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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (14 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-674210

20 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. Stanfield
C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 196TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96256

4VBFS4-HO

10 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967.
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Operational Report for Quarterly Period (RCS CSFOR-65)
Location: Vicinity, Chu Lai (BT550015), RVN
Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Frank H. Linnell
Prepared by: 1Lt Patrick A. Di Napoli, Brigade Staff Historian

1. Significant Organizational Activities:

a. Personnel and Administration:

(1) Personnel General:

(a) Infusion and Rotation Program:

1. To reduce the rotational hump which would have occurred in July 1968, an infusion program was devised accordingly. This plan provided for the infusion on 429 EM and 21 officers with the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. Briefly stated, the plan provided for this Brigade to ship personnel in aforementioned numbers to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and to receive a similar number of replacements from the pipeline. Major problems encountered were mainly air transportation problems and non-receipt of some replacements from the pipeline in MOS's and quantities required.

2. As the results of a change in October 1967 in USARV's policy for the computation of rotational humps, new rotational humps were encountered. The previous method of computing humps was based on assigned strengths; however, in October the method of computation was changed and required humps were to be computed based on authorized strengths. Since the Brigade had been operating with an over-strength, new humps were incurred for some months. Further, the policy required separate computation for officers (including warrant officers) and enlisted men. Since the Brigade had never implemented an effective infusion plan for officers, when humps were computed, almost every unit came up with a hump for June and July. Where possible, these hump problems will be solved within the Brigade and with other Brigades of the Americal Division. Where hump problems can't be resolved in this manner, they will be reported to USARV for solution in accordance with applicable USARV directives.

(b) Personnel Records: The problem of replacements arriving

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without records has been greatly reduced. This has been caused mainly by the change in Department of the Army policy which now permits all personnel to hand carry their records. Actions are still being taken to obtain records which were previously not received. Also, actions are being taken to dispose of records of individuals who were scheduled for assignment to this command, but were apparently diverted to some other unit in RVII.

(c) Assignment Instructions: Although the Brigade has experienced an increase in the timely receipt of assignment instructions, some difficulties are still encountered in this area. USARV has been most helpful and cooperative and has taken prompt action to obtain missing assignment instructions when so notified. This is an area that is kept under continuous surveillance.

(d) MOS Shortages: This command is experiencing an MOS shortage in the senior grade 11 series: 81 Auth, 76 Asg. We have also had shortages in experienced senior grade replacements in the supply and maintenance field (MOS series: 76 10 Auth, 3 Asg, 7 E6's on Sect. 11 req; MOS series: 63 2 Auth, 0 Asg, 2 on Sect. 1 requisition). We have requisitioned the appropriate senior grades, but have been receiving grade substitutions one grade lower than the required grade. In the 8th Sgt Bn, there are two positions, 63Z50, for which replacements were requisitioned for July 67. To date we have not received fill action.

(e) Eligibility for Promotion: For the months of September, October, and (projected) November, we have not been able to promote any personnel from grade E3 to grade E4, due to an excess of personnel in higher grades. This problem was compounded somewhat by a special DA allocation in October 67 to 28 E4 promotions, to be used without regard to position vacancy. We have no problem in the E5 and E6 areas, and are receiving cancelled Section 11 requisitions on senior grades, for which promotions are made as quotas are received. On May 68 requisitions, 18 positions have not been cancelled: (6-11E40, 2-11F50, 1-13E40, 2-13B50, 1-31G50, 171E40, 2-76E40, 1-76E40, 1-76Z50, and 1-95D20). For June 68 requisitions, 1-11F50, 1-63Z50, 3-76E40 have not been cancelled.

(2) Personnel:

(a) Strength as of last day of report period.

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WC</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Auth.	254	24	3733	4011
Asg	268	25	4135	4428
PDY	249	25	3967	4241

(b) Losses and Gains:

1. Losses for the period:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
KIA	0	0	21	21
MIA	0	0	27	27
DEA	0	0	0	0

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2. Gains for the period:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
67	4	978	1049

(c) Key personnel gains:

<u>GRADE/NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATE ASSUMED POSITION</u>	<u>DATE ARRIVED IN-COUNTRY</u>
COL GELLING, Louis	Bde C6	31 Oct 67	8 Jun 67
LTC THOMAS, Jack D.	Bde XO	1 Aug 67	10 Jul 67
MAJ HOWARD, John O.	Bde S-1	1 Oct 67	18 Mar 67
MAJ LOGAN, Laddie B.	Bde S-2	8 Sep 67	13 Jul 67
MAJ MAC DONALD, Bruce S.	Bde Surg	4 Aug 67	2 Aug 67
MAJ WILKE, Frederic W.	Avn Staff O	7 Sep 67	11 Jul 67
LTC REESE, Grady G.	CO, 8th Spt	10 Oct 67	4 Jul 67
MAJ FORSYTH, Frank R. Jr.	XO, 8th Spt	11 Oct 67	18 Jun 67
MAJ MATTS, John H.	Bde AG	19 Aug 67	18 Aug 67
LTC HANCOCK, Lyman H. Jr.	CO, 2/1st	11 Oct 67	9 Jul 67
MAJ WILLETT, Frank	S-3, 2/1st	1 Aug 67	28 Jun 67
MAJ LASCOLO, Harry R.	XO, 3/21st	1 Oct 67	21 Jul 67
MAJ BURCHFIELD, Walter D.	S-3, 3/21st	31 Oct 67	24 Jun 67
MAJ DEHRY, Davis M. Jr.	CO, 569th MID	11 Sep 67	9 Sep 67

(d) Awards and decorations approved: DFC 2, SS 19, LOM 12, SM 8, ES 183, AM 87, ACM, 208, PH 196

(3) Administrative Services:

(a) Staff Judge Advocate:

1. During the subject period, 17 August 1967 to 31 October 1967, the scope of the Staff Judge Advocate activities expanded in terms of heavier volumes of legal assistance cases, supervision of courts and boards activities, and general administration.

2. There were approximately 230 legal assistance cases processed.

3. There were five (5) General courts processed, thirty-eight (38) Special courts, and four (4) Summary courts processed.

4. Foreign National claims and solatium diminished in volume slightly, reflecting greater care on the part of Brigade units, and an increased emphasis on safety. During the subject period, approximately thirty-five (35) solatium payments were processed. Incidents of service claims increased markedly over the preceding period, twelve (12) such claims were processed.

(b) Financial:

(a) General:

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1. Financial operations during the period have remained unchanged. The extreme work levels experienced during the buildings in June and July leveled off during August & September, with an increase in October due to the infusion with the 199th Brigade. No major problems were encountered. However; the high turnover of Finance clerks in November was solved by the early assignment of replacements.

2. Total payments made on Military Pay Vouchers for the period was 18000.

3. Formal record of pay complaints has not been maintained since it is felt that no major problems exist in this area. Pay complaints are dealt with on an individual basis, and corrective action taken immediately. This section has had one case of IG interest, and that was caused by an error outside this command. The problem was resolved to the satisfaction of both the member and IG.

4. Total travel vouchers processed during the period including PCS, Dep TVL, and TDY was 1287.

(5) Chaplain activities:

(a) General comment on activities .

1. Religious coverage continued to be the primary concern of the Brigade Chaplain Section.

2. The arrangement of having an assistant Brigade Chaplain attached to each of the line Battalions and the 8th Support Battalion has proved to be highly effective. There has been little difficulty encountered in providing adequate religious services for the Brigade.

3. Jewish personnel were provided with the opportunity of attending the observance of the High Holy Days in Da Nang. About 50% of them took advantage of the opportunity. Weekly Jewish services are held at Americal Headquarters Chapel.

4. Hospital visitation was carried out by all the Brigade Chaplains.

5. The Character Audance Program was carried out by means of distributing handouts on the monthly topic down to the company level.

6. Area coverage was provided by the Brigade Catholic Chaplains for units that do not have a Catholic Chaplain. In the 3 month reporting period 48 services were provided for these units.

(b) Total services conducted and attendance:

1. Protestant - 206 services with 4,156 attending.

2. Catholic - 335 services with 6,103 attending.

3. Jewish - No record since services are held by Americal Division on an area basis. Twelve Jewish personnel from the Brigade attended High Holy Days in Da Nang.

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(6) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) Base camp operations:

1. Daily Military Police commitments for the 196th Lt Inf Bde include, but are not limited to, security of the Bde Tactical Operations Center and the II qs, flag detail, manning entrance gates, motor patrols, traffic control points, CHECKGATES and Vietnamese Nationals, escorting VIP'S and tactical convoys, securing and controlling traffic over bridges in tactical area of operations and swiftboat river patrols. Controlling speed violators, enforcing uniform regulations and conducting criminal investigations within the 196th Bde area of operations.

2. Indigenous personnel are processed through the Main Gate entering and leaving the 196th Bde area and are spot checked, (baggage, parcels, etc.) by the Military Policemen on duty. Approximately 11,520 indigenous personnel have been processed to work in the 196th Lt Inf Bde area through joint effort of S-1 and the Provost Marshal Office.

3. The Military Police Platoon does not have a RV collections point as such, however 2 MP's assigned to each of the Bde battalions are responsible for transporting of RV's to the division RV collection point from the battalion concerned. Exact amount from August 1 1967 to October 1967 is 413.

4. 56 convoy escorts were conducted by the 196th MP platoon. Also the platoon is involved for TCP's, escort duty and brigade security for all tactical operations in the brigade area of operations.

5. The MP Platoon assists customs and company commanders in assuring that all privately owned firearms are properly registered by enforcing MACV Directive 210-5 with Change 1.

6. Law and order. 148 non traffic violations, 83 traffic violations, 30 CID cases and 20 motor vehicle accidents were investigated. There were 7 motor vehicle connected fatalities during the period.

(b) Tactical support:

1. The 196th MP Platoon was involved in 5 operations, Hood River, Benton, Golden Floece, Wheeler and Mallova.

2. The exact number of detainees processed is unknown, see paragraph (3) # above.

(7) Postal Services:

(a) General - During this period plans and coordination was made with staff sections for Operation Silver Star (Christmas Mail Season) commencing on 1 October and terminating on 31 December 1967.

(b) Mail processed (pounds):

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2. Dispatched - 70,274

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(c) Total amount of Money Orders sold was \$1,008,601.27.

(b) Total amount of stamps sold was \$14,630.00.

(8) Post Exchange Services:

(a) During the quarter, a mobile PX Barber shop was introduced to the troops of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. It has most of the stateside luxuries and has five chairs. A Xerox Laundry pick-up point was opened beside the Brigade PX and also a tailor shop was added near the end of the quarter, the tailor shop does mending, sewing, etc.

(b) Total sales for the quarter were \$199,262.80. This is lower than previous quarters due to limited merchandise and beverages available from the Da Nang area.

(c) Plans are now being made to move the PX to the rear area on our future move with daily truck service to the forward areas until a PX can be built, this may again produce a low quarter in sales.

(9) Special Services Activities:

(a) Since last quarter we have received from American Division, and distributed to units of this Brigade 20 Athletic and Recreation kits, 10 Televisions, 10 Radios, and 3 Tape Recorders.

(b) There have been six (6) USO shows:

1. Robert Stuck visit 4 Aug 1967, Attendance: 400
2. William Talghman visit 10 Aug 1967, Attendance: 400
3. Mondays Children Show, 25 Aug 1967, Attendance: 500
4. Joey Eilers Show, 26 Aug 1967, Attendance: 500
5. Roll & Soul Show, 5 Sept 1967, Attendance: 250
6. America's Children, 26 Sept 1967, Attendance: 500

(c) Number of R & R:

1. In Country:

a. Tung Tau (Aug - Oct): 60

b. China Beach (Aug - Oct): 425

2. Out of Country:

a. via Cam Ranh Bay (Sept): 187

b. via Da Nang (Aug - Oct): 1776

(d) There have been 828 film showings.

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b. Operations:

(1) General: The Brigade is assigned the mission of securing the Chu Lai airfield and administrative complex, of providing a shield for Revolutionary Development within the TAOR and without it as directed. During the period 1 August to 31 October 1967 there was one major operation and 11,223 small unit operations, the major operation and 447 small unit operations resulted in enemy contact.

(2) Operation BERTON

(a) Inclusive Dates: 140620 August to 010600 Sept 67.

(b) Task Organization:

1. 1st Battalion 14th Infantry(-).
2. 2d Battalion 1st Infantry(-).
3. 3d Battalion 52d Artillery(-).

(c) Task Force Oregon directed the 196th Lt Inf. Bde to conduct operations in zone to locate, fix, and destroy VC/NVA forces and resources.

(d) Location: Quang Tin Province RVN.

(e) Operation BERTON was a search and destroy operation. Troops moved to the area of operations by foot and by helicopter.

(f) Results:

1. Friendly Losses:

- | | | |
|----|----------------------|----|
| a. | KIA | 4 |
| b. | WIA | 40 |
| c. | ARVN Interpreter WIA | 1 |

2. Enemy Losses:

- | | | |
|----|-----------------|----------|
| a. | VC KIA (C) | 87 |
| b. | VC KIA (P) | 80 |
| c. | Detainees | 104 |
| d. | VC POW | 4 |
| e. | Returnees | 4 |
| f. | Weapons | 25 |
| g. | AT mines | 1 |
| h. | AP mines | 51 |
| i. | Small arms ammo | 810 rds |
| j. | Shotgun shells | 2525 rds |
| k. | Hand grenades | 12 |
| l. | Arty rds | 2 |
| m. | 250 lb bombs | 5 |

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n.	Booby traps	45
o.	Bunkers	173
p.	Tunnels	40
q.	Fox Holes	3
r.	Trenches	10
s.	Caves	2
t.	Structures	151
v.	Punji stakes	153
w.	Punji pit	9
x.	Rice	1505 lbs
y.	AA/A positions	4

(3) Artillery:

(a) Rounds fired: 53,819

(b) Results:

1.	VC KIA (G)	12
2.	VC KIA (P)	119
3.	Structures destroyed	4
4.	Bunkers destroyed	0
5.	Secondary fires & explosions	1
6.	Sampans destroyed	0

(4) Air Support:

(a) Number of Tactical Sorties Flown: 1124

1.	VC KIA (G)	73
2.	VC KIA (P)	81
3.	Structures destroyed	608
4.	Bunkers destroyed	174
5.	Secondary fires & explosions	36
6.	Sampans destroyed	0

(3) Training and Organization:

(a) General: The overall training status of the Bde. remains excellent. Upon reporting to the Brigade each enlisted man attended a six day and each officer a three day orientation course at the Charger Academy.

(b) 81 officers and 1,229 enlisted men processed through the Charger Academy during the reporting period.

(c) The 196th Lt Inf Bde. submitted a number of recommended changes to the organization during the reporting period. These almost, without exception, apply to HQ and administrative units which require augmentation in order to adequately accomplish their support mission.

1. MTOE's were submitted on the following units.

a. Hq & Hq Co 196th Lt Inf Bde MTOE 77-102T.

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- b. Hq & Hq Det 8th Support Bn MTOE 29-246T.
- c. Admin Co 8th Support Bn MTOE 12-197T.
- d. Supply and Maint Co 8th Support Bn MTOE

29-247T.

2. An MTOE was also submitted on F Troop 17th Cav. This MTOE 17-57G was an attempt to place the IRRP in the command structure of the cavalry troop. It was subsequently disapproved at USARV where a separate MTOE action is proceeding to create it as a separate divisional unit.

3. Incomplete TOE action is currently taking place at USARV, creating a communication company from organic resources within the separate brigades. This action combines the organic communication platoon of the Hq & Hq Co and the attached signal platoon of the brigade under a single company command structure. This action is not yet completed, although the company is currently functionally reorganized.

(6) Scout Dog Platoon and Activities:

(a) Scout Dog Team Strength: 12

(b) Number of Operations: 181

1. Combat patrols: 32

2. S&D: 61

3. S&C: 10

4. Ambush: 37

5. Outpost: 9

6. Recon: 9

7. Village search: 23

(c) Results: 2 VC dummies, 3,120 lbs rice, 1 rifle, 1 fuse plug (155mm), 67 tunnels and spider holes, 1 bunker, 2 L&S, 2 ammo clips, 2 punji pits, 2 grenades, 2 booby-traps, 1 mortar round, 3 shirts, 8 used 105mm and mortar rounds, 2 huts, and unknown amount of documents, paper, food, clothing, wire, batteries, and tools.

(d) Training status: Continuous training daily.

(e) Casualties:

1. Handlers: 1 KIA, 1 MIA

2. Dogs: 1 KIA, 1 MIA

3. VC: 3 KIA, 1 POW

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(7) Chemical Activities

(a) Reporting period: 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967.

(b) The Chemical Detachment during the reporting period has initiated several important new developments in Chemical Corps warfare and expanded accepted areas of interest. The Chemical Corps is responsible for the following areas of activity in Vietnam: (1) Personnel Detection, (2) Riot Control agent employment, (3) Defoliation, and (4) Flame Field expedients. Because of the mission and the situation of the Brigade, the 27th Chemical Detachment has engaged in the first three of these areas listed. The Personnel detection-Sniffer program, was launched by the Detachment in August and has continued to the present. This program has proved itself to be an invaluable source of intelligence both for Brigade operations and the validation of intelligence information. In the field of riot control agents, the Detachment has "seeded" tunnels (to deny enemy reentry); employed CS grenades in a tactical role by aerial delivery assisting maneuvering troops, and terrain denial using CS-1 and the point detonating fuse, M1173, which we devised. The Detachment also has participated in defoliation, by assisting the Brigade S-3 air in Ranchend requests (air force defoliation program) and by doing base camp and security defoliation. This defoliation is done in both the ground and aerial mode, for the various units of the Brigade. The basic natures of these activities will not change but will vary only as the mission of the Brigade varies.

(c) Listed below are the significant activities of the 27th Chemical Detachment for the reporting period. Aug 67 to 31 Oct 67. Extracted from the detachment operations log.

1. 07 Aug 67 - The Detachment conducted a sixteen (16) drum CS-1 drop vic ESh49974 to ESh63974 with all drums falling on target. No duds.
2. 10 Aug 67 - The Detachment conducted an aerial defoliation exercise using a gravity fed 55 gallon drum apparatus filled with diesel fuel. The target was a ridgeline west of the Brigade base camp and a proposed bunker site vic ESh41013. Results were poor because of the strong vitality of the foliage.
3. 11 Aug 67 - LT Campbell visited the 3d Brigade, 4th Inf Division and 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to obtain ideas concerning Chemical activities in Vietnam. Valuable information on the employment of CS-1 was obtained.
4. 16 Aug 67 - LT Campbell instructed 4/31 on the employment of CS-1 to deny tunnels and spider holes to returning enemy. The Battalion was favorably impressed and decided to try it.
5. 17 Aug 67 - LT Campbell and SFC Jenkins went to the field with 4/31 to instruct the unit in actual employment of CS-1 in tunnel denial.
6. 18 Aug 67 - LT Campbell and SFC Jenkins instructed 1/14 at their field location on tunnel clearing, flushing and denial.

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7. 22 Aug 67 - The Detachment conducted a twenty-five (25) drum CS-1 drop vic BS493895 to BS506896 for 3/21. Area was completely covered with desired heights of burst covering the target area. Drop was within two hundred (200) meters of friendly troops and no hazards were incurred. One dud was destroyed by following artillery.

8. 25-28 Aug 67 - LT Campbell visited DaHang and procured twelve (12) drums of 2,4,5T herbicide. Also coordinated with III MAF in an attempt to locate fifteen (15) HFDs and some ENSURE items.

9. 30 Aug 67 - The Detachment defoliated ridge-line vic BT541013 using 2,4,5T herbicide. A UH1D with a 55 gallon drum gravity feed was used giving complete kill within two weeks. (One part defoliant to four parts water used.)

10. 30 Aug 67 - The Detachment conducted a fifty (50) drum CS-1 drop vic BT309008 to BT319002 for 2/1. Eight duds resulted from faulty fuse lighters and were destroyed by artillery and airstrikes. Target was an enemy MSR.

11. 15 Sep 67 - The Detachment defoliated HHC bunker line around the base camp perimeter using H106 and a PDL from 94th S&S. Mixture was 1:1 and kill resulted in two days.

12. 15 Sep-20 Sep 67 - LT Campbell visited 1st Infantry Division at Dien, 9th Infantry Division at Bearcat and USARV Headquarters. Valuable information concerning Chemical employment and HFD usage was obtained. Seven "sniffer" missions were flown with the 1st Division. HFD machines and parts were obtained from General Electric Technical Representatives at USARV Headquarters. USARV Chemical officer, HHC Adams, promised to include the 196th Lt Inf Bde in more ENSURE item allocations.

13. 22 Sep 67 - The detachment defoliated the base camp perimeter of 2/1 vic Hill 69 and An Tan bridge. Kill occurred within twenty-four (24) hours using 1:1 ratio and H106s and a PDL.

14. 22 Sep 67 - Sniffer mission was flown west of 3/21 AO resulting in nineteen (19) hotspots. One VC KIA (P) was obtained by escorting gunships when he fired on sniffer ship. Weather was good and artillery fired on hotspots for next two days.

15. 25 Sep 67 - Sniffer mission was flown in valley west of 2/1 AO vic BS2898 and BT4307. Seventy-one (71) hotspots were recorded and received fifty (50) rounds 50 Cal fire plus unknown rounds 30 caliber fire. Light gunship team engaged and artillery plus airstrikes were called on position vic BT3002 for four days. Enemy was a Battalion of 21st IMA regiment. Weather good.

16. 26 Sep 67 - Sniffer mission flown west of 3/21 AO. Area consisted of valleys and ridgelines out as far as BS3393 but not returned. Located enemy MSR north of Tri Bong. This was 1st mission using a FAC and his thorough knowledge of area and on call firepower offered accuracy not previously possible. Team for sniffer missions

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consists of EIC, UH1^D rescue ship, UH1D sniffership and light gun team. Located eighty-five (85) hotspots. Weather good.

17. 29 Sep 67 - Sniffer mission flown west of 2/1 and ridgeline west of AO Leopard. This mission was flown twenty (20) kilometers west of AO Leopard. Located 120 hotspots revealing ISRs and enemy base camp location. Area too far away to be fired on by artillery.

18. 30 Sep 67 - The Detachment conducted a twenty (20) drum CS-1 drop via BT265029 to BT265011 on a sniffer enemy location. A secondary explosion occurred at BT265011 and two (2) duds resulted.

19. 01 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown on ridgeline west of AO Leopard producing forty-six (46) hotspots. Revealed enemy ISRs which had been followed for two weeks. Mission followed by artillery H.I. Weather good.

20. 04 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown in 2/1 AO and ridgeline west of AO Leopard. Gusting winds to twenty (20) knots prevented accurate readings. Received a few rounds small arms fire via BTL404 but was too close to village to return fire.

21. 04 Oct 67 - The Detachment conducted a twenty (20) drum CS-1 drop via BSL67944 and BSL74944 on a known enemy base camp location in 3/21 AO. Four duds resulted but area was covered.

22. 06 Oct 67 - LT Campbell instructed MAJ Day, CO of C&P and C&G units in Chu Iai (Marine) on the use of E8 launchers. Gave them twenty-seven (27) launchers for use in C&P compounds for defense.

23. 10 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown west of AO Leopard with few significant hotspots. Artillery fired on hotspot locations. Weather good.

24. 10 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown west of AO Leopard in late evening to determine validity of intelligence report of mortar threat. Ten hotspots recorded and received ten (10) rounds small arms fire that was returned by gunships. Threat proved inconsequential.

25. 13 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown in AO of 2/1, 1/1 and west of AO Leopard. Fifteen (15) hotspots received just outside 2/1 AO. Artillery fired on hotspot and ground troops in area received small arms fire from area of readings. Weather good.

26. 13 Oct 67 - Two drums of CS-1 were dropped from a UH1D to test our point detonating fuse. The fuse activated in both cases but in one drum the demolitions were improperly placed and did not explode. A fuse lighter was also used as a back up to insure proper detonation.

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27. 16 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown west of 2/1 and 3/21 LOCs. Due to winds of twenty (20) knots no accurate results could be obtained.

28. 17 Oct - LT Campbell and SFC Jenkins visited 1 Co, 3/21 at their field location to instruct them on proper seeding of tunnels for terrain denial. CS-1 usage in 4/31 has proved extremely effective and 3/21 desired to learn the technique.

29. 19 Oct 67 - The Detachment conducted second in a series of tests on the point detonating fuse. Ten drums of CS-1 were dropped with 100% detonation. This fuse has proved perfect and solved a large problem of effective CS-1 coverage.

30. 21 Oct 67 - Sniffer mission flown on ridge-line west of AO Leopard inside FLOA. Automatic weapons fire was received vic BS446988 and three (3) hotspots in area. Malfunctioning of IRDs aborted rest of the mission. Winds strong but three readings valid. Gunships and artillery placed fire on the area and a IRD was inserted

31. 21 Oct 67 - The Detachment conducted a CS-1 grenade drop in conjunction with a village sweep vic BT305115. Four hundred grenades were dropped on the upwind side of the village while troops swept the area. All troops, 3 Co, 2/1, were masked and the CS covered the area.

32. 22 Oct 67 - The Detachment tunnel instruction and clearing team cleared ten (10) tunnels vic BT305115 for 3 Co, 2/1. Instruction was also given as to tunnel destruction and denial.

33. 22 Oct 67 - A sniffer mission was flown west of 2/1 LOC in valleys there. Sixty-two hotspots were recorded even with winds up to fifteen knots. Winds prevented accurate location of hotspots. Artillery fixed on results.

34. 23 Oct 67 - A sniffer mission was airborne but just as it started the F-4 was called away to a unit in contact.

35. 25 Oct 67 - A sniffer mission was flown west of 3/21 LOC over suspected enemy units. Twenty (20) hotspots were recorded and automatic weapons fire was received vic BS287968 and was returned by gunships resulting in four (4) VC ML (F).

36. 30 Oct 67 - LT Campbell went to USAW Chemical Conference as representative of the 196th Lt Inf Bde. The conference was an exchange of ideas among all the units present in RVN. The 196th Lt Inf Bde presentation dealt with the point detonating fuse and was well received.

(c) During the reporting period 1LT Jerry E. Campbell served as Detachment commander and Brigade Chemical Officer. The Detachment was minus three (3) TOE slots one (1) E6, 54E40 and two (2) E5s, 54E40.

c. Intelligence:

(1) General:

(a) Throughout the reporting period enemy forces which are located in the Brigade TAOR and immediate adjacent areas generally avoided large scale contacts with the 196th Lt Inf Bde except on the 24th and 26th of September when the 2/11 ACR to the north, gained contact with company size units of the 3rd Regiment, 2nd NVA Division and caused heavy losses to the North Vietnamese Companies. Contacts with squads and reinforced squads were common place during the past ninety days. There were four mortar attacks conducted against Brigade units, one against Brigade units, one against the Chu Lai Defense Command, and four small mortar attacks conducted on Binh Son District Hq and PF in the vicinity of Binh Son. In response to the Government of Vietnam National Elections, the Viet Cong intensified their propaganda and terrorist activities during the last five days of August, and the first five days of September. Despite the Viet Cong efforts 85 - 90% of the population in the Brigade TAOR turned out to vote on the 3d of September. Operation Benton, the Brigades' most successful operation since arriving in Chu Lai, resulted in 87 VC KIA (BC), 4 POW's and 25 individual weapons captured.

(b) Enemy activities were generally confined to guerrilla type activities including harassing, fires, emplacement of mines and booby traps along roads, trails, and other likely avenues of approach. During the reporting period there were a total of 445 VC initiated incidents, including 274 incidents of harassing fire, and 147 incidents of aircraft receiving small arms or automatic weapons fire. A total of 30 incidents occurred where enemy emplaced mines resulted in US casualties or damage/destruction of equipment. Approximately 117 mines were recovered. There were 20 incidents of booby traps causing casualties to Brigade personnel, and a total of 80 booby trap devices were recovered. The number of mines and booby traps found during this period rose significantly, continuing a trend which began during the month of June. Fewer persons were injured by mines and booby traps in September than in any other month.

(c) Viet Cong personnel and equipment losses for the period were:

1	VC KIA (BC)	274	NVA KIA (BC)=74
2	VC KIA (P)	280	NVA KIA (P)= 21
3	VC POW	19	NVA POW = 3
4	Individual & Crew Served Weapons	76	
5	Grain and Rice	11.59	tons
6	Returnees	5	
7	VC Base Camps Discovered	4	Destroyed

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(2) Significant Viet Cong Initiated Incidents:

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(a) On 051235 August, the 1st Platoon, 2/1 Inf observed 1 VC standing at the mouth of a cave at vic BS525895. 1 US soldier maneuvered to the mouth of the cave and was suddenly grabbed and pulled into the cave. During the hand to hand combat that ensued, 1 of 2 VC who were sleeping in the cave, became startled and fled from the cave and subsequently was killed by the patrol outside. The US soldier threw the Viet Cong to the ground, moved out of the cave and threw a grenade into the cave resulting in 2 VC KIA (EC). 1 US carbine was also captured during the encounter.

(b) On 080105 August, an unidentified VC platoon attacked a Revolutionary Development team at My Yen New Life Hamlet at BS599917 from the southwest with SA, AW and hand grenades. RD team returned fire and the VC fled east northeast. Artillery fired illumination and HE in support. 1 RD KHA, 4 RD WFA, 10 VII civilians killed and 18 civilians wounded, resulted from the engagement. VC casualties were unknown.

(c) On 080145 August, an estimated 40 VC entered Huoc Neu Hamlet at BS5776970 and burned all the buildings that US troops frequent. The Viet Cong Guerrillas carried SIG's, carbines and hand grenades. The VC had set up an estimated 3-5 lb charge of C4 with blasting cap along side the road at BS577965. (Possible ambush site for reaction force). 5 civilians were killed, 6 wounded and 4 PF were also wounded. 1 VC was killed during the incident.

(d) On 081050 August, Platoon leader, 1st Platoon, C 1/14 Inf went outside perimeter of LT296134 to relieve himself and was approached by 2 VC, 1 armed with a SIG, the other a knife. The Viet Cong attempted to take the platoon leader's map and weapon. During the fight with the VC, he was stabbed in the arm and leg. The VC fled south as the platoon leader fired at them. His platoon pursued the VC and found the blood stained knife, but nothing further.

(e) On 180945 August, at BS543918 G Troop, 2/11 ACR received 350 rds of SA and 20 rds M-79 from 200 meters north and south from estimated reinforced VC platoon. Fire was returned with heavy SA and M fire and the area was checked with negative findings. At 1020 hrs, while returning to the Troop CP the unit received 10 rds of SA and 10 rds M-79 at BS555918. Fire was returned and the area was checked with negative findings.

(f) On 191415 August, 2nd platoon, C 1/14 Inf located at BT274117 received SA fire from 100 meters southeast. Returned fire, swept area and found 3 VC KIA (EC), 1 AK 47, 1 M-14, and carbine. Several blood trails led to a hootch where 1 VC was seen running. The platoon engaged him resulting in 1 VC KIA (EC). Then the unit fired into the hootch causing a secondary explosion which wounded 3 US (Evac). 2 VC KIA (EC) were found in the hootch. 8 heavy blood trails were found in the area for 8 VC KIA (P).

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(g) On 191645 August, a CH 47 helicopter received a hit in the oil line from enemy ground fire at BS7487C2, which caused the aircraft to make a forced landing. 4 US exited to secure the copter, and at approximately the same time 2 unknown type rounds exploded beside the aircraft. The pilot immediately took off, unknowingly leaving 4 US on the ground. The pilot circled the area and received heavy ground fire resulting in 1 door gunner WIA. The copter landed at Duc Pho and gunships went to extract the 4 soldiers. A ROKMC FAC directed air strikes while a USMC helicopter extracted 3 of the soldiers. 196th Bde helicopter, Charger 914 fired suppressive fire along with a Marine helicopter during the extraction. 3/21 Inf sent a reaction force to extract the US WIA at 1810 hrs. Assault aircraft received ground fire as they flew into the LZ. The WIA was extracted and the reaction force lifted out with no casualties. Gunships and swift boats fired suppressive fires during the extraction.

(h) On 201205 August, C 1/14 Inf found an H-23 helicopter in river vic BT269123. The aircraft was pointed out by a returnee. The copter was the 196th Lt Inf Bde AVN H-23 that went down at an unknown location on 18 June 67, with 2 officers and 1 1st Sgt aboard. Co C rec'd SA and AF fire as they attempted to approach the aircraft in the river. Later in the afternoon a UH1D, Charger 914 rec'd AW fire from BT264122. Gunships assaulted the enemy location and rec'd ground fire from BT262125. An airstrike was directed into the area, during which one fighter rec'd an unknown number of hits from an enemy location vic BT231123. Results of the friendly fire were 9 VC KIA (EC), and 10 VC KIA (P). The H-23 was lifted from the location, and investigation showed numerous holes in the underside of the aircraft, however, the copter appeared to have made a safe landing. The three persons on the chopper are listed as missing in action.

(i) On 211000 August, B 1/14 Inf rec'd heavy AW fire from BT275078 and BT272073. Fire was returned, gunships and FAC air supported in the engagement. Area check revealed the following items: 2 huts at BT275077 contained 2 model 1911 shotguns, 1 US Carbine, 2 SKS, 3 Soviet carbines, 2 shotgun barrels, 400 rounds Soviet 7.62 ammo, 50 AP mines, 40 M-79 rds, misc booby trap equipment and misc weapons parts. 2 VC KIA (EC) were found in the area. No unit identification.

(j) On 251845 August, C 1/14 Inf located 3 huts and a cave at BT260115 and engaged 11 armed VC in the base area resulting in 7 VC KIA (EC), and 4 weapons captured. Co C moved to the cave, heard movement and voices inside the cave, and threw a grenade in resulting in 4 VC KIA (EC). The unit destroyed the cave. The following items were captured by the unit: 1 M1 rifle, 2 MAS 36, 1 Mossin Nagant sniper rifle w/scope, 3 rds 45 Cal ammo, 4 ponchos, 1 US survival kit, 1 pair of Air Force sunglasses with name K-Lemons (missing pilot of H-23 found by C 1/14 Inf), 3 red scarves, 1 radio part, 1 pistol belt with canteen, documents, 1 VC gas mask, 7 hammocks, and 6 small shoulder patches with KIQ Thang 9 on them. No unit identification was made.

(k) On 300040 August, approximately 40 rds of 60 and 82 mm mortar rds landed at BT574033 in the 161st AVN area 1st rds

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landed near fuel bladders damaging 2, then the rounds were shifted in a westerly direction, then a southerly direction to BT575029 vicinity bunker 900. An APC from 2/11 ACR received a direct hit resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. A tank APC and Tower 82 engaged mortar firing positions vicinity BT574023 and BT577023. Casualties were evacuated at 0215 hours. Counter-mortar program was effected at 300050 hours. 1 soldier from 101st ARI Bde was also slightly wounded. C 3/21 Inf found tracks leading south into Thang An (2). Numerous VC flags, w/red top, blue bottom and yellow star in the middle were found in vicinity of BT57013. 160mm mortar rd was found at BT571018 and 1 dud 82mm rd was found at BT571021. A day later 15 more 60mm rds were located at BT571021.

(l) On 040115 September, the CP 1/14 Inf received 30-35 rds 60mm mortar vic BT392142, 100 meters south of their perimeter. 3/16 Arty observed mortar flashes 1500 meters south and engaged with 50 cal 133, 81mm mortar and arty fired sweeping counter-mortar into grids B T395125, BT395132, south to BT 392125. No casualties and area checked by D 1/14 Inf revealed 19 craters 100-400 meters south of hill 54. Exact mortar positions were not located.

(m) On 150645 September, the 1st Plat, 4 4/31 Inf enroute to Phu Long sent 2 point men across the road to check woodline at BS670965. Both men were engaged by Viet Cong hiding in underbrush resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA and the loss of 1 KIA w/scope and 1 M16. 1st Plat engaged 2 VC w/M79 fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (EC). Another VC booby trapped the body w/a grenade prior to their withdrawal. Boobytrap destroyed. Search of area revealed 1 hand grenade, 2 ammo pouches, batteries, flashlight, comms wire, expended M1 and M16 cartridges, documents and camera w/film. No information of significant value was extracted from the document.

(n) On 220155 September, F 2/11 ACR received 15-20 rounds 82mm mortar from 200 meters west vic BT181362 resulting in 17 USMC WIA: 1 sailor WIA, 1 soldier from 2/11 ACR WIA, 2 dump trucks, 2 M38 jeeps, 1 front end loader, 1 lube trailer, and 1 jeep radio were partially damaged. 35 rounds 4.2 mortar and 28 rounds 155 artillery fired in return. 82mm fins were found inside the perimeter. 4 base plate impressions, aiming stakes, and 18 freshly dug foxholes were found at the above mentioned location.

(o) On 211415 September, while checking area vic BT167377 for possible enemy location F 2/11 ACR received AW and RP G-2 fire from the west resulting in a direct hit by RPG-2 on 1 APC causing 2 KIA and 6 WIA (evac). 1425 hrs gunships fired on area. G & F Troop maneuvered toward the enemy location. By 1707 hrs, the unit has sustained another US KIA and 7 more WIA. 2015 hrs, units from 2/11 ACR surrounded in estimated 75 VC dug in. Artillery called on location and heavy contact continued until 250510 hrs w/flareships over the area. Results were 48 WIA KIA (EC), 1 dot incc, 6 individual weapons, 5 crew served weapons, 2 bayonets, 1000rds ammo rd, and 1 RPG-2. The WIA unit was a company from the 3rd WTA Regt.

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(p) On 021943 October, at BS646954 D 4/31 Inf stay behind Ptl obs 5-6 VC around 1 camp fire 200 meters west. As the unit approached the camp position the VC scattered, and 1 VC ran into the pointman and was captured. The suspect stated that Viet Cong were located at Thung Hoa and Phu Long (3) Hamlets. 2nd Plat B 4/31 Inf sustained 2 US KIA at Thuong Hoa Hamlet; at 030945 hours, when a handgrenade was thrown from a spider hole. The platoon engaged the VC in the spider hole with SA fire resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), and 1-38 Smith and Wesson pistol captured. D 4/31 Inf went to Phu Long Hamlet (3) at 031045 hrs found a tunnel containing 1 ton of rice. Rice was evacuated and tunnel destroyed.

(q) On 050245 October, at BS594934 2 ACIV's from C 1/A CIV and 2 sqds of Inf from 3/21 Inf received 4 mortar rds, 75 meters from their perimeter to southwest CAP L-6 and L-8 obs fls shes at BS591922. At 0305 hrs. unit received 200 rds SA fire from 200 meters southwest. At 0415 hrs. received 20 rds SA from the same area. In both cases fire was returned w/SA and AI fire. At 0550 hrs ACIV's on Western side of bridge received 300 rds SA from 300 meters south. Fire was returned after which the CIV unit moved to the Binh Son bridge to support the PF's who were in contact there. 3 VC were engaged resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and 2 AT mines and 1 LP mine were found and destroyed.

(r) On 070805 October, E, F and H Troops, 2/11 ACR received 40-50 rounds SA fire from the south resulting in 2 US KIA (evac). Fire was returned with SA. At 0900 hrs vic BT242410 E Troop observed 4 VC with weapons 400 meters east and engaged them with SA & AW fire. A FAC in the area received enemy ground fire from BT237410. At 1020 hrs, gunships engaged 10-12 VC at BT238411 resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC KIA (P) and 1 wounded VC, captured. At 1125 hrs F 2/11 ACR received 5 rds SA and returned the fire w/SA and AW. At 1126 hrs F Troop sustained 1 US KIA from a hostile booby trap (evac). At 1227 hrs vic BT213425 F.C observed 1 VC dragging a body east along a trail where F Troop had initially engaged the Viet Cong. Results 1 VC KIA (P). No unit identification.

(s) On 170815 October, at BS637954 the 3rd Plat, D 4/31 Inf observed and engaged 7 VC 400 meters west with SA fire, resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and 3 wounded VC females captured with the following weapons: 1 US carbine, and 2 Mossin Nagants. Wounded VC evacuated to 2/1 surg. 1 VC KIA was wearing a holster. Checked area revealed heavy blood trail resulting in 1 VC KIA (P).

(t) On 210800 October, at BS 580914 3rd Plat 3/21 Inf while conducting a sweep, received 1 MG from 4 VC resulting in 2 US KIA (evac). 3 VC, 2 of which were females were captured, and 1 VC was engaged with SA resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The unit captured 1 M1 rifle, 1 M1 carbine and 1 SMG, 53 rounds SA, 1 homemade MG, and 2 magazines; all were evac to 32 196th ACo. Dog Tracker team and 1st Platoon at BS562913 found 2 homemade satchel charges and 4 VN female in the area. Satchel charges destroyed and the 4 VN were evacuated to POW cage.

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(u) On 211931 October, at BS 430109 a PF security platoon engaged an estimated 12 VC trying to infiltrate perimeter. A fire fight ensued resulting in 7 VC KIA (DG). Captured: 1st M9, 2 SIG, 1 Carbine, 2 AK 47 magazines, 2 pistol belts, 5th and a khaki military jacket and 1 POF from Khuog Hhon village was evac to Ly Tin. 3 PF were wounded during the engagement.

(v) On 302310 October, 3/1 CAV Helicopter: vic BT 505130 received 40-50 rounds 60mm mortar rounds, Ground attack was simultaneous with SA, KA and HG. Satchel charges were placed under 25 acft resulting in 4 helicopters destroyed and 11 damaged. 7 US from 3/1 CAV were wounded. 1 RPG-2 round, 4 Chicom HG and 15 satchel charges were found and destroyed. VC withdrew west toward CIP K-1's position. PF from K-1 engaged VC who were fleeing past their positions vic BT 489139, resulting in 4 VC KIA (DG), and 1 PF captured. 2 PF were KIA. PF also captured 1 AK 47, 1 M4 rifle, 1 Chicom HG, and an assortment of web equipment. 1 holster and a bipod for a 60mm mortar were also captured during a search of the area. VC PI stated that 40 VC landed at Fish Island vic BT 492138, and remained until 2200 hrs. 6 boats landed at Ky Hoa Island vic BT 492138, and set up mortar positions at BT 500139 and 1 other position at BT 503134. PI was a member of 71st mortar company 70th Bn, 21st Regt. His statement as to the circumstances of attack were confirmed by the units on the ground search.

(3) Weather generally favored friendly operations throughout the period even though the monsoon season was approaching. Temperatures generally ranged from 70 degrees to 94 degrees. Several heavy thunder-showers were experienced during the period. One electrical storm caused heavy damage to two Bn CP areas and temporarily knocked out communications in the Brigade TOC. Another three day storm caused most of the waterways to overflow and flood substantial portions of the T.O.R. Cloud cover, on many occasions, limited air support and the collection of intelligence information by airborne sensors. Ground fog and haze became increasingly heavy in the mountains during the night and early morning hours.

(4) Terrain in the area consists of coastal plains and isolated hills. Further west of the T.O.R. are the heavily mountainous areas, which contain double and triple canopy jungle. The road network in the area is adequate; however, the numerous streams and paddy lands restrict cross-country travel throughout the T.O.R. Except in the isolated areas in the extreme western portion of the T.O.R. where the isolated hills and mountains begin, aerial observation is excellent. In those areas of dense vegetation, aerial observation is limited due to the natural concealment. Ground observation and fields of fire vary from excellent to unsatisfactory depending on terrain contours, hedgerows, the small hillocks and many gullies which are characteristic of the area.

(5) The Long Range Reconnaissance Detachment maintained two OP sites (Hill 213 and Hill 707), provided two six-man ambushes for a period of three days, and undertook 27 ground reconnaissance missions from 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967. For a full discussion of IRRP employment and tactics in the 196 Infantry Brigade (Light) (Separate) see IRRP after Combat Interview published by the office of the Brigade Historian 7 August 1967. Ground recon mission reports summarized to show specifics of each patrol are as follows:

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(a) DATE: 3-5 Aug 67

LOCATION: BS3908/4110

RESULTS: Five boys and one girl (woodcutters)

walked into IRRP's position on third day. ID card's checked out okay. Team compromised. S-2 had team extracted.

(b) DATE 3-6 Aug 67

LOCATION: BS3597/3799

RESULTS: Found old VC harbor site via BS358973.

Moved to BS357971 and heard voices. Called arty but were out of 155 range. Moved into arty range on a 30° Az. Observed airstrike on same Az. IRRP found trail that lead into valley at coord BS 358976. Observed along trail bundles made up of sticks 1-3 inches in diameter and 10-12 feet long. Moved to harbor site and heard noises from valley. No observations. 6 Aug 67 IRRP got C^o arty to shoot in valley. Had poor coverage but noises ceased. Moving to LZ site, IRRP received 1 round of heavy caliber fire. No friendly casualties.

(c) DATE: 7-10 Aug 67

LOCATION: BS4590/4792

RESULTS: Observed 4 lights at BS45896 on Az. of 60° and 270° thirty meters away. Heard movement in our vicinity from 072100 Aug-080300 Aug 67. Observed 4-5 trails and 2 old campfire sites between BS449893 and BS456902. 9 Aug 67 observed 3 civilians taking water buffalo to paddy to graze. No friendly casualties.

(d) DATE: 9-12 Aug 67

LOCATION: BS4787/4826

RESULTS: 10 Aug 67 observed AF firing into woodline at grid BS473863. Observed airstrike at grid BS438818 and another at BS538667 on 5 VC in open. Had no KIA's or MIA's. Friendly forces in AO talked to villagers. Later, villagers were stopped at grid BS4988 by 30 NVA or possibly VC wearing grey uniforms armed with M-1. Confiscated 15 ID cards. 11 Aug 67, observed FAC directing gunships on target BS485883. Observed fire mission BS501840, 5 VC in open, 1 KIA confirmed. Observed fire mission at 457781. Talked to CIDG SGT Phoung of Tre Bon Valley and got report of many VC in area and road being mined from grid BS455839 to BS420821. Received sniper fire upon extraction. No friendly casualties.

(e) DATE: 14-17 Aug 67

LOCATION: BTh104/4306

RESULTS: 151310 Aug 67 observed 1 VC running into grass hut or cave from BTh22047 Az. 70°. VC left with weapon. 151315-2 more VC entered and emerged with what appeared to be carbines. FAC called arty and hit where 1 VC had run. 1 possible VC KIA. 151300 - observed 2 VC carrying 1 rifle and 1 mortar tube. Request fire mission but was denied because of EF's in the area. IRRP unable to observe further. 1900 hrs, observed arty, tracers and heard AW fire at BTh38030. 16 Aug directed 3 tanks to location where 8 persons were hiding in woodline at BTh40045. 17 Aug, heard voices and movement near harbor site. Called arty and adjusted it within 100 meters of harbor site. Heard fire fight BTh52038. 171310, contact with estimated VC squad. Received AW fire, M-79, and hand fragmentation grenades from IRRP position on Az. of 60° and range approx 10 meters. Returned fire with approx 800 rds M-16, 28 rds M-79, 22 fragmentation hand grenades, 1 WP grenade, and 2 claymore mines. Heard movement to rear and threw 3 fragmentation grenades on

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240°. Called arty in on location of attack with good coverage for 100 meters. 1325 moved out to area where fire had come from to look for bodies. Found 2 drag trails and smelled odor of abdominal wound just beyond claymore site. Called for extraction and request was granted. One man went to take in the one remaining claymore and found it had been turned to the direction of our OP. No friendly casualties.

(f) DATE: 18-21 Aug 67

LOCATION: BT4205/4304

RESULTS: Observed activities of friendlies, air, and arty strikes. Sighted VC but arty impossible because of nearby civilians. 202055 Aug, saw lights with definite pattern at 290° and distance of 2500 meters. Called arty (battery 3 rds), observed large secondary explosion and lights went out. No friendly casualties.

(g) DATE: 22-25 Aug

LOCATION: Vic of BT408037

RESULTS: 22 Aug, BT412039, found knap-sack, at BT408037 IRRP found approx 20 foxholes, homemade bomb, marijuana butts. At 40550385, IRRP found 4 rows of punji stakes and 1 cleaning rod. Observed airstrike at BT428033. 24 Aug 67 at BT431016, observed another airstrike. No friendly casualties.

(h) DATE: 28-30 Aug 67

LOCATION: BT3806/4004

RESULTS: Had poor commo, losing it completely several times. 29 Aug used FIC as a relay. Heard movement but no sightings. Lushes and especially thick jungle made movement rougher and slower than usual. No friendly casualties.

(i) DATE: 28-31 Aug 67

LOCATION: BT3903/4101

RESULTS: Most of march was in knee-deep mud. When IRRP reached canopy, vegetation was so thick knives were used to cut the way. A scout dog from the scout dog platoon which had dropped IRRP off was good at picking out the easier routes of travel which made the march easier. One IRRP member was evacuated because of an injured eye on 29 Aug 67. IRRP observed in valley BT375001-382012 15 lights of an estimated force of 30 people. The closest light came within 50 meters of IRRP but team was undetected. Arty was not called because team leader figured that it would compromise his position. 30 Aug 67 set up concentrations and observed 1 VC with weapon at BT3805105 called for arty but cancelled mission when movement occurred near IRRP position. Checked out the area and found movement had been made by an animal. Meanwhile, VC disappeared. No friendly casualties.

(j) DATE: 1-4 Sep 67

LOCATION: BSh897/5095

RESULTS: 2 Sep 67 observed FIC firing rockets at grid BSh94926 and airstrike at BSh469'50. Heard movement that night and called illumination. Saw nothing. 3 Sep 67 found a non-American canteen, canvas-topped boot at BSh95966 and 1 .45 pistol, SI 2180657 at grid 436968. 4 Sep 67 received sniper fire upon extraction. After IRRP was clear of area, escorting gunships raked over area with heavy volume of fire.

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(k) DATE: 1-4 Sep 67

LOCATION: BT4104/4302

RESULTS: 1 Sep 67 at grid coord BT421023 IRRP found 34 rifle cartridges 30.06 with markings IC 61, match in a Marine ammo pouch. Heard heavy firing for 20 minutes at BT42047 on LZ 225⁰ 2000 meters west. Consisted of 30 and 50 caliber MG fire along with M-60 fire. IRRP team leader wounded (MIA) while clearing LZ and evacuated to 2nd Surg Hospital. Team was extracted as scheduled with no further injuries.

(l) DATE: 4 Sep 67

LOCATION: BT3407/B605

RESULTS: IRRP failed to establish commo and was extracted same day as insertion.

(m) DATE: 7 Sep 67

LOCATION: BT3804/4002

RESULTS: Strong unidentified Vietnamese station was on IRRP frequency. IRRP tried every way possible to get commo with base but failed and was extracted same day as insertion.

(n) DATE: 9-10 Sep 67

LOCATION: BS4893/5091

RESULTS: IRRP had poor commo and no observations. Requested extraction because only place IRRP had commo was in an exposed position. IRRP denied extraction because of difficulty two times. After explaining situation to S-2, team was extracted. No friendly casualties.

(o) DATE: 10-13 Sep 67

LOCATION: BT3804/4002

RESULTS: Airstrike observed at BT357045. The usual H&I fire heard. No enemy movement observed night or day. Extracted with no friendly casualties.

(p) DATE: 13-14 Sep 67

LOCATION: BS4898/5096

RESULTS: IRRP found 4 booby-traps and a firing mechanism of an M-2 grenade. Three of the booby-traps consisted of Chicom grenades with tripwire set-ups. The fourth was in a group of boulders with a special arrangement of small rocks piled over them, to cause them to detonate them. All the booby-traps seemed to be marked by a combination of three rocks near each trap release. 14 Sep, one team member bitten by reptile that left fang marks. Dust-off came for injured, leaving a four-man team. Team was extracted immediately after dust-off left. As slicks went in to get IRRP, a gully opened up. As IRRP was lifted off, door gunners of slick opened up. One had spotted three VC coming up slope near IRRP's former position.

(q) DATE: 16 Sep 67

LOCATION: BS4498/4696

RESULTS: IRRP had no commo after insertion at BS44967. Moved 400 meters and tried again with negative results. PIC was used. IRRP set up a field expedient antenna and tried getting commo

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with Hill 707 (relay). IRRP could receive, but transmissions, to include breaking of squelch were not received by the relay team on Hill 707. IRRP extracted same day with no friendly casualties.

(r) DATE: 18-21 Sep 67
LOCATION: BT4902/5100

RESULTS: IRRP found 1 campfire site at BT508015.
20 Sep, IRRP heard small-arms fire and automatic fire on Az. of 135° and called a fire mission at 514001. No friendly casualties.

(s) DATE: 22-25 Sep 67

LOCATION: 4496/4694

RESULTS: No enemy sightings. Good LZ. No findings. No problems with ammo.

(t) DATE: 23-25 Sep 67

LOCATION: BT3405/3603

RESULTS: No observations or findings. No friendly casualties.

(u) DATE: 27-30 Sep 67

LOCATION: BT4702/4900

RESULTS: IRRP found a natural cave at coord. BT478005. Cave was 6' high, 3' wide, and 15' long in one section and 6' high, 3' wide, and 25' long in the other section. Cave had 2 exits. IRRP search in and around cave but no signs of VC were discovered. At BT484006 IRRP found an anti-personnel mine (mine was taken back to base camp). IRRP arrived at BT483013 and were told to pull back because of a 2/1st ambush being set up nearby. IRRP moved to BT483009 a safe distance from ambush. Extraction took place at BT485016. No friendly casualties.

(v) DATE: 5-6 Oct 67

LOCATION: BT4603/4901

RESULTS: IRRP moved from LZ approximately 150 meters, heard noises from the west, and made a security stop. Unknown number of personnel were moving down trail 25 ft. from location of IRRP. Later more movement discovered in same area. IRRP investigated and found a well camouflaged rest area and complex of trails. IRRP stayed at BT4705 0140 for night. 6 Oct, IRRP set up ambush on trail junction but got negative results. Moved out at BT47350105, IRRP observed 20 VC moving east at BT46750035 wearing black FJs and green uniforms. Observed 2 RMs and 2 carbines. Called arty when they stopped, arty was off. VC left. Called same fire mission again using same corrections. This time guns were on target but no VC KIA or WIA resulted. Weather was zero-zero. IRRP requested permission to move to 2/1st area by foot on extraction date. Permission granted. No friendly casualties.

(w) DATE: 9-11 Oct 67

LOCATION: BT4008/4205

RESULTS: IRRP observed numerous fresh footprints (VN size). 2/1st had air and artillery strikes going into IRRP's cleared AO followed by an infantry sweep. Hasty (2/1st) had IRRP moving with

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disregard to safety precautions. The artillery strike was cancelled but the air strike was brought in anyway with bomb shrapnel hitting trees in IRRP's position and almost hitting the AT. After the bombs IRRP was ordered to move out through the brush, again paying no heed to patrol security and risking running into booby-traps. Gunships were coming in to strafe the area and IRRP had 15 minutes to clear the area. After troops landed, TL called in and gave sitrep, direction of travel and proposed destination. Also checked to see if H&I fire would be in IRRP AO. No H&I fire scheduled but IRRP began receiving Nav rounds above and around their position. IRRP was told that check fire had been called but rounds continued to come. Rammer 9 was contacted by 65 and firing ceased. Timber 6 (F/17 Cav CO) was notified by IRRP and promised a thorough investigation. 11 Oct, IRRP extracted after consulting medic about one ill team member. 1 morphine syrette was lost during airstrike. Medics were notified. Extraction completed with no friendly casualties.

(x) DATE: 16-19 Oct 67

LOCATION: BT4801/BS5099

RESULTS: Gunships received fire before insertion. Gunships sprayed area and team was inserted with no further incident. IRRP observed 3/21 elements making a heliborne assault on second day. No further observations. Extracted with no friendly casualties.

(y) DATE: 22-25 Oct 67

LOCATION: BT3506/3803

RESULTS: IRRP found a man-made hole at BT361044 6' X 10' X 10' deep with 2 logs across each end. Locked unused and only leaves were inside. IRRP heard 15 shots spaced about 20 minutes apart about 1200 meters away on an AZ of 40°. At extraction point IRRP found one set of foot tracks (size six). IRRP extracted with no further observations and no friendly casualties.

(z) DATE: 22-25 Oct 67

LOCATION: BS4598/BT4801

RESULTS: IRRP found main trail near BS469995 to be well used. Trail ran east to west. IRRP had trouble pinpointing location because of map not conforming to terrain and difficulty to seeing through triple canopy. FAC was called after IRRP called several fire missions for Nav. rounds. After FAC found IRRP it took pilot 18 minutes to plot IRRP position because of non-conforming map. IRRP heard 50 cal. machine gun and automatic weapons firing 320° Az. at 1200 meters on 24 Oct 67. Extracted 25 Oct 67 with no friendly casualties.

(aa) DATE: 27-30 Oct 67

LOCATION: BT4401/BS4699

RESULTS: Inserted at BS456995 and found 5 spider holes, a trail with booby-traps, and fresh foot marks at same location. Heard approx. 50 gong sounds such as a man beating on an anvil. Called arty at BS455995 and received secondary explosion. 28 Oct, heard branches breaking but when patrol stopped noises ceased. Found numerous streams, several well used trails, a small base camp at 463997. Team found six home-made shovels and a marine hat in an enclosed portion of base camp.

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IRRP destroyed shovels. IRRP asked for AO extension but was denied it because of friendly elements operating in proposed extension area. IRRP found numerous trails and recent VC signs (fetus) at extraction point. 30 Oct 67, IRRP received heavy volume of automatic weapons fire. Gunships engaged VC on ground in a firefight. Had 1 VC confirmed KIA. Firefight lasted 12 minutes with 3 IRRP personnel still on ground. Chopper finally came in and lifted off remaining team members. No friendly casualties.

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d. Logistics:

(1) Comments on Brigade's Logistical status for the months of August, September, and October.

(a) This quarter marked a period of intensive construction and preparation for the monsoon season. Over 3/4's of a million board feet of lumber was received and issued. For control purposes it was required that units go through the Brigades Engineer's Office to insure Bill of Materials were accurate and complete. It was found however, that the lag time between ordering and receipt greatly hampered construction objectives. For this reason the Engineer's now are maintaining a stockage of building materials. They are to do all the ordering for construction materials and control its issue. Since they hold the responsibility for construction they are the best suited to insure proper utilization of supplies for critical projects. This has proven to be a successful way of operation.

(b) The improved flow of supplies experienced in the previous quarter continued this quarter. Major end items including Engineer Equipment, Ice Boxes, M-60 machine guns, etc. greatly improved our Logistical Status.

(c) Preparation and study of possible problem area is now being conducted to prepare for anticipated operations. Barrier materials, clothing, and M 50-901/902 stockage levels are being researched. Communication is the important ingredient in preparation. Visits to supported units and common meetings with S-4's have proven to be very helpful in the determining problem areas and the alleviating of said problems.

(2) Supply

(a) Class I:

1. 1,399,690 "A" Rations issued during August, September and October.
2. 236,444 "Combat Meals" issued during August, September and October.
3. 668,661 Pounds of Potable Ice issued during August, September and October.
4. 125,216 Pounds of Vegetables issued during August, September and October.
5. 14,780 Pounds of Fruit issued during August, September and October.
6. 6,579 Gallons of Ice Cream issued during August, September and October.

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(b) Class II & IV

1. The list of II & IV items received for this quarter is very extensive. The most notable are the issuing of construction material, Starlight Scopes, Dump Trucks, and H5111-ton Trucks.

2. The items in critical demand are as follows:

a. H-138/U Handsets.

b. Major end items e.g.; ROADER-DN, 1577
CORRIDOR CARRIER, A-DROBETS, LIDING SHOES, and CONCRETE MIXER.

3. During this period both the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Cav were detached from our support.

(c) Class III

1. Starting in October Class III took over the responsibility for the Brigade's Gas Station.

2. Total Issues:

<u>COMPOSITE</u>	<u>DAILY AVERAGE</u>	<u>PERIOD TOTAL</u>
Diesel	146.5	12,605 Gal
Mogas	191.7	16,489 Gal
JP-4	N/A	N/A
IBALS	N/A	N/A

(d) Class V

Total Issues:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PERIOD TOTAL</u>
OTG, 5.56MM	1,486,641
OTG, 12 GA. 00 Dulk	8570
OTG, 7.62MM	644,318
OTG, Gal .45	94,499
OTG, GAL .50	100,820
OTG, 40MM	72,007
OTG, 60MM	944
OTG, 81MM	28,392
OTG, 105MM	53,467
OTG, 106MM	0
OTG, 4.2MM	2577
OTG, PROP OTG, 155MM	13,584
OTG, PROJ 155MM	11,051

(3) Services Maintenance:

(a) During the period 1 Oct 67 - 30 Oct 67 the maintenance shops received and completed the following jobs:

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<u>SHOP</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>
Automotive Maintenance	106	94
Artillery	23	23
Small Arms	158	164
Signal	314	293
Fire Control	44	48
Engineers	48	35
Service & Evac	238	228
Office Machines	7	12
TOT L:	<u>938</u>	<u>897</u>

(b) This was an increase of 246 jobs received and 241 completed over the previous 30 days. This brought the quarterly total to 2382 jobs received and 2193 completed. The heavy rains early in the month of October are considered as the principal cause of the heavy maintenance load. 3/4 Ton Truck engines, 100A generators engines batteries for 1/2 and 3/4 Ton Trucks, tires and tubes continue to be the major problem areas. The demand is so great that our Tech Supply is never able to keep a stockage. To alleviate part of the problem the 120th Supply has increased their stockage level. Our back up support, the 168th Maintenance, is doing the same.

(c) Observation: Continuing heavy rains will place a heavy maintenance and supply burden on the maintenance shops and Tech Supply.

(4) Signal Activities:

(a) General: During the period 1 August 1967 thru 31 October, the 196th Infantry Brigade communications personnel supported from 3 to 5 maneuver battalions. With the majority of the reporting period supporting 5 battalions. .. maximum effort was required for the maintenance of the base camp facilities and to support Operation Denton for assigned and attached units. Facilities available for the 196th Brigade Communication included:

(b) Radio:

1. FI: Primary FI nets included within the brigade consisted of command, intelligence, aviation, and air medical evacuation (Dustoff). The brigade is also entered in the Americal command, and secure nets. During operation Denton FI nets continued to be used at the base camp and in addition, radios were provided to the T.C. Operations Center for use in the brigade command net and intelligence net. Due to land mass interference an FI net had to be established in order for all stations to maintain FI communications. At one time during the reporting period, 6-17 September, the communications platoon had the responsibility to support a rifle company task force with 1 FI radio team.

2. SI: During the reporting period the Brigade operated in two division nets-4th Det #2 (R.F.) and 5th Special Forces SSB Net (Voice).

(c) Radio Terminal and Carrier (VHF): During

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Operation Center a total of five channels were provided to a ch
battalion switchboard; one sole user circuit from the brigade tactical
operations center to the operations center; two channels were provided to
one and one common user from the tactical switchboard to the auxiliary
battalion switchboard; four channels were provided to the brigade staff,
consisting of two common user circuits from the tactical to the operations
center, one speech plus circuit from the operations center to the operations
center, and one speech plus circuit from the operations center to the operations
center. During the reporting period equipment mounted to the operations center
total operating time, one center
total operating time, one center

(a) Wireless Telephone System: Completely
tied in with the Army Division Telephone System and provided telephone
service to all military locations within the theater of operations. Traffic
service is extensively thru VHF except for local requirements and within
secure areas. The 196th Brigade Switchboard (Ribbon) Model 2000-36 bank
board with two additional jack fields 2A-207, providing a capacity of 120
circuits, of which an average of 95 are used. (For some 24-hour periods,
(usually 0800-1000 and 1400-1600) was 225, giving a capacity of 120
circuits, of which an average of 95 are used. For some 24-hour periods,
(usually 0800-1000 and 1400-1600) was 225, giving a capacity of 120

(c) Communications Center Service: A 24-hour commu-
nications center has always been offered and well used for message and
secure teletype service. October's total of service was 3846 messages
received and 1460 sent. Teletype service is tied into the worldwide
network through Division facilities. Total of traffic was 3846 messages
received and 1460 sent. Teletype service is tied into the world wide
network through Division facilities.

(f) Base Camp Support: In order to increase the e-
ffectiveness of the communications personnel, the following changes
were made on 30 August. The 153 Signal Platoon (Forward) was given
sole responsibility for the wire connection and the maintenance of in-
stalling, operating, and maintaining the brigade wire and radio system.
The 196th Brigade Communications Platoon was given sole responsibility for
radio communications center service and have and has the mission
of installing, operating and maintaining the brigade radio system. The
communications center, still radio and 145 services for the 196th Brigade.

(5) Engineer Activities: 1960 for the 196th Brigade.

(a) During this reporting period the 175th Engineer
Company has continued to support the base camps throughout the Brigade
area in constructing roads, maintenance of roads, construction of caves
and tunnels, producing potable water for the Brigade and construction
of base camps. At times materials and equipment were limited; never-
theless, the 175th Engineer Company accomplished its assigned missions
in the allotted time. In the past, the 175th Engineer Company accomplished its assigned missions
in the allotted time.

(b) Base Camp Support and Development:

- (b) 1. Number of permanent building completed:
 - a. One hundred and twenty three (123)
 - b. Five (5) mess halls (123)
- 2. Number of permanent type of building under construction and anticipated time of completion:
- 3. Number of permanent type of building under construction and anticipated time of completion:

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- a. Twenty three (23) tent kits, 20 Nov 1967.
- b. Eight (8) warehouses, 20 Nov 1967.
- c. Four (4) mess halls, 20 Nov 1967.

3. Breakdown of materials used:

- a. Cement: 110 lbs. bags (1,350-74 tons).
- b. Lumber: 146,000 board feet.
- c. Masonite: none.
- d. Plywood: 3,300 sheets.
- e. Nails: 1,850 lbs.
- f. Insulation: none.

4. Roadways

- a. Four (4) Km laterite road for 4/31 area, 24 August 1967- 3 September 1967.
- b. One point five (1.5) Km laterite road for 1/1 area, 8 September 1967-22 September 1967.
- c. Two (2) Km road for the 4/31 area, 13 Oct 1967- 20 Oct 1967.
- d. One point five (1.5) Km laterite road for 8th Spt Bn area, 23 October 1967- 31 October 1967.

5. Total gallons of potable water produced: 690,075 gallons.

(6) Brigade Surgeon

(a) General Comment on Activities:

- 1. The medical support of the base camp remained excellent during this reporting period.
- 2. Tactical operations were adequately supported throughout this period. We continued to borrow medics from the medical company of the support battalion to maintain proper support for the field units. All companies received excellent medical support.

(b) Personnel and Supporting Units:

Medical supplies have been adequate. Proper liaison has aided in facilitating our receiving supplies that become critical from time to time. Our personnel status at the close of this period has been adequate; however, the FOE slots were never completely filled. Sickness or injury during this period, if it had been present, would have definitely curtailed proper medical support.

(c) Preventive Med. and Health of the Command:

- 1. Personal hygiene: remained excellent throughout the command.

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2. Physical Condition remains excellent.

3. Skin and foot disease showed a slight increase with the onset of rainy weather. All Bn Surgeons have initiated timely, definitive treatment so that this presents no problem to the command.

4. Statistical analysis of patient hospitalization and evacuation for the period of August to October

HOSPITALIZED	EVACUATED	TOTAL
Disease 426	448	1891
MBI 24	36	60
IRHL 28	28	28

5. The disease rate for this period has not affected the overall fighting strength of the Brigade.

(d) Environmental Sanitation:

1. Supplies for insect and rodent control have been adequate throughout this period.

2. There has been adequate supply of potable water, and it has been consistently up to purification standards.

3. With the use of 926th Preventive Medicine spraying apparatus we have facilitated control of insects. All sanitation teams throughout the brigade operated adequately during this period.

(e) Other Medical Services:

1. Dental Facilities- Dental services by the dentist at 2 Co. 8th Sp.

2. Veterinarian: Not applicable.

(7) Civil Affairs:

(a) General. The reporting period has seen the development of a cohesive, logical and progressive Civil Affairs Program. Tactical commanders, with few exceptions, have given civil affairs a deserving priority in all unit planning activities. Coordination with GVN officials has been observed to the fullest degree in an attempt to determine the most profitable employment of all resources and to mutually support the purposes of the GVN Revolutionary Development Program. There has been steady, if slow, pacification progress throughout the TAO. Tangible evidence of improved pacification is difficult to ascertain and personnel making such evaluations are reluctant to be overly optimistic. This is a sound approach, resulting in more realistic and reliable data. In general, civil affairs and military civic action within this unit are productive. However, there are limiting factors which will continue to hamper civic action sponsored by tactical units. The following examples are cited.

(b) Coordination of military civic action projects requires GVN approval from the hamlet through province levels. The system is cumbersome and results in excessive non-productive time. Certain coordination is necessary to preclude overlapping and redundant effort. It would appear that the same end result could be achieved with more centralized coordination, either at the district or province level with appropriate direction following, to the lower levels.

1. Supplies for military civic action projects are made available through the CORDS organization. The level of available supplies is not in keeping with command emphasis in supporting this aspect of US efforts in Vietnam. It is apparent that there is more "lip service" than any other commodity. Vertical building material is non-existent. Obtaining necessary supplies is frequently delayed to the point where local national support of a given project ceases. In other examples, work is begun then terminated prior to completion for lack of supplies. This turn of events elicits more antagonism than if no project had been undertaken. Sponsoring units find it necessary to hoard until sufficient supplies are accumulated. Directives specifically prohibit the utilization of US military supplies in such projects, yet this is done and accepted.

2. TO&E authorizations in both personnel and equipment are inadequate. Tactical commitments take priority, rightfully so over civil affairs activities. The answer is not to "boof up" S-5 authorizations, but rather to provide greatly increased numbers of specific TO&E type civil affairs organizations in support: i.e. the civil affairs platoon and company. Present approaches are ill-suited to accomplish the task in any realistic time frame.

3. In connection with the previous point, frequent changes in location, AO's and missions of tactical units work adversely on the long range efforts of civil affairs. Much time is required to develop the confidence and cooperation of GVN officials, and in gaining the trust of the general population through association. Again, greater numbers of civil affairs units in general support would be more sound.

(c) Community Relations: At present organic battalions have very workable understandings with commensurate GVN levels of government. Commanders and staffs concerned make every reasonable effort to work closely with GVN officials. A number of units sponsor spoken English classes, support churches, orphanages and other local groups, and support and participate in local customs, ceremonies and celebrations. The following activities and contributions have taken place during the reporting period.

1. Material Contributions:

6532 lbs of foodstuffs
 20 lbs of tea
 50 gallons of whole milk
 100 gallons of cooking oil
 175 lbs of clothing
 40 lbs of candy
 2 rakes, 17 hoes, 4 machettes and 10 baskets
 182 blankets

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745 sheets of tin
10 sheets plywood
Six 2 1/2 ton truck loads scrap lumber
5 tons crop fertilizer
7 rice threshing machines
3 brick machines

2. Civic Action Projects:

1000 autumn festival kits
1 dispensary repaired
1 new dispensary
1 new school completed
4 new schools in progress
7 wells dug
2 churches repaired
2 market places in progress
1 new playground completed
1 foot bridge completed

3. Medical Program:

41 MEDICALS
1640 bars of soap
7100 immunizations given by MEDALS
100 health kits
763 MEDALS for 44,682 patients
12 hours nurses' instruction for 5 VN nurses

4. Education - Training:

1050 school kits
150 school books
2 gross of chalk
6 hours educational hygiene for 500 persons
200 notebooks
171 1/2 hours of English for 3950 students

5. Audio Visual Team:

128 hours for 9500 people - 69 showings

6. Other: Under the administration of Headquarters, III MAF monies have been made available for the awarding of scholarships to deserving Vietnamese students. Known as the General West Vietnamese Scholarship, amounts of 500 piaster per month, September through December 1967, are awarded to each selected student. The Brigade, through B-5 channels and in cooperation with GVN officials, has awarded eighteen (18) such scholarships. Only three were awarded in Ly Sin District, due to lack of interest of GVN officials. There is to be a continuation of the program for calendar year 1968.

(d) Tactic Operations: Civil Affairs activities during tactic operations have been marked by relatively few requirements during the period covered. The primary considerations have been the safety of innocent civilians, the protection of personal property and crops and that coordination with the GVN to provide the proper hand-

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ling of refugees.

1. Several hundred refugees were generated as a result of Operation Benton 15-27 September. Prior to the active phase of the operation coordination had been made with the Ten My and Ly Tin Districts and Quang Tin Province. The refugee situation in Quang Tin Province constitutes a problem of some magnitude to the GVN. There are, in fact, many more refugees than the government is capable of adequately providing for. In view of this, only voluntary refugees were evacuated from the tactical area of operations. Tactical units evacuated to appropriate government locations those Vietnamsese who so requested. While under control of U.S. units, refugees were given medical treatment and food. Once turned over to the GVN the refugees were absorbed into four different refugee camps.

2. Brigade plans are in effect to assist the GVN in denying the present rice crop to the Viet Cong. "Golden Fleece" operations are currently being conducted.

3. The planning phase of a sizeable relocation operation occurred during the reporting period. The active phase was initiated 21 August with the relocation of the inhabitants of Tuyet Dien to Son Tra (1) in Binh Giang Village. Coordination was effected between military units, village, district and province officials concerned. Based on detailed plans to insure the success of the operation, all parties concerned worked diligently in accordance with planned time schedules. Particularly noteworthy was the effort of local inhabitants of Son Tra (2) and Ten My (1), under the constant, competent supervision of the Binh Giang Village chief. A security post, presently manned jointly by US and RF personnel was constructed in a minimum of time. The area of Son Tra (1) was prepared to accept the relocations. A perimeter security fence of nearly 2,000 meters was constructed by villagers, as many as 1100 working on a given day. All preparations necessary for a County Fair operation in connection with the relocation operation were planned for, adequately provided and on location 20 August. The initial personnel and material support of this operation was the following:

a. Personnel - Local villagers/ up to 1100
 RF - 2 squads
 GVN officials, teams and advisory counter-
 parts-55 (including one cultural drama team, an audio/visual team (ground
 speaker), Red Cross representatives, armed propaganda team, census and
 interrogation personnel and US and VN MEDCAP personnel.
 2 military police squad of USN (ICM crews)- up to 2 Infantry Companies,

b. Equipment -
 1 bulldozer
 2 LCM's
 3 AMTRACS
 2 ater hoilers
 1/4, 3/4 and 2 1/2 ton trucks, as necessary

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- c. Commodities
 - Rice, corn, bulgur
 - Powdered milk
 - Salt
 - Cooking oil
 - Tin
 - Cement
 - Red Cross gifts

4. During the period 21-24 August 1967 Vietnamese were relocated to Son Tra (1). The active phase of the operation was discontinued at this time to preclude interference with the GVN national election period. During this period, those VN relocated prepared their dwellings, improved water supplies, and resumed normal activities. Fishing was resumed within 24 hours following each increment's move. The relocation was resumed 8 Sep. Between 8 and 13 Sep an additional 1145 VN were relocated, bringing the total population of the new hamlet to 4,092. As of this date, the operation is considered a success and has accomplished stated objectives. Currently, coordination is being effected to encourage coordinated GVN and U.S. future support of the area. The ultimate success of the operation will be apparent when the VN are capable of further development and providing their own defense capabilities.

5. Direct requests are currently being processed to provide a new school, dispensary and hamlet office. With the assistance and advice of the Food and Agriculture Chief, 29th Civil Affairs Company, 5 tons of crop fertilizer has been made available for fields belonging to the people of Son Tra (1). The hamlet is developing well, there is no economic problem present. Fishing and farming continue normally. GVN piaster payments in excess of 800,000\$ VN have been made to the people of Son Tra (1).

(e) Psychological Operations.

- 1. 26,376,000 leaflets dropped
 - HB Team - 114 hours groundspeaker time
 - Aircraft speaker time - 92 1/2 hours
 - AV Team - 69 showings for 9500 people, a total of 128 hours
- 6 special leaflets

2. Effective 23 October the Psychological Warfare Section came under S-3 staff responsibility, as it appears by APOE. The shift from the S-5 Section was made to permit the Psychological Warfare Officer to utilize to greater advantage current tactical and intelligence information in psychological operations. It is the opinion of all concerned that this arrangement is very satisfactory and more responsive to Psyops support to unit missions.

(8) Public Information:

(a) The following activities took place in this unit during the period of July, August, September 1967:

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1. Number of press visits 7
2. Number of home town releases 100
3. Number of New Releases 50
4. Number of press photos released 29
5. Number of taped recordings released 0

(b) Brigade Information Office gave full coverage during operation Benton which resulted in wide photo and press coverage in military and civilian news outlets. Extensive coverage was given to the movement of civilians in one of the largest moves of its kind during this conflict. This was also covered by national TV outlets and civilian correspondents. Special coverage was given to the 100,000th civilian medical treatment in support of the M.D.A. program. The 1967 Brigade Year Book, "The Second Year" was completed in September and shipped from Japan to Vietnam for mail out in October.

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2. Commanders Observations and Recommendations:

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a. Personnel

(1) Item: Emergency leaves

Discussion: Rapid processing of emergency leave request will enable members of various units to quickly depart the unit for transportation to the air terminal.

Observation: All units should establish internal procedures on a step by step basis which enables rapid processing of such leaves. (A Co - 8th Spt)

b. Operations & Training

(1) Item: Utilization of 106 RR or mounted M60 machine guns on 1/2 ton vehicles as security escort for convoys.

Discussion: 4/31 Inf utilizes 106RR and M60 machine guns mounted on jeeps as security vehicles for convoy resupply missions and all traffic on the MSR. A majority of the convoys consist of the gun jeep and one or two vehicles being escorted. (Dde S3)

Observation: The most effective security order of the vehicles is to have the escorted vehicle first followed approximately 100 meters by the escort vehicle. Should the escorted vehicle be ambushed the gun jeep can maneuver rapidly to counter the ambush. If the 106 RR or M60 MG vehicles were ambushed it could react quickly to protect itself. (4/31 Inf)

(2) Item: Use of UH-1D Helicopter

Discussion: The use of the UH-1D C&C helicopter is a major factor in the success of any large scale operation in Vietnam. With battalions and companies operating so far from their home base in areas that are inaccessible, it is almost impossible to exercise completely effective tactical and administrative control without the use of the C&C. The use of the C&C varies from the use by the commander for control of tactical operations, reconnaissance for small unit leaders, often to include platoon sergeants, emergency resupply, delivery of orders, visual reconnaissance of enemy positions, detection of enemy communications locations using the homing device, radio relay, pinpointing the location of friendly units in areas of dense forest, CBR drops, and medevacs ranging from urgent to priority.

Observation: The UH-1D is provided for each battalion daily. (4/31 Inf)

(3) Item: Malfunction of M-16 rifle.

Discussion: The malfunction of the M-16 rifle has become a matter of great concern to military personnel in Vietnam, as well as to many civilians and government officials.

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Many malfunctions, though, can be eliminated with a little knowledge and sufficient attention to insure that the weapon is properly cleaned daily.

Observation: The small amount of tolerance between the cartridge and chamber walls leave little room for expansion of shells. Heavy buildup of carbon on the chamber walls and dirt in the chamber causes definite problems. These problems can be reduced by:

- (a) Using a .30 cal bore brush attached to a drill to eliminate the carbon in the bore.
- (b) Covering the barrel opening with tape.
- (c) Checking the extraction spring and replacing it if it becomes weak.
- (d) Frequently cleaning ammunition and magazines.
- (e) Carrying a cleaning rod to knock out any cartridge that doesn't extract. The cleaning rod can be attached to the barrel of the M-16 by using a link from 7.62mm belt ammo. (2/1, 3/21, 4/31 Inf)

- (4) Item: Keeping the PRC 25 dry during the rainy season.

Discussion: Because of the heavy monsoon rains a means was needed to keep the PRC 25 radios functional and dry, but not so well protected that the radio is cumbersome or unusable.

Observation: By using salvage pieces of canvas from shelter halves, installing a zipper and utilizing flexible, clear plastic over the control knobs, a water-tight, compact envelope is achieved for the PRC 25 with control of adjustments being retained. (4/31 Inf) See Incl 1.

- (5) Item: Detailed Search Techniques.

Discussion: VC snipers normally fire and then withdraw to spider hole type hiding places. These holes are very difficult to detect and can be discovered only after a very thorough search to include probing for the holes. Detection can be enhanced by searching for significant indicators which are normally present in the vicinity of the holes. These indicators are:

- (a) Human feces, generally located within 30 to 40 meters from the hole.
- (b) Slight Depression on ground within the bamboo thicket or hedge. May be in the same area as stubble from cut bamboo or camouflaged with grass, leaves, etc. Detection will be possible only after probing with bayonets, shaking bamboo stubbles, etc.
- (c) Game Trails through hedgerows into thickets. These trails are paths that display frequent use. Holes leading through thickets are small and will be detected only upon thorough examination.

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(d) Air holes into bunker, constructed with hollow bamboo in and around the thickets.

(e) Patches of different color or texture of soil within the fields in the immediate vicinity.

(f) Isolated Vietnamese, normally an old man, old woman, or young child within the search area. These persons do external camouflage on spider holes after the VC enter their hiding place.

Observation: The detailed search technique is the most effective means of finding the enemy in this environment. (Bdc S3)

(6) Item: Point Detonation Fuse for CS drops.

Discussion: Due to the failure of fuse lighters to function 100% of the time and due to inconsistent volumes of CS being dispersed on the ground because of varied heights of burst, a point detonating fuse was adapted to the 55 gal drum to solve these problems. The majority of targets are MSRs and base camp locations requiring the total 80 lb. drum to effectively deny the terrain for up to sixty days. The AN/M173A1 bomb fuse allows for impact detonation and the achievement of desired results.

Observation: Forty drums of CS-1 have been dropped using the M173 fuse and a fuse lighter as a back up means of detonation. Of those forty, thirty nine have exploded on impact effectively covering the target areas. The burst radius of one drum is approx. 30 meters. The one drum that did not explode was due to improper placement of the demolitions and not due to a faulty M173 fuse. This is the same fuse used in napalm bombs. (27th Chem)

(7) Item: Effect of weather on aerial MED operations.

Discussion: ORLLs from various units in RVN employing the MED in the aerial mode have been found valid by this unit. The main area of interest was in determining if the different weather conditions in I Corps would vary from patterns found in other areas of Vietnam.

Observation: The main hindrance to MED operations in this area results from gusting winds. Being located on a coastal area subjects us to varying wind directions and speed. If the wind speed exceeds 12 knots accurate readings cannot be obtained. The ideal time for flying in this area has proved to be between 0800 and 1200 hrs. The wind is lowest at these times. During the monsoon season the wind comes predominantly from the north/northwest; and during the dry season from the south/southeast.

(8) Item: Summary of MED aerial flying techniques.

Discussion: Due to extremely variable and rugged terrain located in southern I Corps new techniques of flying had to be developed. The coastal plain has not lent itself to personnel detection due to the large civilian population that dominates the area.

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The mountainous terrain west of the coast presents hazards to low level flying. Ridges have to be flown by following contour lines in order to avoid down drafts. Stream beds running from the tops of the mountains have to be flown downward for the UH1D cannot climb at a safe speed. Valleys and streams are flown in preference to ridges because of the characteristic placement of enemy troops near water.

Observation: A rescue UH1D is always employed because of the increased hazard of aerial accident as well as enemy ground fire. A PAC is used as a plotter due to his familiarity with the terrain. On several occasions a sniffer ship was almost lost due to updrafts and downdrafts on ridgelines, resulting in the flying techniques described above. Peaks also offer generally poor results because the wind is usually 15 knots or higher at those elevations. (27th Chen)

(9) Item: Cordon, Search and Interrogation of Vietnamese Villagers.

Discussion: During Operation Checker, a cordon and search operation, the 650 residents of Hamlet 8, in KY Sahn Village were removed from their homes to an assembly area. The cordon was established during the hours of darkness to enclose any enemy and prevent the villagers from vacating the area early for work details. Previous experience in this particular location dictated that all villagers be removed so that airstrikes could be brought in to set off known mines and booby traps that would hamper our planned search. While the airstrike and search were going on a netcap was set up and the villagers were screened by national police, an IRV team, and a CI team. Detainees were interrogated and moved to LY TIN District Hq. Food, water, and shelter were provided for the Vietnamese during the day long operation. An Armed Propaganda Team was employed to pass instruction to the people and present pro-government and Chieu Hoi speeches.

Observation: In a cordon and search operation it is essential to keep those persons who have been screened segregated from those who have not yet been processed. One or two strands of wire for control purposes can be utilized. Also since a thorough screening job takes a considerable length of time, tents for shelter and a water source should be provided both in the collection area and the holding area. Provisions should also be made to feed the people in both sections separately. Because of the necessity of passing instructions to the civilians and the opportunity to present propaganda speeches to a large assemblage of persons, an Armed Propaganda Team should be employed. They are extremely cooperative and professional in their conduct. IIP's should be taken to the assembly area to both control the persons waiting processing and to guard the detainees. A maximum number of interpreters should be available in the assembly area. They are needed for interrogation, coordination with participating Vietnamese agencies, and control of the civilians. (2/1 Inf)

(10) Item: Squad Radios

Discussion: During a recent operation where the new squad radios were used, they were found to be an outstanding piece of equipment.

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The range was sufficient to accommodate the operation of any platoon except when the radio got wet, which decreased the range significantly. When the radio got wet, the platoon leader in the center of the platoon file could not adequately communicate with his front or rear due to the heavy amount of static and the squealing that was caused by the excess moisture in the radio transmitter.

Discussion: To get the maximum efficiency out of the new squad radio it is imperative that the transmitter be kept free from moisture at all times.

(11) Item: Artillery preparations.

Discussion: Patterns should not be set in firing preparations.

Observation: The sequence of preparations should be varied between air, artillery, and gunships. Diversionary preparations also have been used to confuse the enemy. (3/82 Arty)

(12) Item: Field Installation of (FADAC) Field Artillery Digital Analytical Computer.

Discussion: Protection of FADAC in field location.

Observation: Build the FADAC into the sand bag wall leaving the back open. A wall 2 or 3 feet away from the rear of the machine will permit proper ventilation. This procedure increases space available in FDC and protects the FADAC from direct small arms and mortar or rocket fragments.

(13) Item: Fuzing of Smoke Rounds.

Discussion: Difficulty experienced in firing, "Shell Smoke, High Streamer."

Observation: Due to dense vegetation in Vietnam, the observers frequently request, "Smoke High Streamers", to facilitate their positive identification of the target location. The smoke rounds usually received at present are pre-fuzed with a 25 second fuze. When the mission requires a time of flight greater than 25 seconds, it is often impossible to fire shell smoke. Due to the fact that the 25 second fuze is semi-permanently tapped into the fuze well, it is often impossible or at least very time consuming to change fuzes. Recommend that shell smoke be packed with an M564 fuze or without fuze. (3/82 Arty)

(14) Item: Area and Road Drainage.

Discussion: During the rainy season, roads and storage areas throughout the Bde area become flooded and/or washed out due to improper or poorly constructed drainage. This loss of road nets causes loss of equipment and hinders operations in general causing many equipment and man hours to be expended unnecessarily. This situation could be helped greatly in many cases if storage areas and road drainage were properly employed.

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Observation: During the recent typhoon, a large quantity of water fell in a very short time and demonstrated a lack of proper drainage and construction of various roads and storage areas. The major problems were; roads cut by water flow, especially around culvert sites; large quantities of soil running off hills, standing pools of water in storage area, and severe erosion throughout road ditches and camp areas. Therefore, units in and around these trouble areas must take the following precautions:

(a) Head walls of all culvert sites must be sandbagged to prevent erosion of ditch sites and loss of roads.

(b) Steep hills with no foliage cover must be sandbagged and revetted in order to stop the downhill flow of soil.

(c) Check dams of sandbags and steel picket design must be installed in existing roadside ditches to slow the flow of water. See FM 5-15 & FM 5-34.

(d) Pick and shovel work on local drainage must be done. Unless ditches and culverts are clean, unless water is given a flow away from roads and critical areas and unless proper drainage from a high to a low area is planned and emphasized, units will be cut off from supply bases. The road nets must be maintained on a unit level or small faults will develop into major problems.

(15) Item: Wet weather demolition procedures.

Discussion: Wet weather has had the following observed effects on demolition: sputtering or inactive fuses, dud shots, and low grade explosions. The following discussion treats these problems.

Observation: Demolitions procedures also become problems in wet weather. Fuse and detonating cord must be stored above ground level and kept absolutely dry, and the actual demolitions must be kept as dry as possible. Often the weather will be such that only electrical detonation can be used. Finally, to ensure first shot results, all charges should be double fused. (175th Eng)

(16) Item: Support Troops awareness of Tactical Situation:

Discussion: Many times support troops, because of the nature of their mission are not fully aware of the tactical situation of the troops they are supporting.

Observation: The reaction time and effort put forth by support troops can be increased considerably if adequate information is disseminated concerning the affect of their support in aiding the combat troops to accomplish their mission. By providing support troops with adequate information on the tactical situation in their immediate area an appreciation is developed for the reasons behind extra training covering the infantrymen's skills, which they may have to use in the future. (8th Spt)

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Observation: A defense overlay is now prepared for each photo mission report. Thus, when two missions have been flown over the same area on different dates a comparison of the respective overlays will reveal whether there has been a significant increase or decrease in enemy defenses. (Bde S-2)

(5) Item: The Proper Tagging of Detainees

Discussion: During the month of October 1967, 124 detainees were interrogated and classified by the IFW Section of the 369th MID at the CHU LAM Collection Point (CLO). Numerous detainees were interrogated and classified at the Second Surgical Hospital.

Observation: The overwhelming majority of these detainees arrived at CLO without capture data on USARV Form 365 or with incomplete or incorrect capture data. Without complete and accurate capture data, the IFW Section is at a distinct disadvantage when they attempt to interrogate and classify the detainees sent in by the elements of the 196th Lt Inf Bde in the field. (S-2)

(6) Item: Evacuation of Detainees

Discussion: Experience has proven conclusively that when detainees are evacuated to any other location than the 196th Lt Inf Bde IFW Center, the resultant delay in receipt of information, coupled with frequent failure to exploit detainees completely, tends to negate the value of the captive.

Observation: Battalion S-2's should evacuate all detainees with accompanying tag, documents and equipment through intelligence channels to the 196th Lt Inf Bde IFW Center in order to insure expeditious and thorough exploitation.

(7) Item: Weekly Detainee Disposition Report

Discussion: In the past, battalions S-2's were learning the disposition of detainees which their units sent in to the IFW Cage only when the detainee gave information valuable enough to warrant a written report. Detainees that furnished IFW with no significant information were accounted for by number only on the daily and weekly Detainee Status Report which is submitted to the S-2, 196th Bde. As a result, the units could not give an exact account as to the disposition of many of the suspects they detained.

Observation: Effective 11 Nov 67, the IFW Section will submit a "Weekly Detainee Disposition Report" to the Battalion S-2's. This report will account for each detainee sent to the IFW Cage as to name, capture data, classification, and final disposition.

(8) Item: Use of Nightly Flareships and FAC's

Discussion: This Battalion utilized flareships and FAC's nightly during the period of the Vietnamese National elections, 15 August thru 5 September 1967. The flareships activities were used for ho

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purpose of deterring enemy activity. The flareships flew throughout the Battalion AO and occasionally assisting neighboring units, providing illumination, directing small arms fire, and adjusting artillery. One Officer from the S-2 and S-3 complex accompanied each flight.

Observation: The enemy action reports for hours of darkness verified the effect of the flareship. A definite drop in the number of incidents was noticed for this period. Inquiries made of the Vietnamese Nationals of our AO revealed that the enemy was apprehensive of movement or activity during hours while flareships were airborne. On two occasions, a FAC was utilized in conjunction with flareships. The flareships illuminated the area, while the FAC's would fly underneath the flareships, thus increasing the visual reconnaissance of the area. The presence of the FAC's increased the possibility of an immediate air-strike in case contact was made. (4/31)

d. Logistics.

- (1) Item: The PLL for the M1937 Burner.

Discussion: The PLL for subject items was not being maintained properly throughout the brigade. Five units had no spare parts of any description on hand for several months. Priority 12 in most cases was being used for requisitions. A contributing factor to this unsatisfactory condition was that Battalion S-4's were not following up on requisition which were older than 30 days.

Observation: Battalion S-4's were encouraged by this office to use a higher priority (05) for requisitioning parts for subject items and for them to continually check all requisitions. (Bde S-4)

- (2) Item: Airborne Type Helmet Liner for Combat Tracker Team.

Discussion: During operations, it was found personnel from the combat tracker team, would have their helmets fall off, while running with the dogs.

OBSERVATION: The team turned in the regular helmet liner and were issued the airborne type helmet liner, which has a chin strap. By interlacing the helmet strap through the chin strap of the liner the liner and helmet becomes secure. (Bde S-4)

- (3) Item: Company Grade Officers clear through Brigade S-4.

Discussion: In the past, company grade officers were not required to clear the Brigade S-4 office prior to being transferred out of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. In many cases, surveying officers returned to COMUS for reassignment without completing and returning the surveys to the brigade S-4. This caused many surveys to be lost or delayed for long periods of time.

Observation: All surveying officers must now clear the Brigade S-4 prior to being released. (Bde S-4)

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(4) Item: Excess Concrete on the job site.

Discussion: In many cases when ready mix concrete is used there is cement left over that isn't needed for the job. Excess cement should be dumped around the walls of culverts and in areas that have a tendency to wash out in the rainy season, or not on the ground around the job site.

Observation: Careful planning will prevent having excess concrete but a plan should always be made just in case there is some extra, then all concrete will be utilized for the best results. (175th E.)

(5) Item: Signal - Re-transmission sites.

Discussion: When establishing a re-transmission site which may only be reached by helicopter, there is a requirement for a DC generator, and sufficient fuel to operate the generator.

Observation: In the majority of cases two AN/PRC 25's with the re-transmission kit MX-456 should be used. This will eliminate the generator requirement, POL requirement and reduce the weight of equipment. The reduced weight will increase the capability to transport other supplies. (Edo Sig)

c. Civil Affairs

(1) Item: The reluctance of the Vietnamese to undertake totally self-help projects.

Discussion: The theme of self help in civic action activity is sound. The need for wide improvement in the basics of health, sanitation and improved methods is well known. The approach is to encourage people to accomplish projects for the good of the general public utilizing local resources. Projects of this nature must be preceded by local organization and cooperation. There is an inherent resistance to change in the nature of the Vietnamese. This is most difficult obstacle and requires maximum understanding and patience. Even needs which seem very obvious are often not considered propitious by the Vietnamese, mainly due to cultural influences. They are capable and do have resources to accomplish such basics as drainage and waste disposal.

Observation: Educational influence must be exerted to a great degree based on a thorough understanding of the people and proposed through frequent and intimate grass roots association.

(2) Item: The importance of insuring a future means of livelihood prior to sizeable involuntary local national relocations.

Discussion: There exist many examples of contrasting success and failure in relocation operations. It must be known, prior to relocation, that the new area is capable of sustaining life; that the

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area is available; and, that the people concerned are of a vocation suitable to productivity in the area. Too often, relocation occurs with the result being an additional burden to the GVN and for which it is not capable of providing. These circumstances combine to create another area fertile for VC encroachment and may constitute a problem of greater magnitude than that which was supposedly eliminated through relocation. Conversely there are those operations which have permitted immediate resumption of activities and the basis for further development.

Observation: Operations objectives must be closely scrutinized, planning must be thorough, GVN agencies must be in complete agreement and willing to properly support the operation. The advantages of obtaining objectives must be carefully compared to resultant disadvantages.

(3) Item: Discouraging association of the Vietnamese with U.S. military sponsored civil affairs activities.

Discussion: The underlying theme of U.S. military civic action in support of GVN Revolutionary Development is the eventual assumption and continuance of programs by the people. Projects such as MEDCAPS, the donation of necessity items and the sponsorship of orphanages are very worthwhile. However, many such projects terminate with the withdrawal of U.S. efforts. The condition then degenerates to its former undesirable status, efforts having been for naught.

Observation: Increased use of local inhabitants in all programs will lead the people to associate with the program. Starting on a small level, responsibility can be increased by degree, to the point where the people feel, and are in fact, totally responsible. Chances of sustaining such programs become increasingly better under these conditions.

(4) Item: Lack of Vietnamese boat control in 2-1 area.

Discussion: It is imperative that some means be employed to enforce some type of curfew of boats in the 2-1 area. The patrol boats (Boston Chasers) have proven inadequate, for maintaining overall control.

Observation: It has been learned that by supplementing the boat patrols with adequate loudspeaker broadcasts, the people receive the curfew enforcement instructions in mass. This is accomplished by the Armed Propaganda Team operating at a proximately 200 foot altitude in a UH-1D helicopter. This flyer mission can be lifted on with little or no advance notice, making it an immediate reaction capability. Bde- Psyops)

(5) Item: Appeals based on hardships of war and life in the jungle.

Discussion: Information gained from VC F.O.W.'s indicate that our appeals to Chieu Hoi based upon the hardships of war, life in the jungle and dying away from their loved ones is lacking in effectiveness. The same sources indicate that all of these things have now been accepted by the Viet Cong and should not influence their behavior to any degree, example, Chieu Hoi.

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Observation: By placing the psyops program on a more personalized basis, greater results can be expected. At present, individuals are being named on broadcasts, and leaflets. VC Units are receiving specific appeals. The result of such appeals, become apparent when Ngo Lo, a 17 year old VC guerilla rallied to 3/21 Inf of the 196th. No indicated that a direct appeal leaflet was responsible for his actions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Thomas M. Finnegan
THOMAS M. FINNEGAN
Lit, Inf
Asst Adjutant

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- 3 CG, 9th Inf Div, APO 96370
- 5 CG, Americal Div, ATTN: Historian, APO 96374
- 3 CG, 198th Lt Inf Bde, APO
- 3 CIIUSARPAC, ATTN: G-3, APO 96557

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AVDF-GC (10 Nov 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFCR-65)(U)

DA, HQ, Americal Division, APO San Francisco 96374 JAP/5 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) Forwarded herewith is the subject report of the 196th Light
Infantry Brigade.

2. (U) The following comments are considered pertinent to the
referenced paragraph of the basic communication.

a. Reference: Paragraphs 1b(7)(b), 1b(7)(c)4, 2b(6). When
referring to the use of CS-1, the term "restrict" should be used rather
than "deny."

b. Reference: Paragraph 1d(5), page 29. The term "permanent
building" is improperly used. The type construction referred to is
"temporary."

3. (U) This headquarters concurs with the observations and comments
contained in subject report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


KAZUTO KAWABATA
Capt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST (10 Nov 67) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967.
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 19 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 196th Light Infantry Brigade (FBEA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning the M-16 rifle, page 37, paragraph 2b(3): Concur. A muzzle cover has been developed and recently requisitioned. Use of a 30 cal. bore brush and electric drill is not required if the weapon is properly cleaned on a daily basis.

b. Reference item concerning fuzing of smoke rounds, page 41, paragraph 2b(13): Nonconcur. The M564 Fuze will not fit in the fuze well of the M84 series smoke rounds. The problem stated stems from TSQ M54 Fuze, with a 25 second delay, which is no longer being procured. The MTSQ M501 Series Fuze, with a 75 second delay is the current issue item. The 1st Logistical Command has been requested to issue an equitable mix where the TSQ M54 Fuze is the item issued.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


D. E. TUMAN
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

cy furn:
HQ, 196th Lt Inf Bde
HQ, Americal Div

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
GPOP-DT(10 Nov 67) (U) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October
1967 from HQ, 196th Lt Inf Bde (UIC: WFBEAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 30 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



HEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

