and wounded as a result of the attack on Bird. US casualties were fifty-eight killed and one hundred and seventy-seven wounded in the same period. In light of the above it cannot be said the enemy accomplished his mission, nor was the attack an enemy victory. An important sequel to this conclusion is provided by Senior Captain Phouc, training and plans officer of the 22nd NVA Regiment who coordinated the attack on LZ Bird. When informed of both friendly and enemy casualties and the minor damage inflicted on the howitzers, he termed the attack a "disasterous defeat" for the North Vietnamese Army.

The defense of LZ Bird demonstrated clearly the immediate reaction capability of hard pressed American troops. Given no warning that an


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enemy was within five meters of their positions, and then the instantaneous neutralization of several crucial defensive bulwarks, the men displayed extreme courage and unhesitating response to the threat of complete annihilation. The firing of the Bee Hive round, the setting up of a new perimeter, and the blocking positions, and the effective adjustment of ARA and artillery fires were definitely decisive. The immediate support received from ARA, artillery and reinforcing units was also crucial. Within five to six minutes after the initiation of the attack, there was artillery support. In less than thirty minutes, ARA ships were in the area. Within less than an hour after notification, there were reinforcements on the ground helping to re-establish the perimeter. In these actions it is obvious that an alert response on the part of those participating, the ability to effectively deliver fire support and reinforcements, and prior coordination were instrumental in defeating a large, well-organized enemy force.

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 - 1 - Army Digest, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Va 22314
 - 1 - Time Magazine, Editorial & Advertizing Office, Time & Life Bldg, Rockefeller Center, N.Y., N.Y. 10020
 - 1 - Saturday Evening Post, Independence Square, Philadelphia, Pa. 19105
 - 1 - Army Magazine 1529 18th St. N.W., Wash, D.C. 20036



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TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MAJOR OPERATIONS

OPERATION: (C)

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BYRD (26 AUG 66 - CONTINUING)

TF 2/7

- 2/7
- C 1/9
- C (-) 8th Engr
- A 1/21 Arty
- C (-) 2/20 Arty (ARA)
- Det: 228 Avn Bn
- Tm 3 (-) 13th Sig Bn
- tm 3 IPW/CI Det 191 MI
- 3d Bde CA Det
- 3d FSE

THAYER II (25 Oct 66 - 11 FEB 67)

1st BRIGADE

- 1/8
- 1/12
- 5/7
- 2/19 Arty (-) DS
- D 2/17 Arty Atch 2/19 Arty
- C 1/21 Arty Atch 2/19 Arty
- A 3/18 Arty GSR 2/19 Arty
- C 8th Engr Bn
- Plat (-) 545th MP
- 25th Scout Dog Plat
- Tm 1 13th Sig
- Tm 1 IPW/CI Det 191 MI
- Tm 5th Weather Squadron
- Tm 41st CA Co

2d BRIGADE

- 2/7
- 1/5 (-)
- 1/7 (-)
- 2/12
- 1/77 Arty (-) DS
- B 1/8 Arty
- A 1/21 Arty
- B (-) 8th Engr
- C 1/30 Arty Reinf 1/77 Arty
- Sq@ Secty Dogs

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2d BRIGADE (CONTINUED)

Tm 2 13th Sig Bn
Tm 2 IPW/CI 191 MI
Tm 5th Weather Squadron

3d BRIGADE

2/8
C 1/5
1/21 Arty (-) DS
2/17 Arty Reinf
C 6/16 Arty GSR
C 2/19 Arty Reinf 1/21 Arty
C 8th Engr Bn
229 Avn Bn
Plat (-) 545th MP
Sec 25th Scout Dog Plat
Tm 3 13th Sig Bn
Tm 3 IPW/CI Det 191 MI
Tm 3 371st RRC Co
Tm 5th Weather Squadron
Tm 11 41st CA Co

3/25 INF DIV (OPCON TO 1st AIR CAV DIV)

1/14 Inf
1/35 Inf
2/9 Arty (-) DS
A 1/77 Arty Atch
C 5/16 Arty Atch 2/9 Arty
Plat C Trp 4/4 Cav

DIVISION ARTILLERY

2/20 Arty (-) GS
7/13 Arty (-) GS
Plat B/29th Arty (SL)
Btry E/82 Arty
3/18 Arty (-) GS

DIVISION TROOPS

1/9 Cav
8th Engr (-)
4th Avn Gp (-)
13th Sig Bn (-)
191st MI Det (-)

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DIVISION TROOPS (CONTINUED)

371st RRC Co (-)
Det: 31 5th Weather Squadron

PERSHING (11 FEB - CONTINUING)

1st BRIGADE

1/8
1/12
5/7
2/19 Arty (-) DS
D 2/17 Arty Atch 2/19 Arty
C 1/21 Arty Atch 2/19 Arty
A 3/18 Arty GSR 2/19 Arty
C 8th Engr Bn
Plat (-) 545.MP
25th Scout Dog Plat
Tm 13th Sig Bn
Tm 1 IPW/CI 191st MI Det
Tm 5th Weather Squadron
Tm 41st CA Co

2d BRIGADE

2/5
1/5 (-)
1/7 (-)
2/12
1/77 Arty (-) DS
B 1/8 Arty
A 1/21 Arty
B (-) 8th Engr Bn
C 1/30 Arty Reinf 1/77 Arty
Sqd Security Dogs
Tm 2 13th Sig Bn
Tm 2 IPW/CI 191st MI Det
Tm 5th Weather Squadron

3d BRIGADE

2/8
C 1/5
1/21 Arty (-) DS
2/17 Arty Reinf

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PERSHING (CONTINUED)

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3d BRIGADE (cont)

C 6/16 Arty GSR
C 2/19 Arty Reinf 1/21 Arty
C 8th Engr Bn
229th Avn Bn
Plat (-) 545th MP
Sec 25th Sct Dog Plat
Tm 3 13th Sig Bn
Tm 3 IPW/CI 191st MI Det
Tm 3 371st RRC Co
Tm 5th Weather Squad
Tm 11 41st CA Co

3/25 INFANTRY (OPCON to 1st Air Cav)

1/14 Inf
1/35 Inf
2/9 Arty (-) DS
A 1/77 Arty Atch
5/16 Arty Atch
2/9 Arty
Plat C Trp 3/4 Cav

DIVISION ARTILLERY

2/20 Arty (-) GS
7/13 Arty (-) GS
Plat B/29 Arty (SL)
Btry E 82d Arty
3/18 Arty (-) GS

DIVISION TROOPS

1/9 Cav
8th Engr (-)
4th Avn Gp (-)
13th Sig Bn (-)
191st MI Det (-)
371st RRC Co (-)
Det 31 5th Weather Squadron

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LEJEUNE (7 April - 22 April '67)

2d BRIGADE

1/5 Cav
2/5 Cav

TF 3/25 INF (OPCON to 1st Air Cav)

1/35 Inf
1/14 Inf
B 1/9 Cav

DAZZLEM (1 OCT 66 - CONTINUING)

1st BRIGADE

1/8 Cav
2/8 Cav
1/12 Cav

2d BRIGADE

2/12 Cav

3d BRIGADE

1/7 Cav
5/7 Cav

DIVISION ARTILLERY

2/17 Arty
1/21 Arty

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QUARTERLY REPORT
AVIATION

Aviation Operations: During the reporting period, Division Aircraft flew 79414 hours and 232753 sorties, moving 35681 tons of cargo and 265820 troops. In performing these missions, 272 aircraft were hit by hostile fire, 15 being shot down. Of those shot down, 7 were repairable. During the entire period 23 crew members were KIA and 85 WIA as a result of enemy action.

PART I (C)
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT HOUR (MONTHLY)

FEBRUARY 1967	01	OV1	OH13	UH1B	UH1D	CH47	CH54
11th Avn Group	38	237	63	2131	7677	1940	
1/9 Cav Sqdn			2404	2694	1084		
Div Artillery	190		707	1569		130	
Support Command			17		788		105
1st Bde			580		379		
2d Bde			428		378		
3rd Bde			484		395		
DIVISION TOTAL	228	237	4683	6394	10701	2070	105
TOTAL FLYING HOURS	24418		CUMULATIVE 430178				
MARCH 1967	01	OV1	OH13	UH1B	UH1D	CH47	CH54
11th Avn Group		348	15	2647	8411	1729	
1/9 Cav Sqdn			2158	3079	1077		
Div Artillery	199		970	2506		158	
Support Command					879		127
1st Bde			503		346		
2d Bde			460		513		
3rd Bde			573		67		
DIVISION TOTAL	199	348	4679	8282	12495	1887	127
TOTAL FLYING HOURS	27967		CUMULATIVE 458145				

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APRIL 1967	01	OV1	UH1B	OH13	UH1D	CH47	CH54
11th Avn Group		342	2185		8804	2207	
1/9 Cav Sqdn			2497	2336	1318		
Div Artillery	274		2331	953	24	172	
Support Command					748		242
1st Bde				405	337		
2d Bde				482	331		
3rd Bde				544	494		
DIVISION TOTAL	274	342	7017	4719	12056	2379	242
TOTAL FLYING HOURS	27029		CUMULATIVE 485168				

PART II
MAJOR OPERATIONS

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>HRS FLOWN</u>	<u>SORTIES FLOWN</u>	<u>TONS CARGO</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>
THAYER II	23 Oct 66 11 Feb 67	66013	187661	26199	183900
LEJEUNE	7 Apr 67 22 Apr 67	2949	10061	3354	12533

PART III
SUPPORT RENDERED
TO NON - US FORCES

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>CH-47 DAYS</u>	<u>UH-1 DAYS</u>	<u>CH-54 HOURS</u>
Feb 67	ARVN ENGR -1 CH54 ARVN	1	8	1.8
Mar 67	ARVN CIDG	8	12 5	
Apr 67	ARVN	9	10	
TOTALS		18	35	1.8

PART IV
SUPPORT RENDERED
TO NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>CH-47 DAYS</u>	<u>UH-1 DAYS</u>	<u>CH-54 HOURS</u>
Feb 67	III MAF, CH46 RECOVERY 1 CH54			3.8

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPOR TED</u>	<u>CH-47 DAYS</u>	<u>UH-1 DAYS</u>	<u>CH-54 HOURS</u>
Feb 67	CB Special Forces Recovery-CH46, Move Engr Equip 1 CH54			11.3
	3/25 Inf	4	1	
	Task Force One	7		
Mar 67	III MAF, Move ENGR EQUIP 4 CH54			9.3
	4th Inf, Move ENGR EQUIP 4 CH54			10.5
	IFFV, MOVE ENGR EQUIP 1 CH54			4.6
	3/25 Inf	5	5	
	TASK FORCE ONE	13		
	SPECIAL FORCES		3	
	1/35th Arty		1	
	1/14th Arty		1	
NO REPORT FOR APRIL 1967				

PART V
SIGNIFICANT AVIATION OPERATIONS
PERFORMED BY ORGANIC AIRCRAFT

- 23 Oct 66 - 11 Feb 67 OPERATION "THAYER II"

142 Infantry Battalions Airlifted
78 Artillery Batteries Airlifted
- 7 Apr 67 - 22 Apr 67 OPERATION "LEJEUNE"

6 Infantry Battalions Airlifted
24 Artillery Batteries Airlifted

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PART VI
MONTHLY AVIATION STATISTICS

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>FLYING HOURS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>TONS CARGO</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>
Feb 67	24418	70230	16472	91358
Mar 67	27967	81630	9349	94288
Apr 67	27029	80893	10860	80174
CUMULATIVE	79414	232753	35681	265820

PART VII
AIRCRAFT HIT DATA AND AVIATION CASUALTIES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL HITS</u>	<u>SRP</u>	<u>SRN</u>	<u>SNR</u>	<u>DAG</u>	<u>DEG</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
11th Avn Group	84	4	1	1	10	0	9	28	0
1/9 Cav Sqdn	134	0	0	6	0	0	14	41	5
Div Artillery	20	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Support Command	18	0	0	0	4	0	0	8	0
1st Bde	8	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0
2d Bde	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
3rd Bde	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CUMULATIVE	272	7	1	7	15	0	23	85	6

PART VIII
MONTHLY MISSION READY AIRCRAFT AVILABILITY

<u>% AVAILABLE</u>	<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>							
	<u>OH13</u>	<u>UH1B/C</u>	<u>UH1D</u>	<u>CH47</u>	<u>CH54</u>	<u>OV1</u>	<u>O1</u>	<u>ACH47</u>
Feb 67	72	77	71	59	82	44	69	---
Mar 67	74	73	74	64	74	72	62	85
Apr 67	73	66	71	49	54	75	88	86
CUMULATIVE	219	216	216	172	210	191	219	171

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SUPPORTING FORCES:

DAZZLEM: 010600 Feb 67 - 010600 May 67

TAC AIR	Missions: 197	B-52	Missions: 2
	Sorties: 490		Sorties: 18
	Bombs: 712000 lbs		Bombs: 324 tons
	Napalm: 344500 lbs		
	Rockets: 608		

LEJEUNE: 070600 Apr 67 - 190600 Apr 1967

TAC AIR	Missions: 54
	Sorties: 220
	Bombs: 205,000 lbs
	Napalm: 111,000 lbs
	Rockets: 524

THAYER II: 010600 Feb 67 - 111315 Feb 67

TAC AIR	Missions: 73	B-52	Missions: 4
	Sorties: 212		Sorties: 45
	Bombs: 300,750 lbs		Bombs: 810 tons
	Napalm: 150,000 lbs		
	Rockets: 722		

PERSHING: 111315 Feb 67 - 010600 May 67

TAC AIR	Missions: 1020	B-52	Missions: 14
	Sorties: 2347		Sorties: 108
	Bombs: 3,921,200 lbs		Bombs: 2352 tons
	Napalm: 1,524,750 lbs		
	Rockets: 3049		

Totals for period 010600 Feb 67 - 010600 May 67

TAC AIR	Missions: 1344	B-52	Missions: 20
	Sorties: 3269		Sorties: 171
	Bombs: 5,138,950 lbs		Bombs: 3486 tons
	Napalm: 2,130,250 lbs		
	Rockets: 4903		

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
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PSYOPS LEAFLETS

Nature and purpose: Psyops Leaflets have an effect upon the immediate attitude and behavior of the enemy soldier and consequently the battle situation. Essentially, the leaflet is a message from one soldier to another. As such it is simple and direct in language, limited in scope and timely in employment.



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FRONT

LEAFLET NUMBER: 245(P)-140-67 AMOUNT: 200,000 REQUESTOR: 4th Inf Div
 THEME: Political or Military Leadership?
 TARGET: 8th Bn, 66th NVA Regiment
 REASON FOR DEVELOPMENT: Create discord between political and military leaders.

AI LÃ VỊ CHỈ HUY



MỘT VỊ CHỈ HUY QUÂN SỰ GIỎI



MỘT VỊ CHỈ HUY CHÍNH TRỊ

WHO IS IN COMMAND ?

A GOOD MILITARY LEADER

A POLITICAL LEADER

BACK

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GỬI ĐẠI-UY DẠP TIỂU-ĐOÀN-TRƯỞNG TIỂU-ĐOÀN 8 TRUNG-ĐOÀN 66
NGÀY 17 THÁNG 2 NĂM 1967, TRUNG-SĨ-1 NGUYỄN-KIM-BANG THUỘC
ĐẠI-ĐỘI 6 CỦA ĐƠN-VỊ ĐẠI-UY BỊ LỰC-LƯỢNG HOA-KỲ BẮT GIỮ. KHI
CHÚNG TÔI TÌM THẤY ANH THÌ ANH NÀY BỊ THƯƠNG RẤT NẶNG. CÁC
BÁC-SĨ ĐÃ BĂNG BÓ VẾT THƯƠNG CHO ANH VÀ ĐƯA ANH VỀ PLEIKU
BĂNG TRÚC THĂNG. BÂY GIỜ NGƯỜI TRUNG-SĨ NÀY BỊ THƯƠNG ĐƯỢC
NẤM GIƯỜNG SẠCH CÓ CƠM NÓNG BA BỮA MỖI NGÀY VÀ CHẮNG BAO
LẤU ANH TA SẼ LÀNH BỆNH.
TRUNG-SĨ 1 BĂNG MÂY MÀN LẠM MỖI SỜNG ĐƯỢC. GIÁ ANH SỜNG
THÊM VÀI GIỜ NỮA TRONG RỪNG SẬU, CHẮC ANH TA SẼ CHẾT NHƯ
MỘT CON VẬT VẬY.

ĐẠI UY HOA VÀ ĐẠI UY LAN. CÁC VỊ ĐỀU LÀ QUÂN NHÂN CẢ, SAO
CÁC VỊ LAI ĐỀ CHO NHỮNG SỰ VIỆC NHƯ THỂ XẢY RA CHO BINH SĨ
THUỘC HẠ CỦA MINH. CỐ PHẢI VỊ ĐẠI UY HOA NGƯỜI CHÍNH TRỊ VIÊN
MÀ CÁC LÃNH TỰ HẠ NỘI PHẢI TÔI ĐỀ KIỂM TOA NHỮNG HÀNH ĐỘNG
CỦA QUI VỊ CHẮNG? CHẮC CHẮN ĐẠI UY CHẮNG BAO GIỜ TẤN NHẬP
ĐỐI VỚI MỘT CHIẾN SĨ. AI LÀ NGƯỜI CHỈ HUY TIỂU ĐOÀN 8? ĐẠI UY
HAY ĐẠI UY HOA?

245(P)-140-67

To CPT Dap, CO 8th Bn, 66th Regiment

On 17 Feb 67, Msgt Nguyen Kim Bang of your 6th Co was captured by US Forces. When we found him he was badly wounded. Our doctors bandaged his wounds and evacuated him by helicopter to Pleiku where he now rests in a clean bed, has three hot meals each day and soon will be well. Msgt Bang is most fortunate to have lived. A few more hours alone in the jungle and he would have died like an unwanted dog.

Cpt Dap and Cpt Lan, you are military men. Why do you allow such things to happen to your men? Is it because of Cpt Hoa, the political officer whom the leaders in Hanoi have sent to be your conscience? Surely you would not commit such an atrocity against a soldier. Who is the commander of the 8th Bn? you or Cpt Hoa?

245(P)-140-67

FRONT

111
LEAFLET NUMBER: 245(P)-153-67 AMOUNT: 500,000 REQUESTOR: 4th Div

THEME: Stay in your hamlet after dark

TARGET: Hamlets in 4th Div AO

REASON FOR DEVELOPMENT: To keep people in their hamlets at night.

SU ĐOÀN 4 (4th DIVISION) MY TRUH TI ANAI MOGANG MNUIH BUON SANG, HLAM EPOL SU ĐOAN ANAN AMAO MAO DUI KOBIA ETAIH MAT MLAM, HLOI PO KOBIA ETAC ENGAO NGA KO AYONG ADEI MOGANG BUON SANG MIN PHUNG ROH VIET-CONG LEH ANAN ARANG PONAH MTAM.

PHUNG IH MOGANG IH PO LEH ANAN PUK SANG IH PO HOKDRU PHUNG HMEI MOGANG AYONG ADEI. MAT MLAM AYONG ADEI DOK HLAM BUON SANG AMAO MAO DUI HIU KOBUI.

245(P)-153-67

The American 4th Division has come here to protect you. In order to insure your safety, the 4th Div requests you to stay in your hamlet after dark. Anyone seen outside after dark, may be mistaken for a VC and accidentally shot.

Protect yourself and your family. Help the 4th Div to protect you. Stay in your hamlets after dark.

245(P)-153-67

BACK

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SỨ ĐOÀN 4 BỘ BINH HOA KỸ TỚI ĐÂY ĐỂ BẢO VỆ ĐỒNG BÀO VÀ GIỮ GIỮ AN NINH CHO ĐỒNG BÀO. VẬY YÊU CẦU ĐỒNG BÀO TRONG KHU VỰC CỦA SỨ ĐOÀN HÃY Ở YÊN TRONG ẤP ĐỪNG RA NGOÀI KHÍ TRỜI TỐI. NGƯỜI NÀO RA NGOÀI BAN ĐÊM LÂM NHÂN VIÊN THỬA HÀNH CÓ THỂ TƯƠNG LÂM LÃ VIỆT CỘNG VÀ HỌ SẼ BỊ BẮN OAN.
HÃY TỰ BẢO VỆ LẤY BẠN VÀ GIA ĐÌNH BẠN. GIÚP ĐỠ CHÚNG TÔI BẢO VỆ CÁC BẠN. HÃY Ở YÊN TRONG ẤP LÚC VỀ TỐI!

The American 4th Division has come here to protect you. In order to insure your safety, the 4th Div requests you to stay in your hamlet after dark. Anyone seen outside after dark, may be mistaken for a VC and accidentally shot.

Protect yourself and your family. Help the 4th Div to protect you. Stay in your hamlets after dark.

245(P)-153-67

FRONT

113
LEAFLET NUMBER: 245(P)-154-67 AMOUNT: 200,000 REQUESTOR: Special Forces, C-2 Det

THEME: VC have lost on all fronts.

TARGET: Special Forces, Det. B-22 - AO

REASON FOR DEVELOPMENT: To demoralize the Viet Cong.

QUÂN DÂN VINH-THANH SẼ BẢO TOÀN AN NINH VÀ XÂY DỰNG
LẠI ĐỜI SỐNG AN VUI CỦA HỌ.

BỘN VIỆT CÔNG CANG NGÀY CANG THẢI BẠI NẶNG NỀ TRÊN
KHÁP CÁC CHIẾN TRƯỜNG.

NHƯNG AI CÓ THÂN NHÂN THEO VC SẼ BỊ NHẬN DẤU TRÚNG
PHẠT XỬNG ĐÁNG./.

245(P)-154-67

The soldiers and civilians of Vinh Thanh will maintain security and
rebuild their lives in liberty and happiness.

All VC units have lost and they will loose more miserably on all
fronts.

The families who have sons, husbands and fathers who are VC and
have relatives with them will be punished by fellow villagers.

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BACK

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QUÂN DÂN VINH-THANH SẼ BẢO TOÀN AN NINH VÀ XÂY DỰNG
LẠI ĐỜI SỐNG AN VUI CỦA HỌ.
BỌN VIỆT CỘNG CANG NGÀY CANG THỐI BẠI NẶNG NỀ TRÊN
KHẮP CÁC CHIẾN TRƯỜNG.
NHỮNG AI CÓ THÂN NHÂN THEO VC SẼ BỊ NHẬN DẤU TRƯNG
PHẠT XỬNG ĐÁNG. /.

245(P)-154-67

The soldiers and civilians of Vinh Thanh will maintain security and rebuild their lives in liberty and happiness.

All VC units have lost and they will loose more miserably on all fronts.

The families who have sons, husbands and fathers who are VC and have relatives with them will be punished by fellow villagers.

245(P)-154-67

FRONT

LEAFLET NUMBER: 245(P)-129-67 AMOUNT: 50,000 REQUESTOR: 1st Cav Div

THEME: Story of NVA Aidman

TARGET: 1st Cav - AO

REASON FOR DEVELOPMENT: Show good US medical treatment, and encourage VC to Chieu Hoi.

113



BACK

116

Các đồng chí Quân Đội miền Bắc.

Tôi là một y tá thuộc đại đội súng cối 124, trung đoàn 18, Sư Đoàn 325. Trong tháng Giêng, tôi đã thấy truyền đơn và nghe Quân-Đội Mỹ phóng thanh rằng họ sẽ ngừng bắn để kêu gọi binh sĩ của Trung Đoàn 18 trở về hồi chánh. Trong truyền đơn có in bản đồ ghi rõ vị trí đóng quân của chúng ta và chỉ dẫn cho chúng ta địa điểm tiếp đón khi chúng ta thực tâm quay về với Chánh-Nghĩa. Địa điểm đó là một đám khói đen và một lá cờ của Chánh-Phủ VNCH. Các cán bộ đã tuyên truyền và nhồi sọ chúng ta, và ngày 19-1, khi cuộc ngừng bắn bắt đầu, thì bọn cán bộ lại tăng cường sự canh gác và kiểm soát không ai được ra khỏi vị trí.

Mãi đến ngày 12-2-1967 tôi đã dùng tờ bản đồ đó đi về phía Nam thung lũng Suối Cao, tôi đã vẫy tay khi thấy trực thăng bay ngang, và họ đã đáp xuống đón tôi, về đây tôi mới thấy có nhiều đồng chí khác đã trở về Hồi-Chánh trước tôi, có cả các đồng chí bị bắt nửa, người bị thương kẻ đau yếu, nhưng chúng tôi đã được đối xử tử tế, được săn sóc thuốc men và mọi thứ, trái hẳn với lời tuyên truyền xảo trá của các cán-bộ VC.

245 (P)-129-67

Nguyễn Quang Nhung

Comrades of the NVA.

I am a medical aidman with the 124th Mortar Company, 18th Regt, 325th Div. In January, the Americans told us with leaflets and loudspeaker messages that they were going to have a cease fire for soldiers in the 18th Regiment to return to the GVN. The leaflets had maps of the area where we were located on them. They indicated the positions where troops would be to accept returnees. They marked the positions with black smoke and GVN flags.

In my company the cadre started an immediate indoctrination to discourage rallying. But they did not trust us at all. On the 19th of January when all firing ceased, the cadre kept us all together in position and would not let anyone go anywhere.

Later, on 12 February 1967, I used the map to go south in the Soul Ca valley. I waved both hands at a helicopter and they picked me up. They treated me very well. Many others here also rallied. There are a great number of comrades who have been taken prisoner. Some of the prisoners who were slightly wounded before being captured, told me they saw many other seriously wounded comrades in the American hospitals. They said the Americans have all kinds of medical equipment and many doctors. We all enjoyed riding in helicopters.

245(P)-129-67

Nguyễn Quang Nhung