Battalion Operational Report:

Quarterly Report - Period Ending 30 Apr 67

HEADQUARTERS,
1ST BATTALION, 14TH INFANTRY
(GOLDEN DRAGONS)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

TO: Commanding Officer

3rd Bde TF, 25th Inf Div

APO SF 96355

SECTION I: Significant Organization or unit activities.

   1. General.

During the quarterly period 1 February to 15 April, the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations, village searches and ambushes in the Suoi Ca valley area and the southern portion of Phu My District, Binh Dinh Province.

These operations continued to deny the enemy access to the fertile rice bowl of the Phu My District. The enemy was unable to reorganize and cause any threat in that area. The presence of the battalion deterred the enemy from disrupting the R&D programs in the area.

   2. Intelligence.

a. During Operation Pershing this unit made frequent and regular contacts with elements of the 18th NVA Regiment. In addition, there was evidence indicating the presence of the following enemy units:

(1) 93d Bn 2d VC Regt - documents located in the Suoi Ca valley dated May 66.

(2) 91st Co 9th Bn 22 Regt - interrogation of Sgt Taun Van Thanh sqd leader 2d Sqd 1st Plt 91st Co 9th Bn 22d Regt.

(3) 2d Co 8th Bn 18th Regt - report from POW stating that the E2B VC Bn was operating with the 2d Co 8th Bn 18th Regt.

(4) 2d Co 50th Bn (E-2B) - Hoi Chanh Le Einh Lang member of this unit states that the Bn mission was to operate in the Phu Cat area.

(5) 3d Plt 2d Co 7th Bn 18th Regt - interrogation report of Mai Trong Binh a member of the above unit indicates its presence in the area of operation.

(6) 1st Co 97th Bn 2d VC Regt - captured documents following a contact with members of this unit indicate its presence in the area.

(7) 5001 Co 500 Inf Bn - NVA POW states that this new company was organized in mid-Aug 66 and infiltrated in Jan at Quang Ngai Province moving south to Binh Dinh.

(8) 124th Mortar Co 18th Regt - two separate interrogation reports indicate that this unit mortared LZ Crystal and were later ambushed by the 41st ARVN Regt.

(9) E-210 Bn - intelligence reports indicate that the E210 Bn was working with the NVA, probably resupplying the 7th Bn 18th Regt.

Intelligence reports indicate that the 18th Regiment's combat effectiveness had been seriously impaired during the previous month. A POW reported that he heard his political officer state that the "18th Regiment had been so badly beaten that it had been assigned to the Binh Dinh Province as guards. Another POW report indicates that the 7th Bn had a strength of 400 persons of which only 250 were combat effective. Documents captured 13 February confirmed a close association between the NVA and VC indicating the enemy's need to consolidate his efforts. An example of this is the report that the E-210 VC Bn was working with the NVA probably resupplying the 7th BN 18th Regt. Interrogation reports indicated that the morale of the VC/NVA units is low. Hai Chanh Le Einh Lang stated that more VC want to "Cheiu Hoi" but they don't trust the system. All Cheiu Hois apprehended during Operation Pershing indicated that conditions were poor and that the course of the war was not going smoothly for their units. In summary it would appear that the organizational structure and unit effectiveness of those elements located in the Luoi Ca and Phu My areas has been disrupted and that the units are split up and devoting their efforts toward sustaining and rebuilding themselves. Their units seek refuge in the mountains during the day traveling and seeking food during the night. There were isolated incidents of friendly units making contact during the daylight with small enemy units but the majority of the enemy were killed in the late afternoon and at night.

b. The primary target for enemy units in this area continues to be the abundant rice crops in the Suoi Ca valley and the coastal plains surrounding Phu My District. This unit successfully interdicted these two area denying much needed food to the enemy. by ambushing trails and continuously patrolling the mountains and valleys this unit was able to successfully block enemy transportation routes to their previously used markets. Many village sweeps were conducted to collect excess food stuffs and relocate VC family members and supporters, which resulted in further denial of subsistence to the enemy. POW's from the 18th NVA Regt stated that the morale is low because of hardships and lack of food and the denial of food from the Suoi Ca valley has seriously restricted the 18th Regt operations and forced them to go to either Nghia Dien or My Loc for food. Pfo No Ny Lop from the 124th Mortar Co also stated that his unit was forced to go to My Loc for food.

c. This unit captured a total of 33 weapons, several tons of rice and salt and one PRC/10 radio (which was set on the Bde frequency.)

d. During Operation Pershing the unit accounted for the following enemy casualties:

1. Enemy KIA - 77

2. Enemy CIA - 10

3. Enemy bodies found - 10

4. Enemy WIA - 4

   3. Operations and Training Activities.

a. Plans

(1) Current plans for the 1/14th are to continue search and destroy operations under OPCON to the 196th Light Infantry Brigade in the Chu Lai Area of Operations as part of TF Oregon.

(2) Another Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol course will be conducted to train replacement personnel for the present teams and possibly organize additional teams.

b. Operations:

(1) The 1-14th Inf participated in Operation Thayer II terminating on 12 Feb and Pershing commencing 13 February and continuing until the battalion was attached to the 196th Light Infantry Brigade on 15 April 67.

(2) On 26 March 67 the 41st ARVN Regt made contact with an estimated NVA Bn in Vinh Nhon. (1) Hamlet coord BR937613. The 1-14th was helilifted into the area of contact on 26 March 67. On 27 March the remainder of the Bn with C Co, 1-35th attached were employed in the Phu My District and Conducted a combined operation with the 41st ARVN Regt.

It was believed that the increased enemy activity in the Phu My District was an attempt to disrupt the R&D program in that area. Although there were no major enemy contacts in the Phu My District after the 1-14th was deployed, the operation was successful in that it forced the enemy to withdraw from the Phu My District. The 1-14 was given an AO in the southern Phu My District and continued S&D operations, village searches and ambushes in that AO until deployment to the Chu Lai area on 15 April. All village searches were conducted in conjunction with the Vietnamese National Police.

(3) During the reported period the 1-14th Inf was engaged in 89 consecutive days of tactical operations.

c. Training

(1) From 1 February thru 30 April the battalion was engaged in continuous tactical operations and no period was set aside for formal training. However each company conducted periodic standdowns during which training was conducted.

(2) Subjects stressed during training:

a. Map Reading.

b. Small Unit Tactics.

c. VC Tactics.

d. Care and cleaning of M16 rifle.

(3) During March three Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols were organized and trained. Six men per each rifle company were selected to attend a one week course conducted at the Bn CP. The course consisted of the following:

These LRRPs have proven to be very valuable in that each of the teams have several enemy kills, they have provided good surveillance over enemy routes of movement and also served as commo relay.

SECTION II: Chronology of Events:

13 Feb - Bn continued S&D in Suoi Ca valley. Neg results

14 Feb - A Co continued its security mission of LZ HAMMOND. B Co found one dead body believed to be killed by arty at coord 759648. B Co made contact with 4 VC. Results 2 VC KIA at coord 764649. C Co conducted ambushes in lower Suoi Ca valley.

15 Feb - 3/C/1-14 received sniper fire in vic LZ MONKEY. Arty and guns called with neg results.

16 Feb - A Co made contact with 2 VC at coord 776587. Results: 2 VC KIA.

17 Feb - A Co made contact with 2 VC at coord 797578. Results: 2 VC KIA, 1 carbine CIA. B Co made contact at LZ TIP with 1 VC; neg results. Recon Plt made contact with and killed NVA at coord 822584. The platoon set up an ambush at 829582 and killed 1 VC during the hours of darkness.

18 Feb - 3/A/1-14 made contact from ambush loc vic 786543. 3 enemy were seen and 1 enemy KIA. 1 carbine CIA.

19 Feb - A Co continued ambushes in the lower Suoi Ca valley. 1/A/1-14 made contact with 2 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA. 3/A/1-14 made contact with 8 VC. Results: 1 SKS CIA. B Co conducted S&D in the Kim Son valley area. 3/B/1-14 located a weapons cache at coord 750673, (1 bipod for 60mm Mortar, 1 BAR, 3 US carbines.) 3/C/1-14 found 1 dead VC believed to have been killed by arty.

20 Feb - 2/A/1-14 made contact with 3 VC. Results: 3 VC KIA, 1 AK47 and 1 SMG CIA. At coord 805592 C Co started destruction of a large bunker complex which consisted of approximately 500 bunkers. LT COL Miller captured 1 VC with a carbine at coord 814588.

21 Feb - 2/A/1-14 made contact with 4 NVA at coord 801584. Results: 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK47 CIA.

22 Feb - 1/A/1-14 spotted 1 man outside of perimeter. Took him under fire with neg results. 1/A/1-14 made contact with 2 VC at coord 806595. Neg results. 3/A/1-14 made contact with 1 VC at coord 808575. Neg results. 3/B/1-14 made contact with 2 VC at coord 753681. Results: 2 VC KIA. 3/C/1-14 made contact with 4 VC at LZ AA and killed 2.

23 Feb - 1/A/1-14 found 1 dead body and weapon (1 SKS.) A Co located the 2 pilots that had crashed their L19 and evacuated them. 2/B/1-14 received sniper fire conducting a CA into a LZ at coord 682719; neg results. 3/B/1-14 found some equipment vic coord 692705; (1 MG spring, 1 air mattress, 10 lbs of rice, all destroyed.) 3/B/1-14 spotted 6 NVA at coord 692705, engaged them with SA fire. Swept area with neg results.

24 Feb - 2/A/1-14 made contact with 1 VC at coord 819759; neg results. 3/B/1-14 located a field of punji stakes at coord 688704, destroyed same.

26 Feb - b/1-14 made contact with 4-6 VC at coord 705765. Results: 2 VC KIA. 3/B/1-14 made contact with 5 VC at coord 703761. Results: 5 VC KIA, 1 chicom weapon and 16 chicom grenades CIA. 2/C/1-14 made contact with 3 enemy at coord 808574. Results: 1 VC KIA, 1 AK47 and 2 magazines of ammo CIA.

28 Feb - 1/B/1-14 made contact with 4-6 enemy at coord 691781. Results: 2 VC KIA. 3/B/1-14 made contact with 1 VC at coord 653777. Results: 1 VC KIA.

1-4 Mar - 2/A/1-14 made contact at coord 806596 with 1 VC. Results: 1 VC WIA/CIA. B/1-14 captured 1 VC. A Co made contact with 3 VC at coord 828583. Results: 1 carbine and 2 chicom grenades CIA. 2/C/1-14 made contact with 8 VC; neg results. Scty/1-14 captured 2 VC, 1 male and 1 female at coord 870603.

13-16 Mar - Recon made contact with 2 VC, one wearing a black jacket, swept area with neg results. Blue team found 200 lbs of rice.

17-20 Mar - 3/B/1-14 spotted a VC in a tree at coord 775604, called in arty with neg results. LRRP found 5--- lbs of salt at coord 797688. B/1-14 located a body approximately 2 weeks old killed by arty fire at coord 784606. C/1-14 received sniper fire at coord 803572 and located 2 dead VC killed by arty fire. 1/A/1-14 received sniper fire at coord 727644, searched area with neg results.

21-24 Mar - Assault Plt received sniper fire at coord 850638, neg results. 2&3/B/1-14 made contact with 3 VC at coord 857704. Results: 1 weapon CIA and 2 VC CIA. Command Group spotted 2 VC vic LZ ILLINI. Results; 2 VC CIA and 1 carbine CIA.

25-28 Mar - B/1-14 received fire from coord 863597 and called arty fire. Results: 3 VC KIA, 5 grenades CIA. 3/A/1-14 made contact with 5 enemy at coord 814584; neg results. 3/A/1-14 made contact enroute to an ambush site with 5 enemy. Results: 1 VC KIA and 1 M-1 and pack CIA. Co B conducted a CA vic 955665 and received heavy AW fire on insertion, neg casualties. D/1-12 (OPCON to the Bn) found 2200 lbs of rice at coord 888600.

29-31 Mar - 1/A/1-14 made contact with 7 VC at coord 8235605. Results: 3 VC KIA. 2/A/1-14 located 200 lbs of rice vic coord 807608. Assault Plt made contact with 7 VC at coord 938598. Results: 7 VC KIA and 5 weapons CIA. B Co received sniper fire from village loc 937613 and detained 1 VCS.

1-4 Apr - Recon made contact with 3 VC at coord 970631. Results: 2 VC KIA and 1 VC CIA/WIA. They also found a commo trench 4 ft wide, 5 ft deep and 400 ft long used in last 2-3 months. B/1-14 detained 10 VCS at coord 933587, all of whom were evacuated to sector. B/1-14 LRRP at coord 955614 spotted 3 VC and engaged with SA fire. Results: 2 VC KIA. Assault Plt made contact with 1 enemy; results 1 enemy KIA. B/1-14 made contact with 1 VC; results 1 VC KIA. 2/A/1-14 observed 4 enemy with weapons. Results: 2 VC KIA and 1 cook stove and 1 flashlight CIA. C/1-14 detained 4 VCS at coord 822644. Rcn located about 30 packs coord 968641 and numerous items (magazines, clothing, misc documents which indicated 8th Bn 18th Regt, 8 grenades, 100rds.30 cal ammo and medical equipment.) A Co LRRP made contact with 2 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA and 2 chicom grenades CIA.

5-8 Apr - 3/A/1-14 received sniper fire from village loc 873632, arty called with neg results. 1/A/1-14 spotted 1 NVA, engaged with SA. Results: 1 NVA KIA. C/1-14 detained 14 VCS at coord 951619, all of whom were evacuated to sector. The Bn S2 detained 5 VCS 1 mile south of LZ CRYSTAL and captured 1 carbine. C/1-14 detained 13 more VCS. C/1-14 found 350 lbs of rice at coord 965625, and evacuated same to sector. C/1-14 captured 1 VC, 600 lbs of rice, 50 lbs potatoes and 10 lbs tobacco. They also detained 19 VCS in the same area. B/1-14 detained 28 VCS and evacuated them to sector. They also located 1000 lbs of rice.

9-12 Apr - A/1-14 LRRP made contact with 2 VC at coord 785595. Results: 1 enemy KIA. C/1-14 detained 15-20 VCS and found 5000 lbs of rice at coord 941601 all evacuated to sector. C/1-14 found 2 VCS dead about a week at coord 940607. 3/A/1-14 found 2 bodies both dressed in black PJ's rolled up in a poncho at coord 785606. C/1-14 made contact with 3 VC at coord 950625. Results: 1 VC KIA.

13-15 Apr - C/1-14 detained 1 VCS. 3/B/1-14 located 4 tin huts at coord 825634 along with 1000 lbs of rice and 1000 lbs of bond paper, destroyed same. 2/B/1-14 at coord 825625 found a PRC/10 radio on 43.00 (bde organic freq) evacuated same to bde. Assault Plt detained 9 VCS, all evacuated to sector. The Bn moved from LZ TIP to LZ HAMMOND and conducted a motor march to Qui Nhon. The Bn was airlifted to the Chu Lai AO by C-130.

17-20 Apr - A Co moved out of LZ SAND and conducted operations to the west with neg results. B Co conducted S&D to the south. At loc 515935 they received 10 rds AW sniper fire. Swept the area with neg results. At loc 524939 the point man of 2/B/1-14 stepped on a mine. C Co conducted local patrols with neg results.

21-24 Apr - A Co closed LZ SAND. Co B continued S&D to the south at vic 465943. B Co received 5-10 rds sniper fire. Arty was called in and B Co made contact with 4 VC. Results: 4 VC KIA and 2 weapons CIA. At loc 432968 B Co found 7 huts use recently. At 445950 B/1-14 had a man step on a mine. 1/B/1-14 received 3 rds of sniper at loc 468935, swept area with neg results. C Co conducted S&D to the southwest with Ren attached. They received sniper fire from vic 470940. Ren returned fire and swept the area. Results: 2 VC KIA, 1 weapon CIA and assorted documents & clothing CIA.

25-27 Apr - Co A conducted local patrols around Bn CP vic 538023. Co C continued S&D and returned to the Bn CP.

28-30 Apr - The Bn moved to Hill 35 and relieved the 3-5 Marine of their responsibility for defense of that area. At vic 642688 1/B/1-14 received 10 rds sniper fire, returned 25 rds M16. Results: 1 VC KIA and 2 chicom grenades CIA, destroyed same. Co C conducted local patrols with neg results.

* Fireball Operation - On 28 April 1967 Co B 1-14 and B Btry 2/9 Arty were airlifted to a Special Forces camp located at Ha Thanh coord BS388698 to conduct a "Fireball Operation". The purpose of this operation was to demonstrate a show of force to the enemy forces in that area. Both the District Chief and the American advisor welcomed this force, for it was the first time that close support artillery had been employed in that area. During the duration of the operation (28 Apr - 5 May) a total of 64 enemy were killed by actual body count, and 120 more were estimated KIA. The greatest majority of these kills resulted from artillery fire.

SECTION III: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. ITEM: Enemy Snipers.

DISCUSSION: It has been found that the VC employ snipers and booby traps concurrently. Personnel attempting to maneuver against a sniper(s) have encountered booby traps a/o mines along trails, cuts in hedgerows and rice paddy dikes.

OBSERVATION: When maneuvering against sniper fire keep maneuver elements off of trails and obvious approaches into the area from which the fire is emanating.

b. ITEM: Field expedient night vision aide.

DISCUSSION: Quite often night operations require aids to assist the leader in maintaining control. At times illumination, reflectors and other man made items are not available.

OBSERVATION: Decaying bamboo has proven to contain a luminous substance. A small piece of this material placed on the back of a helmet assists in maintaining control during hours of darkness.

c. ITEM: Maneuvering while taking part in search & destroy.

DISCUSSION: The guerilla enemy very seldom stands & fights. In most instances he attempts to avoid contact by moving to one flank or the other. He also will follow a searching unit in order to avoid being discovered.

OBSERVATION: Frequent changes in direction to include doubling back has quite often enabled friendly units to engage enemy who would have normally been by-passed.

d. ITEM: Sling loading of miscellaneous equipment.

DISCUSSION: When displacing Battalion/Company forward fire bases it is often necessary to transport much equipment which cannot be carried in a rifleman's pack. Mortars, medical supplies, commo equipment and heavy ammunition become a hindrance when these items must be internally loaded on any type of aircraft. In these instances much time and energy is expended unnecessarily.

OBSERVATION: The use of a general purpose sling greatly enhances the transporting of miscellaneous equipment. This method saves time and energy normally spent in loading an aircraft, enables the aircraft to carry additional payloads and cuts down turn around time. Each unit should have available GP slings for use in building external leads.

William H Miller
LTC, INF           
Commanding   

Our special thanks to Cpt. Mark Morris, former 1967 Bn Artillery LNO to 1/14th Infantry, for supplying the 1967 Bn Operational Reports. This is the first of many to be transcribed and posted.

OPERATIONAL REPORTS: 1967 TIMELINE 1967